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Bug 588652 (CVE-2016-6170) - <net-dns/bind-9.10.4_p3: Malicious primary DNS servers can crash secondaries (CVE-2016-6170)
Summary: <net-dns/bind-9.10.4_p3: Malicious primary DNS servers can crash secondaries ...
Alias: CVE-2016-6170
Product: Gentoo Security
Classification: Unclassified
Component: Vulnerabilities (show other bugs)
Hardware: All Linux
: Normal minor (vote)
Assignee: Gentoo Security
Whiteboard: B3 [glsa cve]
Depends on:
Reported: 2016-07-12 08:36 UTC by Agostino Sarubbo
Modified: 2016-10-11 18:55 UTC (History)
1 user (show)

See Also:
Package list:
Runtime testing required: ---


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Description Agostino Sarubbo gentoo-dev 2016-07-12 08:36:43 UTC
From ${URL} :

It turns out that most DNS server implementations do not implement 
reasonable restrictions for zone sizes.  This allows an explicitly 
configured primary DNS server for a zone to crash a secondary DNS 
server, affecting service of other zones hosted on the same secondary 

Some references:

PowerDNS is reportedly affected as well, but I did not find a public bug 
for this issue.

@maintainer(s): after the bump, in case we need to stabilize the package, please let us know if it is ready for the stabilization or not.
Comment 1 Christian Ruppert (idl0r) gentoo-dev 2016-07-14 19:47:24 UTC
Comment 2 GLSAMaker/CVETool Bot gentoo-dev 2016-07-16 08:53:10 UTC
CVE-2016-6170 (
  ISC BIND through 9.9.9-P1, 9.10.x through 9.10.4-P1, and 9.11.x through
  9.11.0b1 allows primary DNS servers to cause a denial of service (secondary
  DNS server crash) via a large AXFR response, and possibly allows IXFR
  servers to cause a denial of service (IXFR client crash) via a large IXFR
  response and allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service
  (primary DNS server crash) via a large UPDATE message.
Comment 3 Aaron Bauman (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2016-07-16 09:06:02 UTC
(In reply to Christian Ruppert (idl0r) from comment #1)

Given ISC's review of the matter, it would probably be best that we address this with a GLSA discussing the workaround for administrators.  This is an inherent flaw within the protocol specifications, but of course can be administratively controlled through the implementation.  ISC is going to offer that solution soon and PowerDNS already has patches proposed.
Comment 4 GLSAMaker/CVETool Bot gentoo-dev 2016-10-11 18:55:40 UTC
This issue was resolved and addressed in
 GLSA 201610-07 at
by GLSA coordinator Kristian Fiskerstrand (K_F).