MinIO is a multi-cloud object storage solution. Starting with version RELEASE.2019-09-25T18-25-51Z and ending with version RELEASE.2022-06-02T02-11-04Z, MinIO is vulnerable to an unending go-routine buildup while keeping connections established due to HTTP clients not closing the connections. Public-facing MinIO deployments are most affected. Users should upgrade to RELEASE.2022-06-02T02-11-04Z to receive a patch. One possible workaround is to use a reverse proxy to limit the number of connections being attempted in front of MinIO, and actively rejecting connections from such malicious clients.
There seems to be exploit code available: https://gist.github.com/harshavardhana/2d00e6f909054d2d2524c71485ad02e1
Needs bump to RELEASE.2022-06-02T02-11-04Z.
*** Bug 830137 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
MinIO is a Kubernetes native application for cloud storage. Prior to version `RELEASE.2021-12-27T07-23-18Z`, a malicious client can hand-craft an HTTP API call that allows for updating policy for a user and gaining higher privileges. The patch in version `RELEASE.2021-12-27T07-23-18Z` changes the accepted request body type and removes the ability to apply policy changes through this API. There is a workaround for this vulnerability: Changing passwords can be disabled by adding an explicit `Deny` rule to disable the API for users.
MinIO is a High Performance Object Storage released under GNU Affero General Public License v3.0. In affected versions all 'admin' users authorized for `admin:ServerUpdate` can selectively trigger an error that in response, returns the content of the path requested. Any normal OS system would allow access to contents at any arbitrary paths that are readable by MinIO process. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may disable ServerUpdate API by denying the `admin:ServerUpdate` action for your admin users via IAM policies.