% Philosophical logic reading list % Josh Parsons This is a reading list for the Oxford finals "Logic and Language" paper, oriented more around philosophical logic than my [other reading list for this paper](log-and-lang). Students may wish to also consult the philosophy faculty's reading list available through [WebLearn](https://weblearn.ox.ac.uk/portal/hierarchy/humdiv/philfac). Particularly significant readings are starred (*). ### 1. Reference and definite descriptions * (*) **Lycan**, ch. 1--2 * (*) @Russell-on-denoting * (*) @Strawson-on-referring * (*) @Donnellan-definite-descriptions * @Russell-strawson **Essay question:** What is Russell's theory of definite descriptions? Set out and evaluate an objection to it. ### 2. Semantic presupposition * (*) @Lycan-phil-language, pp. 163-166 * (*) @Gamut-logic, vol. 1, section 5.5 * @Parsons-disagreement * @Gamut-logic, vol. 1, section 6.9-6.10 * @Grice-logic-conversation * Davis, W. "Implicature". *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy* * @Priest-non-classical-logic, ch 7 **Essay question:** Contrast Grice's theory of *conventional implicature* with Strawson's (and his followers') theory of *semantic presupposition*. **OR** What is semantic presupposition? Is many-valued logic a suitable way of representing semantic presuppositions? ### 3. Paraconsistency and the liar paradox * (*) @Tarski-semantic-conception * (*) @Priest-logic-of-paradox * (*) Beall and Glanzberg. "Liar Paradox". *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy* * @Soames-truth, ch 5. * Priest. "Dialetheism". *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy* * @Glanzberg-liar **Essay question:** TBA ### 4. Modal logic and possible worlds semantics * (*) @Loux-possible, ch. 1 * (*) @Lewis-plurality, pp. 1-20 * Garson, J. "Modal logic". *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy* **Essay question:** Which, if any, is the correct logic of metaphysical modality? (e.g. T? S4? S5?) ### 5. Modal realism and its rivals * (*) @Stalnaker-possible-worlds * (*) @Lewis-plurality, ch. 3 Forrest's defence of pictoral? / magical? ersatzism: * @Forrest-worlds * @Lewis-structural-universals * @Forrest-magic Inwagen's defence of magical? ersatzism: * @Inwagen-two-concepts * @Jubien-magic **Essay question:** Must an actualist theory of possible worlds involve primitive modality? ### 6. On trans-world identity and counterpart theory * (*) @Chisholm-identity (also found in Loux, *ibid*) * (*) @Kripke-naming-necessity, pp. 42-46 * (*) @Lewis-plurality, pp. 192-209 * @Sider-humphrey * @Lewis-counterpart-theory **Essay question:** Do individuals exist in more than one possible world? ### 7. Identity across times and worlds * (*) @Lewis-plurality pp. 202-205 * (*) @Sider-four-dimensionalism ch. 1 and 4 * (*) @Parsons-endurance7 * (*) @Haslanger-persistence * @Inwagen-four-dimensional * @Heller-hunks ch. 1 * The rest of Sider's book **Essay question:** Do object persist through time by perduring or enduring? ### 8. TBA