[patch] tls + ipv6 Patch

tls+ipv6-1.1.11-20020613.patch (text/plain), 337.81 KB, created by Philipp Morger on 2002-07-15 08:28:11 UTC

diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/Makefile.in	Sat Jun  8 20:49:42 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/Makefile.in	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -6,7 +6,8 @@
 	src/lmtp src/trivial-rewrite src/qmgr src/smtp src/bounce src/pipe \
 	src/showq src/postalias src/postcat src/postconf src/postdrop \
 	src/postkick src/postlock src/postlog src/postmap src/postqueue \
-	src/postsuper src/nqmgr src/qmqpd src/spawn src/flush src/virtual
+	src/postsuper src/nqmgr src/qmqpd src/spawn src/flush src/virtual \
+	src/tlsmgr
 MANDIRS	= proto man html
 
 default: update
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/master.cf postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/master.cf
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/master.cf	Sat Jun  8 20:21:38 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/master.cf	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -70,11 +70,16 @@
 # 		(yes)	(yes)	(yes)	(never)	(50)
 # ==========================================================================
 smtp	  inet	n	-	n	-	-	smtpd
+#smtps	  inet	n	-	n	-	-	smtpd
+#  -o smtpd_tls_wrappermode=yes -o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes
+#submission	inet	n	-	n	-	-	smtpd
+#  -o smtpd_enforce_tls=yes -o smtpd_sasl_auth_enable=yes
 #628	  inet	n	-	n	-	-	qmqpd
 pickup	  fifo	n	-	n	60	1	pickup
 cleanup	  unix	n	-	n	-	0	cleanup
 qmgr	  fifo	n	-	n	300	1	qmgr
 #qmgr	  fifo	n	-	n	300	1	nqmgr
+#tlsmgr	  fifo	-	-	n	300	1	tlsmgr
 rewrite	  unix	-	-	n	-	-	trivial-rewrite
 bounce	  unix	-	-	n	-	0	bounce
 defer	  unix	-	-	n	-	0	bounce
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/postfix-files postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/postfix-files
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/postfix-files	Sun May 26 23:27:31 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/postfix-files	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 $daemon_directory/smtp:f:root:-:755
 $daemon_directory/smtpd:f:root:-:755
 $daemon_directory/spawn:f:root:-:755
+$daemon_directory/tlsmgr:f:root:-:755
 $daemon_directory/trivial-rewrite:f:root:-:755
 $daemon_directory/virtual:f:root:-:755
 $command_directory/postalias:f:root:-:755
@@ -139,6 +140,7 @@
 $manpage_directory/man8/smtp.8:f:root:-:644
 $manpage_directory/man8/smtpd.8:f:root:-:644
 $manpage_directory/man8/spawn.8:f:root:-:644
+$manpage_directory/man8/tlsmgr.8:f:root:-:644
 $manpage_directory/man8/trivial-rewrite.8:f:root:-:644
 $manpage_directory/man8/virtual.8:f:root:-:644
 $sample_directory/sample-aliases.cf:f:root:-:644
@@ -166,6 +168,7 @@
 $sample_directory/sample-rewrite.cf:f:root:-:644
 $sample_directory/sample-smtp.cf:f:root:-:644
 $sample_directory/sample-smtpd.cf:f:root:-:644
+$sample_directory/sample-tls.cf:f:root:-:644
 $sample_directory/sample-transport.cf:f:root:-:644
 $sample_directory/sample-virtual.cf:f:root:-:644
 $readme_directory/DB_README:f:root:-:644
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-auth.cf postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/sample-auth.cf
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-auth.cf	Fri Mar 29 22:36:53 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/sample-auth.cf	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -117,3 +117,15 @@
 #
 #smtp_sasl_security_options = 
 smtp_sasl_security_options = noplaintext
+
+# Sending AUTH data over an unencrypted channel poses a security risk. When
+# smtpd_tls_enforce_tls is set, AUTH will only be announced and accepted,
+# once the TLS layer has been activated via the STARTTLS protocol. If
+# TLS layer encryption is optional, it may however still be useful to only
+# offer AUTH, when TLS is active. To not break compatiblity with unpatched
+# postfix versions, the default is to accept AUTH without encryption. In
+# order to change this behaviour, set smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes.
+# THIS OPTION ONLY WORKS WITH SSL/TLS SUPPORT COMPILED IN.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_auth_only = no
+
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-smtp.cf postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/sample-smtp.cf
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-smtp.cf	Tue Mar 26 22:46:30 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/sample-smtp.cf	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -188,6 +188,14 @@
 #
 smtp_helo_timeout = 300s
 
+# The smtp_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
+# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
+#
+# In case of problems the client does NOT try the next address on
+# the mail exchanger list.
+#
+# smtp_starttls_timeout = 300s
+
 # The smtp_mail_timeout parameter specifies the SMTP client timeout
 # for sending the SMTP MAIL FROM command, and for receiving the server
 # response.
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-smtpd.cf postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/sample-smtpd.cf
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-smtpd.cf	Sat Jun  8 20:21:38 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/sample-smtpd.cf	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -116,6 +116,11 @@
 # 
 strict_rfc821_envelopes = no
 
