Multiple security flaws were found in the way kexec-tools performed management of created kdump core files and ramdisk images: * the default value of "StrictHostKeyChecking=no" has been used for kdump / mkdumprd openssh integration. A remote malicious kdump server could use this flaw to impersonate the intended, correct kdump server to obtain security sensitive information (kdump core files), * mkdumprd utility copied content of certain directories into newly created initial ramdisk images, potentially leading to information leak, * mkdumprd utility created the final initial ramdisk image with world-readable permissions, possibly leading to information leak.
Changed CVE per: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/10/10/1
I am pretty sure this doesn't apply to us. We don't have any support for kdump through initscripts. Could someone please cross check that this is really only about the redhat/fedora init scripts of kdump?
This only applies to redhat/fedora and kexec-tools 1.x before 1.102pre-154 and 2.x before 2.0.0-209. None of these are in Portage. Per previous comment we do not even support the initscripts referenced in RHEL.
