There is a security vulnerability in bluez-utils 2.16 through 2.18 (I only tested 2.18, but the CVS logs indicate that the problem exists at least since 2.16) which allows for remote command execution (over the air) with root privileges and bypassing of the Bluetooth PIN. The vulnerability occurs when the pin helper is called and thus exists only when "security user" is set in hcid.conf (which is the default in Gentoo Linux, but not in the upstream package). The attacker also needs to get his device name into the device name cache and I'm not sure how to do this in general so it might be harder to exploit in a default installation. However, upstream has released a fixed bluez-utils-2.19 (which also needs bluez-libs-2.19, unfortunately) and I think Gentoo include this version ASAP. Should this not be possible then at least the existing version ought to be patched. The difference between the vulnerable and the non-vulnerable version is: http://cvs.sourceforge.net/viewcvs.py/bluez/utils/hcid/security.c?r1=1.31&r2=1.34 Reproducible: Always Steps to Reproduce:
liquidx or mobile/pda herds: please apply patch or bump to 2.19
liquidx: are you around to handle this? If I do not hear from you by tomorrow, I will handle the bump so we can get it marked stable on all affected archs.
I have added net-wireless/bluez-libs-2.19 and net-wireless/bluez-utils-2.19, which address the issue of this bug report. I will mark them stable on x86 tomorrow if no additional bug reports tick in. Other archs: please follow.
I asked for a CAN number to MITRE.
Stable on x86.
ppc stable
====================================================== Candidate: CAN-2005-2547 URL: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-2547 Reference: MLIST:[bluez-devel] 20050804 Possible security vulnerability in hcid when calling pin helper Reference: URL:http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?thread_id=7893206&forum_id=1881 Reference: CONFIRM:https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101557 Reference: CONFIRM:http://cvs.sourceforge.net/viewcvs.py/bluez/utils/hcid/security.c?r1=1.31&r2=1.34 security.c in hcid for BlueZ 2.18 and earlier allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the Bluetooth device name when invoking the PIN helper.
amd64 stable
What about hppa?
You're right, we missed hppa. hppa, sparc : please test and mark stable.
Stable on hppa.
sparc please test and mark stable ASAP, thx.
sparc stable. didn't get the chance to properly test it, but it should be fine, hopefully i'll get the bt kit by this weekend, play with it and leave it be or mask it.
GLSA 200508-09