Transport Layer Security (TLS, RFC 5246 and previous, including SSL v3 and previous) is subject to a number of serious man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks related to renegotiation. In general, these problems allow an MITM to inject an arbitrary amount of chosen plaintext into the beginning of the application protocol stream, leading to a variety of abuse possibilities. In particular, practical attacks against HTTPS client certificate authentication have been demonstrated against recent versions of both Microsoft IIS and Apache httpd on a variety of platforms and in conjunction with a variety of client applications. Cases not involving client certificates have been demonstrated as well. Although this research has focused on the implications specifically for HTTP as the application protocol, the research is ongoing and many of these attacks are expected to generalize well to other protocols layered on TLS.
Discovered by Marsh Ray of PhoneFactor and independently by Martin Rex with SAP.
The TLS protocol, and the SSL protocol 3.0 and possibly earlier, as
used in Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS) 7.0, mod_ssl in
the Apache HTTP Server 2.2.14 and earlier, OpenSSL before 0.9.8l,
GnuTLS 2.8.5 and earlier, Mozilla Network Security Services (NSS)
3.12.4 and earlier, and other products, does not properly associate
renegotiation handshakes with an existing connection, which allows
man-in-the-middle attackers to insert data into HTTPS sessions, and
possibly other types of sessions protected by TLS or SSL, by sending
an unauthenticated request that is processed retroactively by a
server in a post-renegotiation context, related to a "plaintext
injection" attack, aka the "Project Mogul" issue.
All open bugs blocking this are in [glsa] status.
All dependent bugs have been closed.