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Bug 84659 - net-misc/dyndnsupdate remote vulnerability
Summary: net-misc/dyndnsupdate remote vulnerability
Alias: None
Product: Gentoo Security
Classification: Unclassified
Component: Vulnerabilities (show other bugs)
Hardware: All All
: High enhancement (vote)
Assignee: Gentoo Security
Whiteboard: B2 [glsa masked removed] koon
Depends on:
Reported: 2005-03-09 13:00 UTC by Toby Dickenson
Modified: 2005-06-15 05:31 UTC (History)
1 user (show)

See Also:
Package list:
Runtime testing required: ---


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Description Toby Dickenson 2005-03-09 13:00:00 UTC
dyndnsupdate-0.6.15 has a remote vulnerability which appears to be exploitable. In src/dyndnsupdate.c, the ipcheck function fails to validate data read from a socket before copying it into 'ipaddress', a stack allocated buffer, using sprintf.

I guess that wont be the only problem... Most of this code is very naive.
Comment 1 Toby Dickenson 2005-03-13 05:02:09 UTC
1. I have been unable to contact upstream author; registrations of domains for contact email addresses have lapsed.

2. Googling suggests that no other distributions are including this package.

3. There is already a viable alternative to this package in portage; net-dns/ddclient

I suggest adding this package to package.mask, and removing it from portage.

Comment 2 Luke Macken (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2005-03-16 10:44:01 UTC
Re-assigning to security.
Comment 3 Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2005-03-16 11:35:22 UTC
Upstream is dead, package has no Gentoo maintainer...

Auditors, could you please confirm the package is a mess ?
I have nfc how this works... Does the attacker need to setup a malicious server ? Or is dyndnsupdate a listening daemon ? In the latter we'll have to issue a GLSA about this if we dump it.
Comment 4 Toby Dickenson 2005-03-16 12:26:34 UTC
It doesnt listen - exploiting this requires dns cache poisoning, tcp session hijacking, or control over an http proxy. There is no ssl here (unlike most other dyndns clients), so these attacks are not too demanding.

The ebuild doesnt run this program automatically, but I guess many users will be running this as root. *I* would want to receive a GLSA for this.

Access to the local filesystem looks safe; I dont see any local exploits.

Comment 5 Tavis Ormandy (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2005-03-17 02:36:24 UTC
Confirmed, it does look exploitable via multiple vectors. dns poisoning would be required though, so not a high priority. 

I think it should be dropped in favour of the maintained package.
Comment 6 rob holland (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2005-03-17 02:41:55 UTC
the problems start in the argument parsing and get worse from there. bin it.

nemo dyndnsupdate-0.6.15 # ./dyndnsupdate -a \
 -u $(perl -e 'print "x" x 1024') \
 -h bleh -s $(perl -e 'print "x" x 1024')
Segmentation fault
Comment 7 Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2005-03-17 03:15:14 UTC
OK. Upstream is dead, package is a mess, it has no maintainer and alternatives exist. Should be masked prior to removal, and a Masking GLSA should be issued to warn our users to switch to better alternatives.
Comment 8 Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2005-03-21 06:31:29 UTC
Security please review the masking GLSa draft
Comment 9 Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2005-03-21 07:58:08 UTC
Masking GLSA 200503-27
Keeping open as enhancement to remember to remove it sometime
Comment 10 Robert Paskowitz (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2005-05-17 15:54:05 UTC
Probably safe to remove this from the tree now.
Comment 11 Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2005-06-15 05:31:30 UTC