Spotted in the 2.6.30.4 ChangeLog: commit 4df9205138cd0c610b52eefe1ecdafdaf65cfb12 Author: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Date: Tue Jul 28 13:57:01 2009 -0500 eCryptfs: Check Tag 11 literal data buffer size (CVE-2009-2406) commit 6352a29305373ae6196491e6d4669f301e26492e upstream. Tag 11 packets are stored in the metadata section of an eCryptfs file to store the key signature(s) used to encrypt the file encryption key. After extracting the packet length field to determine the key signature length, a check is not performed to see if the length would exceed the key signature buffer size that was passed into parse_tag_11_packet(). Thanks to Ramon de Carvalho Valle for finding this bug using fsfuzzer. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CVE-2009-2406 (http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2009-2406): Stack-based buffer overflow in the parse_tag_11_packet function in fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c in the eCryptfs subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.30.4 allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges via vectors involving a crafted eCryptfs file, related to not ensuring that the key signature length in a Tag 11 packet is compatible with the key signature buffer size.