+# The smtpd_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
+# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
+#
+# smtpd_starttls_timeout = 300s
+
 #
 # TARPIT CONTROLS
 #
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-tls.cf postfix-1.1.11-20020613/conf/sample-tls.cf
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/conf/sample-tls.cf	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/conf/sample-tls.cf	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,497 @@
+# DO NOT EDIT THIS FILE. EDIT THE MAIN.CF FILE INSTEAD. THE STUFF
+# HERE JUST SERVES AS AN EXAMPLE.
+#
+# This file contains example settings of Postfix configuration
+# parameters that control the behaviour of the TLS extensions.
+#
+# We strictly seperate between server side TLS (smtpd_) and client side
+# TLS (smtp_), as for practical reasons we might choose differently.
+
+# Section with SMTPD specific settings
+
+# To use TLS we do need a certificate and a private key. Both must be in
+# "pem" format, the private key must not be encrypted, that does mean:
+# it must be accessable without password. Both parts (certificate and
+# private key) may be in the same file.
+#
+# Both RSA and DSA are certificates are supported. Typically you will only
+# have RSA certificates issued by a commercial CA, also the tools supplied
+# with OpenSSL will by default issue RSA certificates.
+# You can have both at the same time, in this case the cipher used decides,
+# which certificate is presented. For Netscape and OpenSSL clients without
+# special cipher choices, the RSA certificate is preferred.
+#
+# In order to check the certificates, the CA-certificate (in case of a
+# certificate chain, all CA-certificates) must be available.
+# You should add these certificates to the server certificate, the server
+# certificate first, then the issuing CA(s).
+#
+# Example: the certificate for "server.dom.ain" was issued by "intermediate CA"
+# which itself has a certificate of "root CA". Create the server.pem file by
+# 'cat server_cert.pem intemediate_CA.pem root_CA.pem > server.pem'
+#
+# If you want to accept certificates issued by these CAs yourself, you can
+# also add the CA-certificates to the smtpd_tls_CAfile, in which case it is
+# not necessary to have them in the smtpd_tls_[d]cert_file.
+#
+# A certificate supplied here must be useable as SSL server certificate and
+# hence pass the "openssl verify -purpose sslserver ..." test.
+#
+smtpd_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/server.pem
+smtpd_tls_key_file = $smtpd_tls_cert_file
+#
+# Its DSA counterparts:
+smtpd_tls_dcert_file = /etc/postfix/server-dsa.pem
+smtpd_tls_dkey_file = $smtpd_tls_dcert_file
+
+# The certificate was issued by a certification authority (CA), the CA-cert
+# of which must be available, if not in the certificate file.
+# This file may also contain the the CA certificates of other trusted CAs.
+# You must use this file for the list of trusted CAs if you want to use
+# chroot-mode. No default is supplied for this value as of now.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_CAfile = /etc/postfix/CAcert.pem
+
+# To verify the peer certificate, we need to know the certificates of
+# certification authorities. These certificates in "pem" format are
+# collected in a directory. The same CAs are offered to clients for
+# client verification. Don't forget to create the necessary "hash"
+# links with $OPENSSL_HOME/bin/c_rehash /etc/postfix/certs. A typical
+# place for the CA-certs may also be $OPENSSL_HOME/certs, so there is
+# no default and you explicitly have to set the value here!
+#
+# To use this option in chroot mode, this directory itself or a copy of it
+# must be inside the chroot jail. Please note also, that the CAs in this
+# directory are not listed to the client, so that e.g. Netscape might not
+# offer certificates issued by them.
+#
+# I therefore discourage the use of this option.
+#
+smtpd_tls_CApath = /etc/postfix/certs
+
+# To get additional information during the TLS setup and negotiations
+# you can increase the loglevel from 0..4:
+# 0: No output about the TLS subsystem
+# 1: Printout startup and certificate information
+# 2: 1 + Printout of levels during negotiation
+# 3: 2 + Hex and ASCII dump of negotiation process
+# 4: 3 + Hex and ASCII dump of complete transmission after STARTTLS
+# Use loglevel 3 only in case of problems. Use of loglevel 4 is strongly
+# discouraged.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_loglevel = 0
+
+# To include information about the protocol and cipher used as well as the
+# client and issuer CommonName into the "Received:" header, set the
+# smtpd_tls_received_header variable to true. The default is no, as the
+# information is not necessarily authentic. Only the final destination
+# is reliable, since the headers might have been changed in between.
+#
+#smtpd_tls_received_header = yes
+
+# By default TLS is disabled, so no difference to plain postfix is visible.
+# Explicitely switch it on using "smtpd_use_tls". (Note: when invoked
+# via "sendmail -bs", STARTTLS is never offered due to insufficient
+# privileges to access the private key. This is intended behaviour.)
+#
+smtpd_use_tls = yes
+
+# You can ENFORCE the use of TLS, so that no commands (except QUIT of course)
+# are allowed without TLS. According to RFC2487 this MUST NOT be applied
+# in case of a publicly-referenced SMTP server. So this option is off
+# by default and should only seldom be used. Using this option implies
+# smtpd_use_tls = yes. (Note: when invoked via "sendmail -bs", STARTTLS
+# is never offered due to insufficient privileges to access the private key.
+# This is intended behaviour.)
+#
+# smtpd_enforce_tls = no
+
+# Besides RFC2487 some clients, namely Outlook [Express] prefer to run the
+# non-standard "wrapper" mode, not the STARTTLS enhancement to SMTP.
+# This is true for OE (Win32 < 5.0 and Win32 >=5.0 when run on a port!=25
+# and OE (5.01 Mac on all ports).
+# It is strictly discouraged to use this mode from main.cf. If you want to
+# support this service, enable a special port in master.cf. Port 465 (smtps)
+# was once chosen for this feature.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_wrappermode = no
+
+# To receive a client certificate, the server must explicitly ask for one.
+# Hence netscape will either complain if no certificate is available (for
+# the list of CAs in /etc/postfix/certs) or will offer you client certificates
+# to choose from. This might be annoying, so this option is "off" by default.
