Bug 358877 – <app-emulation/libvirt-0.8.8-r1: Server DoS w/read-only connection (CVE-2011-1146)

• Status: RESOLVED FIXED
• Product: Gentoo Security

[Description Alex Legler (RETIRED) 2011-03-14 14:10:22 UTC]

From https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=683650:
It has been found that several libvirt API calls (virNodeDeviceDettach,
virNodeDeviceReset, virDomainRevertToSnapshot, virDomainSnapshotDelete) did not
honour read-only connection. Remote attacker could use this flaw to crash the
host server (DoS).

Patch (applied upstream): see $URL

[Comment 1 Diego Elio Pettenò (RETIRED) 2011-03-14 14:31:48 UTC]

0.8.8-r1 in tree.

[Comment 2 Tim Sammut (RETIRED) 2011-03-15 04:00:53 UTC]

(In reply to comment #1)
> 0.8.8-r1 in tree.

Thank you.

Arches, please test and mark stable:
=app-emulation/libvirt-0.8.8-r1
Target keywords : "amd64 x86"

[Comment 3 Agostino Sarubbo 2011-03-15 12:29:48 UTC]

amd64 ok

[Comment 4 Markos Chandras (RETIRED) 2011-03-15 15:19:58 UTC]

amd64 done. Thanks Agostino

[Comment 5 Thomas Kahle (RETIRED) 2011-03-17 23:23:36 UTC]

x86 stable.

[Comment 6 Tim Sammut (RETIRED) 2011-03-19 22:36:42 UTC]

Thanks, folks.

GLSA Vote: yes.

[Comment 7 Stefan Behte (RETIRED) 2011-03-29 20:01:40 UTC]

Yes, too.

GLSA request filed.

[Comment 8 GLSAMaker/CVETool Bot 2011-06-24 00:27:00 UTC]

CVE-2011-1146 (http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2011-1146):
  libvirt.c in the API in Red Hat libvirt 0.8.8 does not properly restrict
  operations in a read-only connection, which allows remote attackers to cause
  a denial of service (host OS crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a
  (1) virNodeDeviceDettach, (2) virNodeDeviceReset, (3)
  virDomainRevertToSnapshot, (4) virDomainSnapshotDelete, (5)
  virNodeDeviceReAttach, or (6) virConnectDomainXMLToNative call, a different
  vulnerability than CVE-2008-5086.

[Comment 9 Doug Goldstein (RETIRED) 2012-02-09 19:25:52 UTC]

Affected versions are no longer in tree.

[Comment 10 GLSAMaker/CVETool Bot 2012-02-27 22:32:49 UTC]

This issue was resolved and addressed in
 GLSA 201202-07 at http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201202-07.xml
by GLSA coordinator Stefan Behte (craig).