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Bug 707974 (CVE-2020-8516)

Summary: net-vpn/tor: Tor through 0.4.1.8 and 0.4.2.x through 0.4.2.6 does not verify rendezvous node correctly (CVE-2020-8516)
Product: Gentoo Security Reporter: filip ambroz <filip.ambroz>
Component: VulnerabilitiesAssignee: Gentoo Security <security>
Status: RESOLVED INVALID    
Severity: minor CC: blueness, filip.ambroz
Priority: Normal    
Version: unspecified   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
URL: https://www.hackerfactor.com/blog/index.php?/archives/868-Deanonymizing-Tor-Circuits.html
Whiteboard: B4 [upstream]
Package list:
Runtime testing required: ---

Description filip ambroz 2020-02-02 22:16:23 UTC
The daemon in Tor through 0.4.1.8 and 0.4.2.x through 0.4.2.6 does not verify that a rendezvous node is known before attempting to connect to it, which might make it easier for remote attackers to discover circuit information.
Comment 1 Anthony Basile gentoo-dev 2020-02-05 15:34:56 UTC
(In reply to filip ambroz from comment #0)
> The daemon in Tor through 0.4.1.8 and 0.4.2.x through 0.4.2.6 does not
> verify that a rendezvous node is known before attempting to connect to it,
> which might make it easier for remote attackers to discover circuit
> information.

Upstream is skeptical of this bug.  Nick Mathewson redirected me to the following bug: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33129

At this point, I'll just follow what upstream does and report back here.
Comment 2 Anthony Basile gentoo-dev 2020-02-05 15:45:32 UTC
(In reply to Anthony Basile from comment #1)
> (In reply to filip ambroz from comment #0)
> > The daemon in Tor through 0.4.1.8 and 0.4.2.x through 0.4.2.6 does not
> > verify that a rendezvous node is known before attempting to connect to it,
> > which might make it easier for remote attackers to discover circuit
> > information.
> 
> Upstream is skeptical of this bug.  Nick Mathewson redirected me to the
> following bug: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/33129
> 
> At this point, I'll just follow what upstream does and report back here.

Also take a look at the following thread on tor-dev@

https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2020-February/014146.html
Comment 3 filip ambroz 2020-02-07 21:47:51 UTC
Thank you very much, very informative! Closing the bug as invalid.