Description: Gangstuck and Psirac have reported some vulnerabilities in openMosixview, which can be exploited by malicious, local users to perform certain actions on a vulnerable system with escalated privileges. The vulnerabilities are caused due to various temporary files being created insecurely with predictable filenames. This can be exploited via symlink attacks to create or overwrite arbitrary files on the system with the privileges of the user running openmosixview or the openmosixcollector daemon. The vulnerabilities have been reported in versions 1.5 and prior. Solution: Grant only trusted users access to affected systems
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/394282
See discussion about this bug at: http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?thread_id=6929877&forum_id=1042 Patches are at: http://uw-dig.uwaterloo.ca/~hy3chan/patches/openmosixview/1.5/20logdirectory.diff http://uw-dig.uwaterloo.ca/~hy3chan/patches/openmosixview/1.5/50nonodestmp.diff tantive/cluster: please review patches and bump with them if you think they are ok.
xmerlin (cluster herd) said he would have a look.
fixed in cvs
Reopening to handle stable/glsa steps
xmerlin: could you bump the revision ?
done
Security please vote on GLSA need
Do openmosixview or the openmosixcollector daemon typically run as root ? If yes, I would issue a GLSA about it, if not, I wouldn't. xmerlin/cluster herd, could you give us your opinion ?
I think it can be run by root quite usually, so I vote YES.
It needs to be run as root as I can remember
I vote yes as well.
GLSA 200504-20