+# You will however need the certificate if you want to to e.g. certificate
+# based relaying.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = no
+
+# You may also decide to REQUIRE a client certificate to allow TLS connections.
+# I don't think it will be necessary often, it is however included here for
+# completeness. This option implies smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = yes
+#
+# Please be aware, that this will inhibit TLS connections without a proper
+# certificate and only makes sense, when normal submission is disabled and
+# TLS is enforced (smtpd_enforce_tls). Otherwise clients may bypass by simply
+# not using STARTTLS at all. When TLS is not enforced, the connection will be
+# handled, as if only smtpd_tls_ask_ccert = yes would be set and an information
+# is logged.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_req_ccert = no
+
+# The verification depth for client certificates. A depth of 1 is sufficient,
+# if the certificate ist directly issued by a CA listed in the CA locations.
+# The default value (5) should also suffice for longer chains (root CA issues
+# special CA which then issues the actual certificate...)
+#
+# smtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth = 5
+
+# Sending AUTH data over an unencrypted channel poses a security risk. When
+# smtpd_tls_enforce_tls is set, AUTH will only be announced and accepted,
+# once the TLS layer has been activated via the STARTTLS protocol. If
+# TLS layer encryption is optional, it may however still be useful to only
+# offer AUTH, when TLS is active. To not break compatiblity with unpatched
+# postfix versions, the default is to accept AUTH without encryption. In
+# order to change this behaviour, set smtpd_tls_auth_only = yes.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_auth_only = no
+
+# The server and client negotiate a session, which takes some computer time
+# and network bandwidth. The session is cached only in the smtpd process
+# actually using this session and is lost when the process dies.
+# To share the session information between the smtpd processes, a disc based
+# session cache can be used based on the SDBM databases (routines included
+# in Postfix/TLS). Since concurrent writing must be supported, only SDBM
+# can be used.
+#
+smtpd_tls_session_cache_database = sdbm:/etc/postfix/smtpd_scache
+
+# The cached sessions time out after a certain amount of time. For Postfix/TLS
+# I do not use the OpenSSL default of 300sec, but a longer time of 3600sec
+# (=1 hour). RFC2246 recommends a maximum of 24 hours.
+#
+# smtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout = 3600s
+
+# Two additional options has been added for relay control to the UCE rules:
+#   permit_tls_clientcerts	(a)
+# and
+#   permit_tls_all_clientcerts. (b)
+#
+# If one of these options is added to
+#   smtpd_recipient_restrictions,
+# postfix will relay if 
+# (a) a valid (it passed the verification) client certificate is presented
+#     and its fingerprint is listed in the list of client certs
+#     (relay_clientcerts),
+# (b) any valid (it passed the verification) client certificate is presented.
+#
+# Option (b) must only be used, if a special CA issues the certificates and
+# only this CA is listed as trusted CA. If other CAs are trusted, any owner
+# of a valid (SSL client)-certificate can relay. Option (b) can be practical
+# for a specically created email relay. It is however recommended to stay with
+# option (a) and list all certificates, as (b) does not permit any control
+# when a certificate must no longer be used (e.g. an employee leaving).
+#
+# smtpd_recipient_restrictions = ... permit_tls_clientcerts ...
+
+# The list of client certificates for which relaying will be allowed.
+# Unfortunately the routines for lists in postfix use whitespaces as
+# seperators and choke on special chars. So using the certificate
+# X509ONELINES is quite impractical. We will use the fingerprints at
+# this point, as they are difficult to fake but easy to use for lookup.
+# As postmap (when using e.g. db) insists of having a pair of key and value,
+# but we only need the key, the value can be chosen freely, e.g. the name
+# of the user or host:
+# D7:04:2F:A7:0B:8C:A5:21:FA:31:77:E1:41:8A:EE:80 lutzpc.at.home
+#
+# relay_clientcerts = hash:/etc/postfix/relay_clientcerts
+
+# To influence the cipher selection scheme, you can give cipherlist-string.
+# A detailed description would go to far here, please refer to the openssl
+# documentation.
+# If you don't know what to do with it, simply don't touch it and leave the
+# (openssl-)compiled in default!
+#
+# DO NOT USE " to enclose the string, just the string!!!
+#
+# smtpd_tls_cipherlist = DEFAULT
+
+# If you want to take advantage of ciphers with EDH, DH parameters are needed.
+# There are built in DH parameters for both 1025bit and 512bit available. It
+# is however better to have "own" parameters, since otherwise it would "pay"
+# for a possible attacker to start a brute force attack against these
+# parameters commonly used by everybody. For this reason, the parameters
+# chosen are already different from those distributed with other TLS packages.
+#
+# To generate your own set of parameters, use
+# openssl gendh -out /etc/postfix/dh_1024.pem -2 -rand /var/run/egd-pool 1024
+# openssl gendh -out /etc/postfix/dh_512.pem -2 -rand /var/run/egd-pool 512
+# (your source for "entropy" might vary; on Linux there is /dev/random, on
+# other system, you might consider the "Entropy Gathering Daemon EGD", 
+# available at http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/.
+#
+smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file = /etc/postfix/dh_1024.pem
+smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file = /etc/postfix/dh_512.pem
+
+# The smtpd_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
+# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
+#
+# smtpd_starttls_timeout = 300s
+
+# Section with SMTP specific settings
+
+# During the startup negotiation we might present a certificate to the server.
+# Netscape is rather clever here and lets the user select between only those
+# certs that will match the CAs accepted from the server. As I simply use
+# the integrated "SSL_connect()" from the OpenSSL package, this is not
+# possible by now and we have to chose just one cert.
+# So for now the default is to use _no_ cert and key unless explictly
+# set here. It is possible to use the same key/cert pair as for the server.
