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Bug 653070 (CVE-2018-1088) - <sys-cluster/glusterfs-4.1.5: Privilege escalation via gluster_shared_storage when snapshot scheduling is enabled (CVE-2018-1088)
Summary: <sys-cluster/glusterfs-4.1.5: Privilege escalation via gluster_shared_storage...
Status: RESOLVED FIXED
Alias: CVE-2018-1088
Product: Gentoo Security
Classification: Unclassified
Component: Vulnerabilities (show other bugs)
Hardware: All Linux
: Normal major (vote)
Assignee: Gentoo Security
URL: http://openwall.com/lists/oss-securit...
Whiteboard: C1 [glsa+ cve]
Keywords:
: 655546 (view as bug list)
Depends on:
Blocks:
 
Reported: 2018-04-12 21:28 UTC by Thomas Deutschmann
Modified: 2019-04-02 21:13 UTC (History)
2 users (show)

See Also:
Package list:
=sys-cluster/glusterfs-4.1.5
Runtime testing required: ---
stable-bot: sanity-check+


Attachments

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Description Thomas Deutschmann gentoo-dev Security 2018-04-12 21:28:01 UTC
Incoming details.
Comment 1 James Le Cuirot gentoo-dev 2018-05-26 11:48:27 UTC
I'm not sure but if this only affected 3.x then I think we're good now.
Comment 2 Thomas Deutschmann gentoo-dev Security 2018-06-22 11:01:52 UTC
When certain options are enabled in Gluster, it creates a volume called gluster_shared_storage. This volume is mounted on each server in the cluster and used to share state. The volume is not intended to be mounted by storage clients as it does not contain any data that is intended to be user accessible.

When snapshot scheduling is enabled in Gluster, this gluster_shared_storage volume is used to coordinate the snapshots. Part of that is sharing the cron job that is used to trigger scheduled snaps. The crontab file exposed in the shared volume is symlinked into each server's /etc/cron.d directory.

By default, the shared_storage volume can be mounted by any client that has access to the cluster to mount data volumes. Further, since Gluster relies on client-reported uids, the shared_storage volume can be written from any of these clients, permitting cron entries to be added to the system crontab directory such that they will be executed by each server as root (or any other uid).

Snapshot scheduler is disabled by default after initialization.

https://review.gluster.org/#/c/19899/
https://review.gluster.org/#/c/19898/
When fixing the issue it's important to not apply the incomplete fix and open
CVE-2018-1112 causing that auth.allow allows all clients to mount volumes.
Cf. https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1570891
Needs: https://review.gluster.org/#/c/19899/1..2
Comment 3 Thomas Deutschmann gentoo-dev Security 2018-06-22 11:02:14 UTC
*** Bug 655546 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
Comment 4 Aaron Bauman Gentoo Infrastructure gentoo-dev Security 2018-12-02 17:12:47 UTC
@arches, please stabilize.

targeting 4.1.5
Comment 5 Mikle Kolyada archtester Gentoo Infrastructure gentoo-dev Security 2018-12-02 18:05:58 UTC
amd64 stable
Comment 6 Sergei Trofimovich gentoo-dev 2018-12-08 10:23:29 UTC
ppc stable
Comment 7 Sergei Trofimovich gentoo-dev 2018-12-08 10:55:32 UTC
ppc64 stable
Comment 8 Thomas Deutschmann gentoo-dev Security 2018-12-09 23:52:11 UTC
x86 stable
Comment 9 Tomáš Mózes 2019-03-19 06:17:42 UTC
Seems like that by accident 4.0.2 got stabilized on amd64 while the rest stabilized 4.1.5.
Comment 10 Agostino Sarubbo gentoo-dev 2019-03-19 13:04:24 UTC
amd64 stable.

Maintainer(s), please cleanup.
Security, please add it to the existing request, or file a new one.
Comment 11 Yury German Gentoo Infrastructure gentoo-dev Security 2019-03-24 12:20:20 UTC
Maintainer(s), please drop the vulnerable version(s): 4.0.2, 4.0.0-r1

New GLSA Request filed.
Comment 12 GLSAMaker/CVETool Bot gentoo-dev 2019-04-02 04:27:51 UTC
This issue was resolved and addressed in
 GLSA 201904-06 at https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201904-06
by GLSA coordinator Aaron Bauman (b-man).
Comment 13 Yury German Gentoo Infrastructure gentoo-dev Security 2019-04-02 07:22:38 UTC
Reopening for cleanup.
Maintainer(s), please drop the vulnerable version(s).
Comment 14 Aaron Bauman Gentoo Infrastructure gentoo-dev Security 2019-04-02 21:13:54 UTC
(In reply to Yury German from comment #13)
> Reopening for cleanup.
> Maintainer(s), please drop the vulnerable version(s).

Cleanup will happen in bug #670088 after final stables...