% Philosophical logic reading list
% Josh Parsons
This is a reading list for the Oxford finals "Logic and Language"
paper, oriented more around philosophical logic than my
[other reading list for this paper](log-and-lang).
Students may wish to also consult the philosophy faculty's
reading list available through
[WebLearn](https://weblearn.ox.ac.uk/portal/hierarchy/humdiv/philfac).
Particularly significant readings are starred (*).
### 1. Reference and definite descriptions
* (*) **Lycan**, ch. 1--2
* (*) @Russell-on-denoting
* (*) @Strawson-on-referring
* (*) @Donnellan-definite-descriptions
* @Russell-strawson
**Essay question:** What is Russell's theory of definite descriptions?
Set out and evaluate an objection to it.
### 2. Semantic presupposition
* (*) @Lycan-phil-language, pp. 163-166
* (*) @Gamut-logic, vol. 1, section 5.5
* @Parsons-disagreement
* @Gamut-logic, vol. 1, section 6.9-6.10
* @Grice-logic-conversation
* Davis, W. "Implicature". *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*
* @Priest-non-classical-logic, ch 7
**Essay question:** Contrast Grice's theory of *conventional
implicature* with Strawson's (and his followers') theory of *semantic
presupposition*. **OR** What is semantic presupposition? Is
many-valued logic a suitable way of representing semantic presuppositions?
### 3. Paraconsistency and the liar paradox
* (*) @Tarski-semantic-conception
* (*) @Priest-logic-of-paradox
* (*) Beall and Glanzberg. "Liar Paradox".
*Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*
* @Soames-truth, ch 5.
* Priest. "Dialetheism". *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*
* @Glanzberg-liar
**Essay question:** TBA
### 4. Modal logic and possible worlds semantics
* (*) @Loux-possible, ch. 1
* (*) @Lewis-plurality, pp. 1-20
* Garson, J. "Modal logic". *Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy*
**Essay question:** Which, if any, is the correct logic of
metaphysical modality? (e.g. T? S4? S5?)
### 5. Modal realism and its rivals
* (*) @Stalnaker-possible-worlds
* (*) @Lewis-plurality, ch. 3
Forrest's defence of pictoral? / magical? ersatzism:
* @Forrest-worlds
* @Lewis-structural-universals
* @Forrest-magic
Inwagen's defence of magical? ersatzism:
* @Inwagen-two-concepts
* @Jubien-magic
**Essay question:** Must an actualist theory of possible worlds
involve primitive modality?
### 6. On trans-world identity and counterpart theory
* (*) @Chisholm-identity (also found in Loux, *ibid*)
* (*) @Kripke-naming-necessity, pp. 42-46
* (*) @Lewis-plurality, pp. 192-209
* @Sider-humphrey
* @Lewis-counterpart-theory
**Essay question:** Do individuals exist in more than one possible
world?
### 7. Identity across times and worlds
* (*) @Lewis-plurality pp. 202-205
* (*) @Sider-four-dimensionalism ch. 1 and 4
* (*) @Parsons-endurance7
* (*) @Haslanger-persistence
* @Inwagen-four-dimensional
* @Heller-hunks ch. 1
* The rest of Sider's book
**Essay question:** Do object persist through time by perduring or enduring?
### 8. TBA