+# If a cert is to be presented, it must be in "pem" format, the private key
+# must not be encrypted, that does mean: it must be accessable without
+# password. Both parts (certificate and private key) may be in the
+# same file.
+#
+# In order to check the certificates, the CA-certificate (in case of a
+# certificate chain, all CA-certificates) must be available.
+# You should add these certificates to the server certificate, the server
+# certificate first, then the issuing CA(s).
+#
+# Example: the certificate for "client.dom.ain" was issued by "intermediate CA"
+# which itself has a certificate of "root CA". Create the client.pem file by
+# 'cat client_cert.pem intemediate_CA.pem root_CA.pem > client.pem'
+#
+# If you want to accept certificates issued by these CAs yourself, you can
+# also add the CA-certificates to the smtp_tls_CAfile, in which case it is
+# not necessary to have them in the smtp_tls_[d]cert_file.
+#
+# A certificate supplied here must be useable as SSL client certificate and
+# hence pass the "openssl verify -purpose sslclient ..." test.
+#
+smtp_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/client.pem
+smtp_tls_key_file = $smtp_tls_cert_file
+
+# The certificate was issued by a certification authority (CA), the CA-cert
+# of which must be available, if not in the certificate file.
+# This file may also contain the the CA certificates of other trusted CAs.
+# You must use this file for the list of trusted CAs if you want to use
+# chroot-mode. No default is supplied for this value as of now.
+#
+smtp_tls_CAfile = /etc/postfix/CAcert.pem
+
+# To verify the peer certificate, we need to know the certificates of
+# certification authorities. These certificates in "pem" format are
+# collected in a directory. Don't forget to create the necessary "hash"
+# links with $OPENSSL_HOME/bin/c_rehash /etc/postfix/certs. A typical
+# place for the CA-certs may also be $OPENSSL_HOME/certs, so there is
+# no default and you explicitly have to set the value here!
+#
+# To use this option in chroot mode, this directory itself or a copy of it
+# must be inside the chroot jail.
+#
+smtp_tls_CApath = /etc/postfix/certs
+
+# To get additional information during the TLS setup and negotiations
+# you can increase the loglevel from 0..4:
+# 0: No output about the TLS subsystem
+# 1: Printout startup and certificate information
+# 2: 1 + Printout of levels during negotiation
+# 3: 2 + Hex and ASCII dump of negotiation process
+# 4: 3 + Hex and ASCII dump of complete transmission after STARTTLS
+# Use loglevel 3 only in case of problems. Use of loglevel 4 is strongly
+# discouraged.
+#
+smtp_tls_loglevel = 0
+
+# The server and client negotiate a session, which takes some computer time
+# and network bandwidth. The session is cached only in the smtpd process
+# actually using this session and is lost when the process dies.
+# To share the session information between the smtp processes, a disc based
+# session cache can be used based on the SDBM databases (routines included
+# in Postfix/TLS). Since concurrent writing must be supported, only SDBM
+# can be used.
+#
+smtp_tls_session_cache_database = sdbm:/etc/postfix/smtp_scache
+
+# The cached sessions time out after a certain amount of time. For Postfix/TLS
+# I do not use the OpenSSL default of 300sec, but a longer time of 3600sec
+# (=1 hour). RFC2246 recommends a maximum of 24 hours.
+#
+# smtp_tls_session_cache_timeout = 3600s
+
+# By default TLS is disabled, so no difference to plain postfix is visible.
+# If you enable TLS it will be used when offered by the server.
+# WARNING: I didn't have access to other software (except those explicitely
+# listed) to test the interaction. On corresponding mailing list
+# there was a discussion going on about MS exchange servers offering
+# STARTTLS even if it is not configured, so it might be wise to not
+# use this option on your central mail hub, as you don't know in advance
+# whether you are going to hit such host. Use the recipient/site specific
+# options instead.
+# HINT: I have it switched on on my mailservers and did experience one
+# single failure since client side TLS is implemented. (There was one
+# misconfired MS Exchange server; I contacted ths admin.) Hence, I am happy
+# with it running all the time, but I am interested in testing anyway.
+# You have been warned, however :-)
+#
+# In case of failure, a "4xx" code is issued and the mail stays in the queue.
+#
+# Explicitely switch it on here, if you want it.
+#
+smtp_use_tls = yes
+
+# You can ENFORCE the use of TLS, so that only connections with TLS will
+# be accepted. Additionally, the hostname of the receiving host is matched
+# against the CommonName in the certificate. Also, the certificate must
+# be verified "Ok", so that a CA trusted by the client must have issued
+# the certificate. If the certificate doesn't verify or the hostname doesn't
+# match, a "4xx" will be issued and the mail stays in the queue.
+# The hostname used in the check is beyond question, as it must be the
+# principle hostname (no CNAME allowed here).
+# The behaviour may be changed with the smtp_tls_enforce_peername option
+#
+# This option is useful only if you are definitely sure that you will only
+# connect to servers supporting RFC2487 _and_ with valid certificates.
+# I use it for my clients which will only send email to one mailhub, which
+# does offer the necessary STARTTLS support.
+#
+# smtp_enforce_tls = no
+
+# As of RFC2487 the requirements for hostname checking for MTA clients are
+# not set. When in smtp_enforce_tls mode, the option smtp_tls_enforce_peername
+# can be set to "no" to disable strict peername checking. In this case, the
+# mail delivery will be continued, if a TLS connection was established
+# _and_ the peer certificate passed verification _but_ regardless of the
+# CommonName listed in the certificate. This option only applies to the
+# default setting smtp_enforce_tls_mode, special settings in the
+# smtp_tls_per_site table override smtp_tls_enforce_peername.
+#
+# This can make sense in closed environment where special CAs are created.
+# If not used carefully, this option opens the danger of a "man-in-the-middle"
+# attack (the CommonName of this attacker is logged).
+#
+# smtp_tls_enforce_peername = yes
+
+# As generally trying TLS can be a bad idea (some hosts offer STARTTLS but
+# the negotiation will fail leading to unexplainable failures, it may be
+# a good idea to decide based on the recipient or the mailhub to which you are
+# connecting.
