The following advisory from securesoftware@list.cr.yp.to is for ringtonetools 2.22, but I was able to get app-misc/ringtonetools-2.18 to SegFault using the given exploit, so it's probably vulnerable. Date: 15 Dec 2004 08:22:15 -0000 From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to> Subject: [remote] [control] ringtonetools 2.22 parse_emelody overflows song buffer To: securesoftware@list.cr.yp.to, mike@mikekohn.net X-HELOcheck: OK: FQDN Mailing-List: contact securesoftware-help@list.cr.yp.to; run by ezmlm Mail-Followup-To: securesoftware@list.cr.yp.to, mike@mikekohn.net Automatic-Legal-Notices: See http://cr.yp.to/mailcopyright.html. [-- Attachment #1 [details] --] [-- Type: text/plain, Encoding: 7bit, Size: 1.4K --] Qiao Zhang, a student in my Fall 2004 UNIX Security Holes course, has discovered a remotely exploitable security hole in ringtonetools. I'm publishing this notice, but all the discovery credits should be assigned to Zhang. You are at risk if you take an eMelody file from an email message (or a web page or any other source that could be controlled by an attacker) and feed that file through ringtonetools. Whoever provides that file then has complete control over your account: she can read and modify your files, watch the programs you're running, etc. The ringtonetools documentation does not tell users to avoid taking input from the network. In fact, the documentation explicitly suggests downloading eMelody files from the web. Proof of concept: On an x86 computer running FreeBSD 4.10, type wget http://downloads.mikekohn.net/ringtonetools/ringtonetools-2.22.tar.gz gunzip < ringtonetools-2.22.tar.gz | tar -xf - cd ringtonetools-2.22 make to download and compile the ringtonetools program, version 2.22 (current). Then save the file 31.emelody attached to this message, and type ./ringtonetools 31.emelody with the unauthorized result that a file named EXPLOITED is created in the current directory. Here's the bug: In parse_emelody.c, parse_emelody() reads any amount of input into a 1024-byte song[] array. ---D. J. Bernstein, Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics, Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago
Created attachment 46175 [details] File 31.emelody from advisory
====================================================== Candidate: CAN-2004-1292 URL: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1292 Reference: MISC:http://tigger.uic.edu/~jlongs2/holes/ringtonetools.txt Buffer overflow in the parse_emelody function in parse_emelody.c for ringtonetools 2.22 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted eMelody file. ======================================================
Upstream acks but won't fix it, he does consider this is a flaw in operating system design (allowing a cmdline tool to do nasty things) and not in his code. If this can only be used safely on RBAC systems I think we should mask it prior to removal.
Security Masked, no MaskGLSA
No maintainer has stepped up. Perhaps we should consider dropping the package?
It looks like this issue is fixed in 2.23 (i haven't tested it though, but the code looks fixed). Can we get someone to bump/unmask this ?
13 Mar 2005; Chris White <chriswhite@gentoo.org> +ringtonetools-2.23.ebuild: Fixed security bug #74700. Marked ppc and x86 stable. Thanks Chris. This one looks ready for GLSA.
GLSA 200503-18