| Summary: | net-dns/knot: multiple vulnerabilities | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | Gentoo Security | Reporter: | John Helmert III <ajak> |
| Component: | Vulnerabilities | Assignee: | Gentoo Security <security> |
| Status: | RESOLVED INVALID | ||
| Severity: | minor | CC: | nemunaire, proxy-maint |
| Priority: | Normal | ||
| Version: | unspecified | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| URL: | https://www.knot-resolver.cz/2022-09-21-knot-resolver-5.5.3.html | ||
| Whiteboard: | B3 [ebuild] | ||
| Package list: | Runtime testing required: | --- | |
|
Description
John Helmert III
2022-09-21 14:54:47 UTC
CVE-2021-40083 (https://gitlab.nic.cz/knot/knot-resolver/-/merge_requests/1169): Knot Resolver before 5.3.2 is prone to an assertion failure, triggerable by a remote attacker in an edge case (NSEC3 with too many iterations used for a positive wildcard proof). CVE-2020-12667 (https://en.blog.nic.cz/2020/05/19/nxnsattack-upgrade-resolvers-to-stop-new-kind-of-random-subdomain-attack/): https://www.knot-resolver.cz/2020-05-19-knot-resolver-5.1.1.html Knot Resolver before 5.1.1 allows traffic amplification via a crafted DNS answer from an attacker-controlled server, aka an "NXNSAttack" issue. This is triggered by random subdomains in the NSDNAME in NS records. CVE-2019-19331 (https://www.knot-resolver.cz/2019-12-04-knot-resolver-4.3.0.html): knot-resolver before version 4.3.0 is vulnerable to denial of service through high CPU utilization. DNS replies with very many resource records might be processed very inefficiently, in extreme cases taking even several CPU seconds for each such uncached message. For example, a few thousand A records can be squashed into one DNS message (limit is 64kB). CVE-2019-10190 (https://www.knot-resolver.cz/2019-07-10-knot-resolver-4.1.0.html): A vulnerability was discovered in DNS resolver component of knot resolver through version 3.2.0 before 4.1.0 which allows remote attackers to bypass DNSSEC validation for non-existence answer. NXDOMAIN answer would get passed through to the client even if its DNSSEC validation failed, instead of sending a SERVFAIL packet. Caching is not affected by this particular bug but see CVE-2019-10191. Oh, is this invalid in the same way as bug 711420? Hi ajak! I just check those links, indeed they only target knot-resolver. Our package net-dns/knot did not include the resolver project, it's just the authoritative part. We are not concerned! Thanks for confirming! |