+#
+# Deciding per recipient may be difficult, since a singe email can have
+# several recipients. We use the "nexthop" mechanism inside postfix.
+# When an email is to be delivered, the "nexthop" is obtained. If it matches
+# an entry in the smtp_tls_per_site list, appropriate action is taken.
+# Since entries in the transport table or the use of a relay_host override
+# the nexthop setting, in these cases the relay_host etc must be listed
+# in the table. In any case, the hostname of the peer to be contacted is
+# looked up (that is: the MX or the name of the host, if no MX is given).
+#
+# Special hint for enforcement mode:
+# Since there is no secure mechanism for DNS lookups available, the
+# recommended setup is: put the sensible domains with their mailhost
+# into the transport table (since you can asure security of this table
+# unlike DNS), then set MUST mode for this mailhost.
+#
+# Format of the table:
+# The keys entries are on the left hand side, no wildcards allowed. On the
+# right hand side the keywords NONE (don't use TLS at all), MAY (try to use
+# STARTTLS if offered, no problem if not), MUST (enforce usage of STARTTLS,
+# check server certificate CommonName against server FQDN), MUST_NOPEERMATCH
+# (enforce usage of STARTTLS and verify certificate, but ignore differences
+# between CommonName and server FQDN).
+# dom.ain		NONE
+# host.dom.ain		MAY
+# important.host	MUST
+# some.host.dom.ain	MUST_NOPEERMATCH
+#
+# If an entry is not matched, the default policy is applied; if the default
+# policy is "enforce", NONE explicitely switches it off, otherwise the
+# "enforce" mode is used even for MAY entries.
+#
+smtp_tls_per_site = hash:/etc/postfix/tls_per_site
+
+# The verification depth for server certificates. A depth of 1 is sufficient,
+# if the certificate ist directly issued by a CA listed in the CA locations.
+# The default value (5) should also suffice for longer chains (root CA issues
+# special CA which then issues the actual certificate...)
+#
+# smtp_tls_scert_verifydepth = 5
+
+# As we decide on a "per site" basis, wether to use TLS or not, it would be
+# good to have a list of sites, that offered "STARTTLS'. We can collect it
+# ourselves with this option.
+#
+# If activated and TLS is not already enabled for this host, a line is added
+# to the logfile:
+# postfix/smtp[pid]: Host offered STARTTLS: [name.of.host]
+#
+smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer = yes
+
+# To influence the cipher selection scheme, you can give cipherlist-string.
+# A detailed description would go to far here, please refer to the openssl
+# documentation.
+# If you don't know what to do with it, simply don't touch it and leave the
+# (openssl-)compiled in default!
+#
+# DO NOT USE " to enclose the string, just the string!!!
+#
+# smtp_tls_cipherlist = DEFAULT
+
+# The smtp_starttls_timeout parameter limits the time in seconds to write and
+# read operations during TLS start and stop handhake procedures.
+#
+# In case of problems the client does NOT try the next address on
+# the mail exchanger list.
+#
+# smtp_starttls_timeout = 300s
+
+# In order to seed the PRNG Pseude Random Number Generator, random data is
+# needed. The PRNG pool is maintained by the "tlsmgr" daemon and is used
+# (read) by the smtp[d] processes after adding some more entropy by stirring
+# in time and process id.
+# The file, which is from time to time rewritten by the tlsmgr, is created
+# if not existant. A default value is given; the default should probably
+# be on the /var partition but _not_ inside chroot jail.
+#
+# tls_random_exchange_name = /etc/postfix/prng_exch
+
+# To feed the PRNG pool, entropy is being read from an external source,
+# both at startup and during run.
+# Specify a good entropy source here, like EGD or /dev/urandom; make sure
+# to only use non-blocking sources.
+# In both cases, 32 bytes are read at each re-seeding event (which is an
+# amount of 256bits and hence good enough for 128bit symmetric keys).
+# You must specify the type of source: "dev:" for a device special file
+# or "egd:" for a source with EGD compatible socket interface. A maximum
+# 255 bytes is read from these sources in each step.
+# If you specify a normal file, a larger amount of data can be read.
+#
+# The entropy source is queried again after a certain amount of time. The
+# time is calculated using the PRNG, it is between 0 and the time specified,
+# default is a maximum of 1 hour.
+#
+# tls_random_source = dev:/dev/urandom
+tls_random_source = egd:/var/run/egd-pool
+# tls_random_bytes = 32
+# tls_random_reseed_period = 3600s
+
+# The PRNG pool inside tlsmgr is used to re-generate the 1024 byte file
+# being read by smtp[d]. The time, after which the exchange file is
+# rewritten is calculated using the PRNG, it is between 0 and the time
+# specified, default is a maximum of 60 seconds.
+#
+# tls_random_upd_period = 60s
+
+# If you have a entropy source available, that is not easily drained (like
+# /dev/urandom), the daemons can also load additional entropy on startup from
+# the source specified. By default an amount of 32 bytes is read, the
+# equivalent to 256 bits. This is more than enough to generate a 128bit
+# (or 168bit) session key, but we may have to generate more than one.
+# Usage of this option may drain EGD (consider the case of 50 smtp starting
+# up with a full queue and "postfix start", which will request 1600bytes
+# of entropy). This is however not fatal, as long as "entropy" data could
+# be read from the exchange file.
+#
+# tls_daemon_random_source = dev:/dev/urandom
+tls_daemon_random_source = egd:/var/run/egd-pool
+# tls_daemon_random_bytes = 32
+
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/makedefs postfix-1.1.11-20020613/makedefs
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/makedefs	Sat May  4 15:36:19 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/makedefs	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -52,6 +52,21 @@
 SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null`
 RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null`
 VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null`
+if test -f /usr/include/netinet6/in6.h; then
+	grep __KAME__ /usr/include/netinet6/in6.h 2>&1 >/dev/null
+	if [ $?  = 1 ]; then
+		INET6=
+	else
+		if [ -f /usr/local/v6/lib/libinet6.a ]; then
+			INET6=kame
+		else
+			INET6=kame-merged
+		fi
+	fi
+fi
+if [ -z "$INET6" -a -f /usr/include/netinet/ip6.h -a -f /usr/include/linux/icmpv6.h ]; then
+	INET6=linux
+fi
 
