Summary: | <sys-apps/systemd-204-r1: PolicyKit UID Checking Race Condition Privilege Escalation Weakness (CVE-2013-4327) | ||
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Product: | Gentoo Security | Reporter: | Agostino Sarubbo <ago> |
Component: | Vulnerabilities | Assignee: | Gentoo Security <security> |
Status: | RESOLVED FIXED | ||
Severity: | major | CC: | systemd |
Priority: | Normal | ||
Version: | unspecified | ||
Hardware: | All | ||
OS: | Linux | ||
URL: | https://secunia.com/advisories/54948/ | ||
Whiteboard: | B1 [glsa] | ||
Package list: | Runtime testing required: | --- | |
Bug Depends on: | |||
Bug Blocks: | 485328 |
Description
Agostino Sarubbo
![]() Do I understand correctly that this is about: commit 72fd713962ca2c2450e23b01d9e22017a7e28fd4 Author: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org> Date: Thu Aug 22 13:55:21 2013 -0400 polkit: Avoid race condition in scraping /proc If a calling process execve()s a setuid program, it can appear to be uid 0. Since we're receiving requests over DBus, avoid this by simply passing system-bus-name as a subject. ? Fixed in -207-r2 and -204-r1. -204-r1 is ready for stabilization but it will require stabilizing =sys-apps/gentoo-systemd-integration-1 (it's basically a few files from FILESDIR moved to a separate package). Arches, please test and mark stable: =sys-apps/systemd-204-r1 =sys-apps/gentoo-systemd-integration-1 Target keywords : "amd64 arm ppc ppc64 x86" arm stable amd64 stable x86 stable ppc stable ppc64 stable Cleanup done, please file the request The offending versions has been removed from the tree. (In reply to Agostino Sarubbo from comment #9) > Cleanup done, please file the request Sorry, I don't understand. GLSA request filed. CVE-2013-4327 (http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-4327): systemd does not properly use D-Bus for communication with a polkit authority, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions by leveraging a PolkitUnixProcess PolkitSubject race condition via a (1) setuid process or (2) pkexec process, a related issue to CVE-2013-4288. This issue was resolved and addressed in GLSA 201406-27 at http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201406-27.xml by GLSA coordinator Chris Reffett (creffett). |