unrtf version bump request. Latest source http://www.gnu.org/software/unrtf/unrtf_0.19.9.tar.gz home page http://www.gnu.org/software/unrtf/unrtf.html Changes: 0.19.4: added unicode support 0.19.5: removed defective PS support and non-free text files more unicode support improved symbol font support - no longer puts entities in latex output Bug#266020 concerning double slashes fixed Bug#269054 concerning Doctype fixed Bug#287038 security breach fixed (thanks to Joey Hess <joeyh@debian.org>) 0.19.6: fix some latex problems 0.19.7: updated FSF address 0.19.8: minor fixes 0.19.9: included verbose mode
of particular interest to me is the addition of unicode support.
Information on the security bug is here: http://bugs.donarmstrong.com/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=287038 I'm not sure if this is serious enough to warrant assigning to the security theam Here's the contents of the find: Subject: [remote] [control] unrtf 0.19.3 process_font_table overflows name buffer Yosef Klein and Limin Wang, two students in my Fall 2004 UNIX Security Holes course, have discovered a remotely exploitable security hole in unrtf. I'm publishing this notice, but all the discovery credits should be assigned to Klein and Wang. You are at risk if you take an RTF document from an email message (or a web page or any other source that could be controlled by an attacker) and feed it through unrtf. (The unrtf documentation does not tell users to avoid taking input from the network.) Whoever provides that document then has complete control over your account: he or she can read and modify your files, watch the programs you're running, etc. Proof of concept: On an x86 computer running FreeBSD 4.10, type wget http://www.gnu.org/software/unrtf/unrtf-0.19.3.tar.gz gunzip < unrtf-0.19.3.tar.gz | tar -xf - cd unrtf-0.19.3 make to download and compile the unrtf program, version 0.19.3 (current). Then save the file 81.rtf attached to this message, and type ./unrtf 81.rtf with the unauthorized result that a file named EXPLOITED is created in the current directory. (I tested this with a 548-byte environment, as reported by printenv | wc -c; beware that 81.rtf is particularly sensitive to the environment size.) Here's the bug: In convert.c, process_font_table() uses an unprotected strcat() to copy any number of bytes into a 255-byte name array. ---D. J. Bernstein, Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics, Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago
The security bug is already fix in our 0.19.3-r1. I've put .9 in the tree as ~arch.
