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Bug 42138 - fluxbox 0.9.8 copies a script in home directory - can't start X while /home is mounted with option "noexec"
Summary: fluxbox 0.9.8 copies a script in home directory - can't start X while /home i...
Status: RESOLVED INVALID
Alias: None
Product: Gentoo Linux
Classification: Unclassified
Component: Current packages (show other bugs)
Hardware: x86 Linux
: High trivial (vote)
Assignee: Commonbox Team
URL:
Whiteboard:
Keywords:
Depends on:
Blocks:
 
Reported: 2004-02-19 04:21 UTC by Sebastian
Modified: 2004-02-20 04:27 UTC (History)
0 users

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Package list:
Runtime testing required: ---


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Description Sebastian 2004-02-19 04:21:20 UTC
Hi,

fluxbox 0.9.8 sets up a script in your home directory when you use startx/startfluxbox for the first time. In this script are some config setting and startx uses it to start fluxbox. This is a good idea, because so the user can easily edit his own settings, but it needs to be executed in a place where it's allowed. I have my users partitions /home and /temp mounted "noexec" for security reasons. So the script is a no go for me. 

I copied /usr/bin/startfluxbox to /usr/bin/startfluxbox.orig and then copied ~/.fluxbox/startup to /usr/bin/startfluxbox. So now it loads flux but maybe you guys can think of a better solution. 

I know it's not a bug but I wanted to tell you anyway.
Thanks!
Sebastian

Reproducible: Always
Steps to Reproduce:
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Comment 1 Brandon Hale (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2004-02-19 18:19:06 UTC
Hiya,
So you are trying to be security conscience, but running XFree on a public machine? This doesnt exactly fit, but anyway, to address your issue, I see the noexec option as uterly useless. Anyone with enough experience to call themselves a script kiddie can easily execute code out of a directory you've marked as such, so it's really nothing more than an annoyance to legitimate users, as seen here with fluxbox's startup script. For this reason, I am invalidating this bug report, and I suggest to you that you find more effective methods of restricting execution of unauthorized code, fex TPE (trusted path execution).
Comment 2 Sebastian 2004-02-20 03:01:52 UTC
Hello Brandon,

I am sorry in case I've done wrong submitting this report. But I was just following a guide which said "Unfortunately these settings can easily be circumvented by executing a non-direct path. However setting /tmp to noexec will stop about 99% of all script kiddies since their exploits are designed to be executed directly from /tmp" (http://www.gentoo.org/doc/en/gentoo-security.xml).
I was just writing what I experienced.

Thanks you
Sebastian 
Comment 3 Brandon Hale (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2004-02-20 04:27:33 UTC
No harm done by a bug report, no worries.
I am familiar with this guide, and the many flaws, including this one. I do not believe in restricting users when the security advantages are as limited as "noexec", this is nothing more than a small annoyance to a real attacker. Unfortunately, myself and other security focused developers do not currently have the time to fix/rewrite this guide to focus more on real security vs what are essentially warm fuzzies with questionable effectiveness (dont get me wrong, it does have some valid points). At some point I may get around to rectifying this document, but it is low priority.

Take care, Sebastian.