Bugzilla Bug 77932

Multiple Unix/Linux Vendor ImageMagick .psd Image File Decode Heap
Overflow Vulnerability

iDEFENSE Security Advisory 01.13.05
http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?type=vulnerabilities
January 13, 2005

I. BACKGROUND

ImageMagick provides a variety of graphics image-handling libraries and 
capabilities. These libraries are widely used and are shipped by default 
on most Unix and Linux distributions. These libraries are commonly 
installed by default and on computers where any other graphical image 
viewer or X Desktop environment is installed (such as Gnome or KDE).

More information is available at the following site:

   http://www.imagemagick.org

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability in The 
ImageMagick's Project's ImageMagick PSD image-decoding module could 
allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. 

A heap overflow exists within ImageMagick, specifically in the decoding 
of Photoshop Document (PSD) files. The vulnerable code follows:

ImageMagick-6.1.0/coders/psd.c

for (j=0; j < (long) layer_info[i].channels; j++) 
{ 
  layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short)ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
  layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
  [...]
} 

The array channel_info is only 24 elements large, and the loop variable, 
"j", is bounded by a user-supplied value from the image file, thus 
allowing a heap overflow to occur when more than 24 layers are 
specified. If heap structures are overflowed in a controlled way, 
execution of arbitrary code is possible.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation may allow attackers to run arbitrary code on a victim's 
computer if the victim opens a specially formatted image. Such images 
could be delivered by e-mail or HTML, in some cases, and would likely 
not raise suspicion on the victim's part. Exploitation is also possible 
when a web-based application uses ImageMagick to process user-uploaded 
image files.

IV. DETECTION

iDEFENSE has confirmed this vulnerability in ImageMagick 6.1.0 and 
ImageMagick 6.1.7. Earlier versions are also suspected vulnerable.

The following vendors may include susceptible ImageMagick packages: 
	
   The Debian Project 
   MandrakeSoft 
   Red Hat, Inc. 

V. WORKAROUND

Do not open files from untrusted sources. Do not allow untrusted sources 
to process images using your web application.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

Multiple unsuccessful attempts were made to inform ImageMagick.org about
this vulnerability.

VII. CVE INFORMATION

A Mitre Corp. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) number has not
been assigned yet.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

12/21/2004  Initial vendor notification
12/22/2004  Rejection notification received from the Magick-bugs mailing
            list
01/13/2005  Public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

Andrei Nigmatulin is credited with this discovery.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://www.idefense.com/poi/teams/vcp.jsp

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright 

Multiple Unix/Linux Vendor ImageMagick .psd Image File Decode Heap
Overflow Vulnerability

iDEFENSE Security Advisory 01.13.05
http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?type=vulnerabilities
January 13, 2005

I. BACKGROUND

ImageMagick provides a variety of graphics image-handling libraries and 
capabilities. These libraries are widely used and are shipped by default 
on most Unix and Linux distributions. These libraries are commonly 
installed by default and on computers where any other graphical image 
viewer or X Desktop environment is installed (such as Gnome or KDE).

More information is available at the following site:

   http://www.imagemagick.org

II. DESCRIPTION

Remote exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability in The 
ImageMagick's Project's ImageMagick PSD image-decoding module could 
allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code. 

A heap overflow exists within ImageMagick, specifically in the decoding 
of Photoshop Document (PSD) files. The vulnerable code follows:

ImageMagick-6.1.0/coders/psd.c

for (j=0; j < (long) layer_info[i].channels; j++) 
{ 
  layer_info[i].channel_info[j].type=(short)ReadBlobMSBShort(image);
  layer_info[i].channel_info[j].size=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
  [...]
} 

The array channel_info is only 24 elements large, and the loop variable, 
"j", is bounded by a user-supplied value from the image file, thus 
allowing a heap overflow to occur when more than 24 layers are 
specified. If heap structures are overflowed in a controlled way, 
execution of arbitrary code is possible.

