http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2005-002-kdc.txt The MIT krb5 Key Distribution Center (KDC) implementation can corrupt the heap by attempting to free memory at a random address when it receives a certain unlikely (but valid) request via a TCP connection. This attempt to free unallocated memory can result in a KDC crash and consequent denial of service. [CAN-2005-1174, VU#259798] Additionally, the same request, when received by the KDC via either TCP or UDP, can trigger a bug in the krb5 library which results in a single-byte overflow of a heap buffer. Application servers are vulnerable to a highly improbable attack, provided that the attacker controls a realm sharing a cross-realm key with the target realm. [CAN-2005-1175, VU#885830] An unauthenticated attacker may be able to use these vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code on the KDC host, potentially compromising an entire Kerberos realm. No exploit code is known to exist at this time. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities is believed to be difficult. ================================================================== http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/MITKRB5-SA-2005-003-recvauth.txt The krb5_recvauth() function can free previously freed memory under some error conditions. This vulnerability may allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code. Exploitation of this vulnerability on a Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) host can result in compromise of an entire Kerberos realm. No exploit code is known to exist at this time. Exploitation of double-free vulnerabilities is believed to be difficult. [CAN-2005-1689, VU#623332]
Waiting for the ebuild to appear in Portage
GLSA 200507-11 Thx everyone