 case "$VERSION" in
  dcosx*) SYSTEM=$VERSION;;
@@ -295,6 +310,26 @@
 esac
 
 : ${CC='gcc $(WARN)'} ${OPT='-O'} ${DEBUG='-g'} ${AWK=awk}
+
+case "$INET6" in
+kame)
+	CCARGS="$CCARGS -DINET6 -D__ss_family=ss_family -D__ss_len=ss_len"
+	if test -f /usr/local/v6/lib/libinet6.a; then
+		SYSLIBS="$SYSLIBS -L/usr/local/v6/lib -linet6"
+	fi
+	;;
+kame-merged)
+	CCARGS="$CCARGS -DINET6 -D__ss_family=ss_family -D__ss_len=ss_len"
+	;;
+linux)
+	CCARGS="$CCARGS -DINET6 -D__ss_family=ss_family"
+	if test -f /usr/include/libinet6/netinet/ip6.h -a \
+		-f /usr/lib/libinet6.a; then 
+		CCARGS="$CCARGS -I/usr/include/libinet6 -DUSAGI_LIBINET6"
+		SYSLIBS="$SYSLIBS -linet6"
+	fi
+	;;
+esac
 
 export SYSTYPE AR ARFL RANLIB SYSLIBS CC OPT DEBUG AWK OPTS
 
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/man/man8/tlsmgr.8 postfix-1.1.11-20020613/man/man8/tlsmgr.8
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/man/man8/tlsmgr.8	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/man/man8/tlsmgr.8	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+.TH TLSMGR 8 
+.ad
+.fi
+.SH NAME
+tlsmgr
+\-
+Postfix TLS session cache and PRNG handling manager
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.na
+.nf
+\fBtlsmgr\fR [generic Postfix daemon options]
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.ad
+.fi
+The tlsmgr process does housekeeping on the session cache database
+files. It runs through the databases and removes expired entries
+and entries written by older (incompatible) versions.
+
+The tlsmgr is responsible for the PRNG handling. The used internal
+OpenSSL PRNG has a pool size of 8192 bits (= 1024 bytes). The pool
+is initially seeded at startup from an external source (EGD or
+/dev/urandom) and additional seed is obtained later during program
+run at a configurable period. The exact time of seed query is
+using random information and is equally distributed in the range of
+[0-\fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR] with a \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
+having a default of 1 hour.
+
+Tlsmgr can be run chrooted and with dropped privileges, as it will
+connect to the entropy source at startup.
+
+The PRNG is additionally seeded internally by the data found in the
+session cache and timevalues.
+
+Tlsmgr reads the old value of the exchange file at startup to keep
+entropy already collected during previous runs.
+
+From the PRNG random pool a cryptographically strong 1024 byte random
+sequence is written into the PRNG exchange file. The file is updated
+periodically with the time changing randomly from
+[0-\fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR].
+.SH STANDARDS
+.na
+.nf
+.SH SECURITY
+.na
+.nf
+.ad
+.fi
+Tlsmgr is not security-sensitive. It only deals with external data
+to be fed into the PRNG, the contents is never trusted. The session
+cache housekeeping will only remove entries if expired and will never
+touch the contents of the cached data.
+.SH DIAGNOSTICS
+.ad
+.fi
+Problems and transactions are logged to the syslog daemon.
+.SH BUGS
+.ad
+.fi
+There is no automatic means to limit the number of entries in the
+session caches and/or the size of the session cache files.
+.SH CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
+.na
+.nf
+.ad
+.fi
+The following \fBmain.cf\fR parameters are especially relevant to
+this program. See the Postfix \fBmain.cf\fR file for syntax details
+and for default values. Use the \fBpostfix reload\fR command after
+a configuration change.
+.SH Session Cache
+.ad
+.fi
+.IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_database\fR
+Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP server session
+cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
+.IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+Expiry time of SMTP server session cache entries in seconds. Entries
+older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
+performed periodically every \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
+.IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_database\fR
+Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP client session
+cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
+.IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+Expiry time of SMTP client session cache entries in seconds. Entries
+older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
+performed periodically every \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
+.SH Pseudo Random Number Generator
+.ad
+.fi
+.IP \fBtls_random_source\fR
+Name of the EGD socket or device or regular file to obtain entropy
+from. The type of entropy source must be specified by preceding the
+name with the appropriate type: egd:/path/to/egd_socket,
+dev:/path/to/devicefile, or /path/to/regular/file.
+tlsmgr opens \fBtls_random_source\fR and tries to read
+\fBtls_random_bytes\fR from it.
+.IP \fBtls_random_bytes\fR
+Number of bytes to be read from \fBtls_random_source\fR.
+Default value is 32 bytes. If using EGD, a maximum of 255 bytes is read.
+.IP \fBtls_random_exchange_name\fR
+Name of the file written by tlsmgr and read by smtp and smtpd at
+startup. The length is 1024 bytes. Default value is
+/etc/postfix/prng_exch.
+.IP \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
+Time in seconds until the next reseed from external sources is due.
+This is the maximum value. The actual point in time is calculated
+with a random factor equally distributed between 0 and this maximum
+value. Default is 3600 (= 60 minutes).
+.IP \fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR
+Time in seconds until the PRNG exchange file is updated with new
+pseude random values. This is the maximum value. The actual point
+in time is calculated with a random factor equally distributed
+between 0 and this maximum value. Default is 60 (= 1 minute).
+.SH SEE ALSO
+.na
+.nf
+smtp(8) SMTP client
+smtpd(8) SMTP server
+.SH LICENSE
+.na
+.nf
+.ad
+.fi
+The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+.SH AUTHOR(S)
+.na
+.nf
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/dns/dns_lookup.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/dns/dns_lookup.c
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/dns/dns_lookup.c	Sun Feb  4 19:16:20 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/dns/dns_lookup.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -132,6 +132,9 @@
 } DNS_REPLY;
 
