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Bug#: 235824
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Status: RESOLVED
Resolution: FIXED
Assigned To: Gentoo Security <security@gentoo.org>
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Reporter: Christian Hoffmann <hoffie@gentoo.org>
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Bug 235824 depends on: 238539 Show dependency tree
Bug 235824 blocks: 235770 244995

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Description:   Opened: 2008-08-26 18:36 0000
See $URL and bug 235770.

------- Comment #1 From Christian Hoffmann 2008-08-26 20:17:39 0000 -------
Confirmed, we are installing /usr/lib/openoffice/program/senddoc and it
contains code which allows for overwriting arbitrary files via symlink attacks.
Tested 2.4.1, 3* is still hardmasked on Gentoo and is not vulnerable according
to $URL.

This (lines 3 and 4 in the mentioned script) just looks like debug code which
could probably removed without problems.

------- Comment #2 From Andreas Proschofsky 2008-08-26 22:15:54 0000 -------
Most of the other distributions (SUSE, Fedora) are handling this low key and
want to just fix it with 3.0, as they don't see a big risk in it. Not saying we
should do the same, just giving some perspective.

Did someone already check openoffice-bin?

------- Comment #3 From Robert Buchholz 2008-08-30 13:46:45 0000 -------
(In reply to comment #2)
> Most of the other distributions (SUSE, Fedora) are handling this low key and
> want to just fix it with 3.0, as they don't see a big risk in it. Not saying we
> should do the same, just giving some perspective.

The impact is that a local attacker can trick a victim into truncating any
local file if he gets the victim to call that script. I don't know the
timeframe for a new release (and its stabling), but I do feel the pain of users
rebuilding OO.


> Did someone already check openoffice-bin?
Yes, /usr/lib32/openoffice/program/senddoc does the same.

------- Comment #4 From Andreas Proschofsky 2008-10-16 20:44:29 0000 -------
Well OOo 3.0 (-bin and source) is in the tree, unmasked and should be fine

------- Comment #5 From Pierre-Yves Rofes 2008-10-16 21:36:55 0000 -------
Arches, please test and mark stable:
- app-office/openoffice-3.0.0 (amd64 ppc x86)
- app-office/openoffice-bin-3.0.0 (amd64 x86)

------- Comment #6 From Markus Meier 2008-10-17 20:32:11 0000 -------
marked the -bin version stable on amd64/x86. maybe I find some time tomorrow
for the non-bin...

------- Comment #7 From Markus Meier 2008-10-18 20:31:59 0000 -------
amd64/x86 stable

------- Comment #8 From Tobias Scherbaum 2008-11-02 09:36:26 0000 -------
ppc stable, sorry for the delay *hide*

------- Comment #9 From Tobias Heinlein 2008-11-08 09:50:58 0000 -------
GLSA request filed.

------- Comment #10 From Pierre-Yves Rofes 2008-12-12 23:08:36 0000 -------
GLSA 200812-13

------- Comment #11 From Robert Buchholz 2008-12-29 18:08:55 0000 -------
As reported on bug 238539, some ~arch users cannot install this issue.

------- Comment #12 From Andreas Proschofsky 2008-12-30 00:53:49 0000 -------
(In reply to comment #11)
> As reported on bug 238539, some ~arch users cannot install this issue.
> 

How is this bug preventing people to install OOo 3.0 when there is a known
workaround for this issue (which is actually referenced in the ebuild)?

------- Comment #13 From Robert Buchholz 2008-12-30 01:28:34 0000 -------
You mean rebuilding with USE=kdeprefix?

Re-thinking the situation, it is no worse than any other USE-dependency and no
blocker to the installation. Sorry for the noise.

------- Comment #14 From Andreas Proschofsky 2008-12-30 09:52:10 0000 -------
(In reply to comment #13)
> You mean rebuilding with USE=kdeprefix?

Yes

> 
> Re-thinking the situation, it is no worse than any other USE-dependency and no
> blocker to the installation. Sorry for the noise.
> 

No problem, I'm going to add the patch soonish anyway, I just didn't think it
was security related...

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