From $URL: ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= Virtual interrupt injection could be triggered by a guest when sending an SGI (e.g IPI) to any vCPU or by configuring timers. When the virtual interrupt is masked, a missing check in the injection path may result in reading invalid hardware register or crashing the host. IMPACT ====== A guest may cause a hypervisor crash, resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS). VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== All Xen versions which support ARM are affected. x86 systems are not affected. MITIGATION ========== On systems where the guest kernel is controlled by the host rather than guest administrator, running only kernels which do not disable SGI and PPI (i.e IRQ < 32) will prevent untrusted guest users from exploiting this issue. However untrusted guest administrators can still trigger it unless further steps are taken to prevent them from loading code into the kernel (e.g by disabling loadable modules etc) or from using other mechanisms which allow them to run code at kernel privilege. CREDITS ======= This issue was discovered by Julien Grall of ARM. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the attached patch resolves this issue. xsa223.patch xen-unstable, Xen 4.8.x, Xen 4.7.x, Xen 4.6.x, Xen 4.5.x $ sha256sum xsa223* b5c8d8e8dac027069bec7dd812cff3f6f99e5949dd4a8ee729255c38274958b1 xsa223.patch $ DEPLOYMENT DURING EMBARGO ========================= Deployment of the patches and/or mitigations described above (or others which are substantially similar) is permitted during the embargo, even on public-facing systems with untrusted guest users and administrators. But: Distribution of updated software is prohibited (except to other members of the predisclosure list). Predisclosure list members who wish to deploy significantly different patches and/or mitigations, please contact the Xen Project Security Team. (Note: this during-embargo deployment notice is retained in post-embargo publicly released Xen Project advisories, even though it is then no longer applicable. This is to enable the community to have oversight of the Xen Project Security Team's decisionmaking.)
commit 7a8fc554850ee501e1ad705b4154874adf102947 Author: Yixun Lan <dlan@gentoo.org> Date: Wed Jul 12 15:15:52 2017 +0800 app-emulation/xen: security bump fix XSA-217,218,219,220,221,222,223,224,225 Gentoo-Bug: 624112,624114,624116,624118,624120,624122,624124,624126,624130 Package-Manager: Portage-2.3.6, Repoman-2.3.2 :100644 100644 6534404116c... 49df2654a33... M app-emulation/xen/Manifest :000000 100644 00000000000... f66bd1b70f8... A app-emulation/xen/xen-4.7.3.ebuild :000000 100644 00000000000... bf73951bc39... A app-emulation/xen/xen-4.8.1-r2.ebuild
Thank you Yixun Lan Arches please let us know when all is stable
Re-Categorized since affects only arm. Even though non stable is not in GLSA, including since we have a GLSA pending. Maintainer(s), please drop the vulnerable version(s).