 #define INET_ADDR_LEN	4		/* XXX */
+#ifdef INET6
+#define INET6_ADDR_LEN	16
+#endif
 
 /* dns_query - query name server and pre-parse the reply */
 
@@ -337,6 +340,19 @@
 	memcpy(temp, pos, fixed->length);
 	data_len = fixed->length;
 	break;
+#ifdef INET6
+    case T_AAAA:
+	if (fixed->length != INET6_ADDR_LEN) {
+	    msg_warn("extract_answer: bad IPv6 address length: %d", fixed->length);
+	    return (0);
+	}
+	if (fixed->length > sizeof(temp))
+	    msg_panic("dns_get_rr: length %d > DNS_NAME_LEN",
+		      fixed->length);
+	memcpy(temp, pos, fixed->length);
+	data_len = fixed->length;
+	break;
+#endif
     case T_TXT:
 	data_len = MIN2(pos[0] + 1, MIN2(fixed->length + 1, sizeof(temp)));
 	for (src = pos + 1, dst = (unsigned char *) (temp);
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/Makefile.in	Tue Jun 11 03:13:13 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/Makefile.in	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
 	tok822_resolve.c tok822_rewrite.c tok822_tree.c xtext.c bounce_log.c \
 	flush_clnt.c mail_conf_time.c mbox_conf.c mbox_open.c abounce.c \
 	verp_sender.c match_parent_style.c mime_state.c header_token.c \
-	strip_addr.c
+	strip_addr.c pfixtls.c wildcard_inet_addr.c
 OBJS	= been_here.o bounce.o canon_addr.o cleanup_strerror.o clnt_stream.o \
 	debug_peer.o debug_process.o defer.o deliver_completed.o \
 	deliver_flock.o deliver_pass.o deliver_request.o domain_list.o \
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
 	tok822_resolve.o tok822_rewrite.o tok822_tree.o xtext.o bounce_log.o \
 	flush_clnt.o mail_conf_time.o mbox_conf.o mbox_open.o abounce.o \
 	verp_sender.o match_parent_style.o mime_state.o header_token.o \
-	strip_addr.o
+	strip_addr.o pfixtls.o wildcard_inet_addr.o
 HDRS	= been_here.h bounce.h canon_addr.h cleanup_user.h clnt_stream.h \
 	config.h debug_peer.h debug_process.h defer.h deliver_completed.h \
 	deliver_flock.h deliver_pass.h deliver_request.h domain_list.h \
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
 	sys_exits.h timed_ipc.h tok822.h xtext.h bounce_log.h flush_clnt.h \
 	mbox_conf.h mbox_open.h abounce.h qmqp_proto.h verp_sender.h \
 	match_parent_style.h quote_flags.h mime_state.h header_token.h \
-	lex_822.h strip_addr.h
+	lex_822.h strip_addr.h pfixtls.h wildcard_inet_addr.h
 TESTSRC	= rec2stream.c stream2rec.c recdump.c
 WARN	= -W -Wformat -Wimplicit -Wmissing-prototypes \
 	-Wparentheses -Wstrict-prototypes -Wswitch -Wuninitialized \
@@ -1160,3 +1160,16 @@
 xtext.o: ../../include/vbuf.h
 xtext.o: ../../include/vstring.h
 xtext.o: xtext.h
+pfixtls.o: pfixtls.c
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/iostuff.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/mymalloc.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/vstring.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/vstream.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/dict.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/myflock.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/stringops.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/msg.h
+pfixtls.o: ../../include/connect.h
+pfixtls.o: mail_params.h
+pfixtls.o: pfixtls.h
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_params.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/mail_params.c
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_params.c	Sat Jun  8 20:21:40 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/mail_params.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -223,6 +223,31 @@
 int     var_in_flow_delay;
 char   *var_par_dom_match;
 char   *var_config_dirs;
+char   *var_tls_rand_exch_name;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file;
+int     var_smtpd_tls_loglevel;
+char   *var_smtpd_tls_scache_db;
+int     var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout;
+char   *var_smtp_tls_cert_file;
+char   *var_smtp_tls_key_file;
+char   *var_smtp_tls_dcert_file;
+char   *var_smtp_tls_dkey_file;
+char   *var_smtp_tls_CAfile;
+char   *var_smtp_tls_CApath;
+char   *var_smtp_tls_cipherlist;
+int     var_smtp_tls_loglevel;
+char   *var_smtp_tls_scache_db;
+int     var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout;
+char   *var_tls_daemon_rand_source;
+int     var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
 