III. ANALYSIS

Exploitation may allow attackers to run arbitrary code on a victim's 
computer if the victim opens a specially formatted image. Such images 
could be delivered by e-mail or HTML, in some cases, and would likely 
not raise suspicion on the victim's part. Exploitation is also possible 
when a web-based application uses ImageMagick to process user-uploaded 
image files.

IV. DETECTION

iDEFENSE has confirmed this vulnerability in ImageMagick 6.1.0 and 
ImageMagick 6.1.7. Earlier versions are also suspected vulnerable.

The following vendors may include susceptible ImageMagick packages: 
	
   The Debian Project 
   MandrakeSoft 
   Red Hat, Inc. 

V. WORKAROUND

Do not open files from untrusted sources. Do not allow untrusted sources 
to process images using your web application.

VI. VENDOR RESPONSE

Multiple unsuccessful attempts were made to inform ImageMagick.org about
this vulnerability.

VII. CVE INFORMATION

A Mitre Corp. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) number has not
been assigned yet.

VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE

12/21/2004  Initial vendor notification
12/22/2004  Rejection notification received from the Magick-bugs mailing
            list
01/13/2005  Public disclosure

IX. CREDIT

Andrei Nigmatulin is credited with this discovery.

Get paid for vulnerability research
http://www.idefense.com/poi/teams/vcp.jsp

X. LEGAL NOTICES

Copyright © 2004 iDEFENSE, Inc.

Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDEFENSE. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
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email customerservice@idefense.com for permission.

Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
this information.

Scheduled for release today and no fix currently available.

Declassifying: signoff=jaervosz/koon

Coordinated release postponed until monday and a patch should be available by
that time.

Created an attachment (id=48565) [details]
psd_overflow.patch

Patch from Martin Schulze (Debian).

Applies to 6.1.3.4 and 6.1.6.0 with :
Hunk #1 succeeded at 667 with fuzz 2 (offset 109 lines).

Karol: This is a confidential bug. You should prepare revbump ebuilds that
include this patch for versions 6.1.3.4 and 6.1.6.0 at least. Please do not
commit them to the tree until the official announcement on Monday. You can
attach them here so that we'll ask arch testing.

Created an attachment (id=48753) [details]
psd_overflow2.patch

More complete patch from SuSE.

It's semi-public now : http://www.imagemagick.org/www/Changelog.html
You should doublecheck that 6.1.8-8 contains all fixes and commit it to portage.
We'll open this bug when iDEFENSE advisory will be officially out.

CAN-2005-0005
Now public @ http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?id=184&type=vulnerabilities

sekretarz/graphics herd: please bump to 6.1.8-8

Bumped imagemagick will be today in portage, i'm testing it now

imagemagick-6.1.8.8 is in portage, we don't need patch, because it is already
patched.

Thx Karol.

Arches please test imagemagick-6.1.8.8 dev-perl/perlmagick-6.1.8.8

fpx support seems to be broken, snip:

coders/fpx.c: In function `WriteFPXImage':
coders/fpx.c:978: warning: passing arg 3 of `ImportQuantumPixels' makes integer from pointer without a cast
coders/fpx.c:978: error: too few arguments to function `ImportQuantumPixels'

There's a newer libfpx-1.2.0.9-1 in imagemagick's ftp but according to the changelog the changes are minimal and don't seem related to this.

Added patch to portage, which fixes compile problem with enabled fpx use flag

Thanks Karol, your patch did the trick.
sparc stable.

stable on ppc64

the upstream src_uri for Imagemagick seems to only have -9 now and its not on
the mirrors.. 

ppc stable.

tester: you can take the file out of distfiles-local on toucan, it will hit the mirrors soon.

x86 stable

amd64 done

Stable on alpha.

Stable on mips.

Thx everyone.

GLSA 200501-26

hppa and ia64 please remember to mark stable to benifit from the GLSA.

Already stable on hppa