| Summary: | <dev-perl/Module-Signature-0.720.0: Arbitrary code execution when verifying SIGNATURE (CVE-2013-2145) | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | Gentoo Security | Reporter: | Agostino Sarubbo <ago> |
| Component: | Vulnerabilities | Assignee: | Gentoo Security <security> |
| Status: | RESOLVED FIXED | ||
| Severity: | normal | CC: | perl |
| Priority: | Normal | ||
| Version: | unspecified | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| URL: | https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971096 | ||
| Whiteboard: | B2 [glsa] | ||
| Package list: | Runtime testing required: | --- | |
+ 20 Aug 2013; Sergey Popov <pinkbyte@gentoo.org> + +Module-Signature-0.730.0.ebuild: + Version bump, wrt bug #472428 Arches, please test and mark stable =dev-perl/Module-Signature-0.730.0 Target keywords: amd64 x86 amd64/x86 stable Thanks for your work New GLSA request filed CVE-2013-2145 (http://nvd.nist.gov/nvd.cfm?cvename=CVE-2013-2145): The cpansign verify functionality in the Module::Signature module before 0.72 for Perl allows attackers to bypass the signature check and execute arbitrary code via a SIGNATURE file with a "special unknown cipher" that references an untrusted module in Digest/. This issue was resolved and addressed in GLSA 201310-01 at http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-201310-01.xml by GLSA coordinator Sergey Popov (pinkbyte). |
From ${URL} : The perl Module::Signature module adds signing capabilities to CPAN modules. The 'cpansign verify' command will automatically download keys and use them to check the signature of CPAN packages via the SIGNATURE file. The format of the SIGNATURE file includes the cipher to use to match the provided hash; for instance: SHA1 955ba924e9cd1bafccb4d6d7bd3be25c3ce8bf75 README If an attacker were to replace this (SHA1) with a special unknown cipher (e.g. 'Special') and were to include in the distribution a 'Digest/Special.pm', the code in this perl module would be executed when 'cpansign -verify' is run. This will execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running cpansign. Because cpansign will download public keys from a public key repository, the GPG key used to sign the SIGNATURE file may also be suspect; an attacker able to modify a CPAN module distribution file and sign the SIGNATURE file with their own key only has to make their key public. cpansign will download the attacker's key, validate the SIGNATURE file as being correctly signed, but will then execute code as noted above, if the SIGNATURE file is crafted in this way. Module::Signature version 0.72 corrects [1],[2] this issue by refusing to load Digest::* modules from relative paths in @INC. [1] https://github.com/audreyt/module-signature/commit/575f7bd6ba4cc7c92f841e8758f88a131674ebf2 [2] https://github.com/audreyt/module-signature/commit/cbd06b392a73c63159dc5c20ff5b3c8fc88c4896 @maintainer(s): after the bump, in case we need to stabilize the package, please say explicitly if it is ready for the stabilization or not.