CVE-2021-21309: Redis is an open-source, in-memory database that persists on disk. In affected versions of Redis an integer overflow bug in 32-bit Redis version 4.0 or newer could be exploited to corrupt the heap and potentially result with remote code execution. Redis 4.0 or newer uses a configurable limit for the maximum supported bulk input size. By default, it is 512MB which is a safe value for all platforms. If the limit is significantly increased, receiving a large request from a client may trigger several integer overflow scenarios, which would result with buffer overflow and heap corruption. We believe this could in certain conditions be exploited for remote code execution. By default, authenticated Redis users have access to all configuration parameters and can therefore use the “CONFIG SET proto-max-bulk-len” to change the safe default, making the system vulnerable. **This problem only affects 32-bit Redis (on a 32-bit system, or as a 32-bit executable running on a 64-bit system).** The problem is fixed in version 6.2, and the fix is back ported to 6.0.11 and 5.0.11. Make sure you use one of these versions if you are running 32-bit Redis. An additional workaround to mitigate the problem without patching the redis-server executable is to prevent clients from directly executing `CONFIG SET`: Using Redis 6.0 or newer, ACL configuration can be used to block the command. Using older versions, the `rename-command` configuration directive can be used to rename the command to a random string unknown to users, rendering it inaccessible. Please note that this workaround may have an additional impact on users or operational systems that expect `CONFIG SET` to behave in certain ways. Patch: https://github.com/redis/redis/commit/c992857618db99776917f10bf4f2345a5fdc78b0 Please bump to 6.0.11 and 5.0.11.
The bug has been referenced in the following commit(s): https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=30020b89b5e0d6ef497ab8983103eec7281abc95 commit 30020b89b5e0d6ef497ab8983103eec7281abc95 Author: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> AuthorDate: 2021-03-04 04:18:30 +0000 Commit: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> CommitDate: 2021-03-04 04:19:35 +0000 dev-db/redis: security version bump to 5.0.12 Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/773328 Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> dev-db/redis/Manifest | 1 + dev-db/redis/redis-5.0.12.ebuild | 162 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 163 insertions(+) https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=2acd97bfc1f3fae1d6f0b82a02614ff1ed72403d commit 2acd97bfc1f3fae1d6f0b82a02614ff1ed72403d Author: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> AuthorDate: 2021-03-04 04:16:43 +0000 Commit: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> CommitDate: 2021-03-04 04:19:34 +0000 dev-db/redis: security bump to 6.0.12 Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/773328 Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> dev-db/redis/Manifest | 1 + dev-db/redis/files/redis-6.0.12-sharedlua.patch | 60 ++++++++ dev-db/redis/redis-6.0.12.ebuild | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 245 insertions(+)
Sanity check failed: > dev-db/redis-6.0.12 > depend arm stable profile default/linux/arm/17.0 (10 total) > dev-tcltk/tls > depend arm dev profile default/linux/arm/17.0/armv4 (35 total) > dev-tcltk/tls
@Tomáš, let me know when you had a chance to test this.
@Sam, just installed 6.0.12 on some testing machines, let's try to stabilize next week.
(In reply to Tomáš Mózes from comment #4) > @Sam, just installed 6.0.12 on some testing machines, let's try to stabilize > next week. +1
So far no issues with 6.0.12 on amd64, feel free to call stabilization.
(In reply to Tomáš Mózes from comment #6) > So far no issues with 6.0.12 on amd64, feel free to call stabilization. Thank you!
amd64 stable
ppc64 done
ppc done
x86 stable
arm64 done
arm done all arches done
Resetting sanity check; keywords are not fully specified and arches are not CC-ed.
Please cleanup
The bug has been referenced in the following commit(s): https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=9deb0bf5a36359f9c7864e3c2625f203e6e26738 commit 9deb0bf5a36359f9c7864e3c2625f203e6e26738 Author: Thomas Deutschmann <whissi@gentoo.org> AuthorDate: 2021-03-31 11:54:02 +0000 Commit: Thomas Deutschmann <whissi@gentoo.org> CommitDate: 2021-03-31 11:54:02 +0000 dev-db/redis: security cleanup Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/773328 Package-Manager: Portage-3.0.18, Repoman-3.0.3 Signed-off-by: Thomas Deutschmann <whissi@gentoo.org> dev-db/redis/Manifest | 2 - dev-db/redis/redis-5.0.9-r1.ebuild | 162 ---------------------------------- dev-db/redis/redis-6.0.9-r100.ebuild | 164 ----------------------------------- 3 files changed, 328 deletions(-)
New GLSA request filed.
The bug has been referenced in the following commit(s): https://gitweb.gentoo.org/repo/gentoo.git/commit/?id=7486aa16a7b0f330f7b6fdbe2284a53dbf4c0446 commit 7486aa16a7b0f330f7b6fdbe2284a53dbf4c0446 Author: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> AuthorDate: 2021-06-11 01:10:35 +0000 Commit: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> CommitDate: 2021-06-11 01:10:51 +0000 dev-db/redis: drop 6.0.12, 6.0.13-r1, 6.2.1, 6.2.3-r1 Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/773328 Bug: https://bugs.gentoo.org/788211 Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org> dev-db/redis/Manifest | 4 - dev-db/redis/redis-6.0.12.ebuild | 184 ----------------------------------- dev-db/redis/redis-6.0.13-r1.ebuild | 187 ------------------------------------ dev-db/redis/redis-6.2.1.ebuild | 184 ----------------------------------- dev-db/redis/redis-6.2.3-r1.ebuild | 187 ------------------------------------ 5 files changed, 746 deletions(-)
Oh, this was already GLSAed as https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202103-02. Tree is clean.
