From URL: The vulnerability is caused due to a boundary error during RLE decompression in the "TranscribePalmImageToJPEG()" function in generators/plucker/inplug/image.cpp when processing images embedded in PDB files, which can be exploited to cause a heap-based buffer overflow by e.g. tricking a user into opening a specially crafted PDB file. Patches appear available from the upstream. Patches have been committed to the KDE Subversion repository in the following revision numbers: 4.3 branch: r1167825 4.4 branch: r1167826 4.5 branch: r1167827 Trunk: r1167828 Patches for KDE SC 4.3, KDE SC 4.4 and KDE SC 4.5 may be obtained directly from the Subversion repository (no checkout needed) with the following command and reference SHA1 sums: 4.3 branch: f1ad2e50ce0ce8592c767365b87a22a80943aa28 svn diff -r 1167824:1167825 \ svn://anonsvn.kde.org/home/kde/branches/KDE/4.3/kdegraphics 4.4 branch: 13f06704919f239ef29ff63e6c1ddf8fa162af9c svn diff -r 1167825:1167826 \ svn://anonsvn.kde.org/home/kde/branches/KDE/4.4/kdegraphics 4.5 branch: d739c58873599f7324c9d6500d3615f803bff39e svn diff -r 1167826:1167827 \ svn://anonsvn.kde.org/home/kde/branches/KDE/4.5/kdegraphics
CVE-2010-2575 (http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2010-2575): Heap-based buffer overflow in the RLE decompression functionality in the TranscribePalmImageToJPEG function in generators/plucker/inplug/image.cpp in Okular in KDE SC 4.3.0 through 4.5.0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted image in a PDB file.
Fixed in 4.5.1 Current stable 4.4.5 is still vulnerable
The patch is added in okular-4.4.5-r2, bumped straight to stable. As long as nothing explodes during the next hours, feel free to * remove 4.4.5-r1 from CVS * remove 4.4.5 pending STABILIZATION of 4.4.5-r2 on ppc (ppc please do!!!)
ppc stable, @security: last arch (though the others were cheating :P) done, back to you
Thanks, everyone. GLSA request filed.
removing KDE, CC us back if you need us again
This issue was resolved and addressed in GLSA 201311-20 at http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201311-20.xml by GLSA coordinator Sergey Popov (pinkbyte).