From ${URL} : It was found that when the UID and GID were changed in the <changeowner> section of the /etc/icecast.xml file, the supplementary groups were left in place. This could allow an attacker to escalate their privileges if the <changeowner> configuration was used. The following fix was added to icecast version 2.4.0: In case of <changeowner> only UID and GID were changed, supplementary groups were left in place. This is a potential security issue only if <changeowner> is used. New behaviour is to set UID, GID and set supplementary groups based on the UID Even in case of icecast remaining in supplementary group 0 this "only" gives it things like access to files that are owned by group 0 and according to their umask. This is obviously bad, but not as bad as UID 0 with all its other special rights. It's a security issue and we fix immediately and recommend users to update. References: http://icecast.org/news/icecast-release-2_4_0/ https://trac.xiph.org/changeset/19137/ http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2014/q4/802
+ 06 Dec 2014; Lars Wendler <polynomial-c@gentoo.org> -icecast-2.3.3-r2.ebuild, + -icecast-2.3.3-r3.ebuild, -icecast-2.4.0.ebuild, -files/init.d.icecast, + metadata.xml: + Removed vulnerable versions. Took over maintenance. +
CVE-2014-9091 (http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2014-9091): Icecast before 2.4.0 does not change the supplementary group privileges when <changeowner> is configured, which allows local users to gain privileges via unspecified vectors.
Arches and Maintainer(s), Thank you for your work. New GLSA Request filed.
This issue was resolved and addressed in GLSA 201412-38 at http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201412-38.xml by GLSA coordinator Sean Amoss (ackle).