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Bug 629682 (CVE-2017-14099, CVE-2017-14100)

Summary: <net-misc/asterisk-{11.25.3,13.17.2}: unauthorized data disclosure and command execution is possible (CVE-2017-{14099,14100})
Product: Gentoo Security Reporter: Aleksandr Wagner (Kivak) <alwag>
Component: VulnerabilitiesAssignee: Gentoo Security <security>
Status: RESOLVED FIXED    
Severity: normal CC: chainsaw
Priority: Normal Flags: stable-bot: sanity-check+
Version: unspecified   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
URL: http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2017-005.html
See Also: https://bugs.gentoo.org/show_bug.cgi?id=629692
Whiteboard: B2 [glsa cve]
Package list:
=net-misc/asterisk-11.25.3
Runtime testing required: ---
Bug Depends on:    
Bug Blocks: 629692, 633856    

Description Aleksandr Wagner (Kivak) 2017-09-02 16:51:15 UTC
CVE-2017-14099 (http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14099):

In res/res_rtp_asterisk.c in Asterisk 11.x before 11.25.2, 13.x before 13.17.1, and 14.x before 14.6.1 and Certified Asterisk 11.x before 11.6-cert17 and 13.x before 13.13-cert5, unauthorized data disclosure (media takeover in the RTP stack) is possible with careful timing by an attacker. The "strictrtp" option in rtp.conf enables a feature of the RTP stack that learns the source address of media for a session and drops any packets that do not originate from the expected address. This option is enabled by default in Asterisk 11 and above. The "nat" and "rtp_symmetric" options (for chan_sip and chan_pjsip, respectively) enable symmetric RTP support in the RTP stack. This uses the source address of incoming media as the target address of any sent media. This option is not enabled by default, but is commonly enabled to handle devices behind NAT. A change was made to the strict RTP support in the RTP stack to better tolerate late media when a reinvite occurs. When combined with the symmetric RTP support, this introduced an avenue where media could be hijacked. Instead of only learning a new address when expected, the new code allowed a new source address to be learned at all times. If a flood of RTP traffic was received, the strict RTP support would allow the new address to provide media, and (with symmetric RTP enabled) outgoing traffic would be sent to this new address, allowing the media to be hijacked. Provided the attacker continued to send traffic, they would continue to receive traffic as well. 

References:

https://rtpbleed.com/
http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2017-005.html
https://bugs.debian.org/873907
https://issues.asterisk.org/jira/browse/ASTERISK-27013

Patch:

http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2017-005-11.diff

CVE-2017-14100 (http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14100):

In Asterisk 11.x before 11.25.2, 13.x before 13.17.1, and 14.x before 14.6.1 and Certified Asterisk 11.x before 11.6-cert17 and 13.x before 13.13-cert5, unauthorized command execution is possible. The app_minivm module has an "externnotify" program configuration option that is executed by the MinivmNotify dialplan application. The application uses the caller-id name and number as part of a built string passed to the OS shell for interpretation and execution. Since the caller-id name and number can come from an untrusted source, a crafted caller-id name or number allows an arbitrary shell command injection. 

References:

http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2017-006.html
https://bugs.debian.org/873908
https://issues.asterisk.org/jira/browse/ASTERISK-27103

Patch:

http://downloads.asterisk.org/pub/security/AST-2017-006-11.diff
Comment 1 Tony Vroon (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2017-09-22 14:39:52 UTC
Arches, please test & mark stable:
=net-misc/asterisk-11.25.3
Comment 2 Thomas Deutschmann (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2017-10-03 00:43:50 UTC
x86 stable
Comment 3 Agostino Sarubbo gentoo-dev 2017-10-25 09:31:57 UTC
amd64 stable.

Maintainer(s), please cleanup.
Security, please add it to the existing request, or file a new one.
Comment 4 D'juan McDonald (domhnall) 2017-10-27 15:43:42 UTC
New GLSA request filed.

Gentoo Security Padawan
(jmbailey/mbailey_j)
Comment 5 GLSAMaker/CVETool Bot gentoo-dev 2017-10-29 19:14:52 UTC
This issue was resolved and addressed in
 GLSA 201710-29 at https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/201710-29
by GLSA coordinator Aaron Bauman (b-man).
Comment 6 Aaron Bauman (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2017-10-29 19:17:01 UTC
re-opened for cleanup.
Comment 7 Aaron Bauman (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2018-03-23 23:37:10 UTC
tree is clean