There's an exploitable buffer overflow in the current version of
MPlayer (v1.0rc1) which can be exploited with a maliciously crafted
video file. It's hidden in the function DMO_VideoDecoder() in the
file loader/dmo/DMO_VideoDecoder.c. The variable format->biSize gets
its value directly from the video file, and thus can have any value
up to LONG_MAX. In line 136 it is used without any further checks as
the length argument to the memcpy() call, which can overflow the
this->m_sVhdr->bmiHeader buffer with data directly from the video file.
117 unsigned int bihs;
119 bihs = (format->biSize < (int) sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER)) ?
120 sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER) : format->biSize;
122 this->iv.m_bh = malloc(bihs);
123 memcpy(this->iv.m_bh, format, bihs);
125 this->iv.m_State = STOP;
126 //this->iv.m_pFrame = 0;
127 this->iv.m_Mode = DIRECT;
128 this->iv.m_iDecpos = 0;
129 this->iv.m_iPlaypos = -1;
130 this->iv.m_fQuality = 0.0f;
131 this->iv.m_bCapable16b = true;
133 bihs += sizeof(VIDEOINFOHEADER) - sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
134 this->m_sVhdr = malloc(bihs);
135 memset(this->m_sVhdr, 0, bihs);
136 memcpy(&this->m_sVhdr->bmiHeader, this->iv.m_bh, this->iv.m_bh->biSize);
This got fixed  in trunk two weeks ago.
Reproducible: Didn't try
"This got fixed  in trunk two weeks ago."
If anyone wants to find the patch, that'd be great.
this looks like the patch:
I'm thinking about adding a snapshot of ffmpeg and mplayer in the weekend
i doubt this whole thing.
line 134 allocates memory based upon the value in bihs. due to line 119 and 120, this value should be ok (actually, a bit larger than format->biSize due to line 134). i see no way how format->biSize can be larger than the allocated memory.
According to http://secunia.com/advisories/24444/, this bug is now fixed in the SVN repository (CVE-2007-1246)
Luca or video-team any news on this?
(In reply to comment #6)
> Luca or video-team any news on this?
its a work in progress
Is it just me or is this a dupe of #170208
(In reply to comment #8)
> Is it just me or is this a dupe of #170208
Same origin, but mplayer is still vulnerable. Video team, is your work going well?
Media-video any news on this one?
Finally fixed the naming scheme, mplayer-1.0.20070321 is our security fix.
Arches please test and mark stable. Target keywords are:
mplayer-1.0.20070321.ebuild:KEYWORDS="alpha amd64 hppa ia64 ppc ppc64 sparc x86 ~x86-fbsd"
ia64 + x86 stable
26 Apr 2007; Steve Dibb <email@example.com> mplayer-1.0.20070321.ebuild:
Stable on Alpha.
Stable for HPPA.
200705-21 is out, thansk everybody