CVE-2022-23649 Cosign provides container signing, verification, and storage in an OCI registry for the sigstore project. Prior to version 1.5.2, Cosign can be manipulated to claim that an entry for a signature exists in the Rekor transparency log even if it doesn't. This requires the attacker to have pull and push permissions for the signature in OCI. This can happen with both standard signing with a keypair and "keyless signing" with Fulcio. If an attacker has access to the signature in OCI, they can manipulate cosign into believing the entry was stored in Rekor even though it wasn't. The vulnerability has been patched in v1.5.2 of Cosign. The `signature` in the `signedEntryTimestamp` provided by Rekor is now compared to the `signature` that is being verified. If these don't match, then an error is returned. If a valid bundle is copied to a different signature, verification should fail. Cosign output now only informs the user that certificates were verified if a certificate was in fact verified. There is currently no known workaround. Patch: https://github.com/sigstore/cosign/commit/96d410a6580e4e81d24d112a0855c70ca3fb5b49 Fix in 1.5.2, please bump.
The bug has been referenced in the following commit(s): https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=3b46724a67c7b5eb095e2a20203a96a6e0a35a6e commit 3b46724a67c7b5eb095e2a20203a96a6e0a35a6e Author: William Hubbs <williamh@gentoo.org> AuthorDate: 2022-02-19 20:49:06 +0000 Commit: William Hubbs <williamh@gentoo.org> CommitDate: 2022-02-19 20:50:50 +0000 app-containers/cosign: 1.5.2 bump Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/833749 Package-Manager: Portage-3.0.30, Repoman-3.0.3 Signed-off-by: William Hubbs <williamh@gentoo.org> app-containers/cosign/Manifest | 2 ++ app-containers/cosign/cosign-1.5.2.ebuild | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+)
Thanks, all done!