 char   *var_import_environ;
 char   *var_export_environ;
@@ -467,6 +492,26 @@
 	VAR_SHOWQ_SERVICE, DEF_SHOWQ_SERVICE, &var_showq_service, 1, 0,
 	VAR_ERROR_SERVICE, DEF_ERROR_SERVICE, &var_error_service, 1, 0,
 	VAR_FLUSH_SERVICE, DEF_FLUSH_SERVICE, &var_flush_service, 1, 0,
+	VAR_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME, DEF_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME, &var_tls_rand_exch_name, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_cert_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_key_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_CAfile, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH, &var_smtpd_tls_CApath, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST, &var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE, &var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB, &var_smtpd_tls_scache_db, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_cert_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_key_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_dcert_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_dkey_file, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE, &var_smtp_tls_CAfile, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH, &var_smtp_tls_CApath, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_CLIST, DEF_SMTP_TLS_CLIST, &var_smtp_tls_cipherlist, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB, DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB, &var_smtp_tls_scache_db, 0, 0,
+	VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE, DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE, &var_tls_daemon_rand_source, 0, 0,
 	0,
     };
     static CONFIG_STR_FN_TABLE function_str_defaults_2[] = {
@@ -489,6 +534,9 @@
 	VAR_TOKEN_LIMIT, DEF_TOKEN_LIMIT, &var_token_limit, 1, 0,
 	VAR_MIME_MAXDEPTH, DEF_MIME_MAXDEPTH, &var_mime_maxdepth, 1, 0,
 	VAR_MIME_BOUND_LEN, DEF_MIME_BOUND_LEN, &var_mime_bound_len, 1, 0,
+ 	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL, &var_smtpd_tls_loglevel, 0, 0,
+ 	VAR_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL, DEF_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL, &var_smtp_tls_loglevel, 0, 0,
+ 	VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES, DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES, &var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes, 0, 0,
 	0,
     };
     static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_defaults[] = {
@@ -499,6 +547,8 @@
 	VAR_FORK_DELAY, DEF_FORK_DELAY, &var_fork_delay, 1, 0,
 	VAR_FLOCK_DELAY, DEF_FLOCK_DELAY, &var_flock_delay, 1, 0,
 	VAR_FLOCK_STALE, DEF_FLOCK_STALE, &var_flock_stale, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME, &var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout, 0, 0,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME, DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME, &var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout, 0, 0,
 	VAR_DAEMON_TIMEOUT, DEF_DAEMON_TIMEOUT, &var_daemon_timeout, 1, 0,
 	VAR_IN_FLOW_DELAY, DEF_IN_FLOW_DELAY, &var_in_flow_delay, 0, 10,
 	0,
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_params.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/mail_params.h
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_params.h	Mon Jun 10 19:49:56 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/mail_params.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -458,6 +458,34 @@
 #define DEF_DUP_FILTER_LIMIT	1000
 extern int var_dup_filter_limit;
 
+#define VAR_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME	"tls_random_exchange_name"
+#define DEF_TLS_RAND_EXCH_NAME	"${config_directory}/prng_exch"
+extern char *var_tls_rand_exch_name;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_RAND_SOURCE	"tls_random_source"
+#define DEF_TLS_RAND_SOURCE	""
+extern char *var_tls_rand_source;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_RAND_BYTES	"tls_random_bytes"
+#define DEF_TLS_RAND_BYTES	32
+extern int var_tls_rand_bytes;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE	"tls_daemon_random_source"
+#define DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_SOURCE	""
+extern char *var_tls_daemon_rand_source;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES	"tls_daemon_random_bytes"
+#define DEF_TLS_DAEMON_RAND_BYTES	32
+extern int var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD	"tls_random_reseed_period"
+#define DEF_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD	"3600s"
+extern int var_tls_reseed_period;
+
+#define VAR_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD	"tls_random_prng_update_period"
+#define DEF_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD "60s"
+extern int var_tls_prng_upd_period;
+
  /*
   * Queue manager: relocated databases.
   */
@@ -678,6 +706,10 @@
 #define DEF_SMTP_HELO_TMOUT	"300s"
 extern int var_smtp_helo_tmout;
 
+#define VAR_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT	"smtp_starttls_timeout"
+#define DEF_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT	"300s"
+extern int var_smtp_starttls_tmout;
+
 #define VAR_SMTP_MAIL_TMOUT	"smtp_mail_timeout"
 #define DEF_SMTP_MAIL_TMOUT	"300s"
 extern int var_smtp_mail_tmout;
@@ -734,6 +766,12 @@
 #define DEF_SMTP_BIND_ADDR	""
 extern char *var_smtp_bind_addr;
 
+#ifdef INET6
+#define VAR_SMTP_BIND_ADDR6	"smtp_bind_address6"
+#define DEF_SMTP_BIND_ADDR6	""
+extern char *var_smtp_bind_addr6;
+#endif
+
 #define VAR_SMTP_HELO_NAME	"smtp_helo_name"
 #define DEF_SMTP_HELO_NAME	"$myhostname"
 extern char *var_smtp_helo_name;
@@ -767,6 +805,10 @@
 #define DEF_SMTPD_TMOUT		"300s"
 extern int var_smtpd_tmout;
 
+#define VAR_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT "smtpd_starttls_timeout"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_STARTTLS_TMOUT "300s"
+extern int var_smtpd_starttls_tmout;
+
 #define VAR_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT	"smtpd_recipient_limit"
 #define DEF_SMTPD_RCPT_LIMIT	1000
 extern int var_smtpd_rcpt_limit;
@@ -795,6 +837,150 @@
 #define DEF_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS	""
 extern char *var_smtpd_noop_cmds;
 
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER	"smtpd_tls_wrappermode"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER	0
+extern bool var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_USE_TLS	"smtpd_use_tls"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_USE_TLS	0
+extern bool var_smtpd_use_tls;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS	"smtpd_enforce_tls"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS	0
+extern bool var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY	"smtpd_tls_auth_only"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY 0
+extern bool var_smtpd_tls_auth_only;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT	"smtpd_tls_ask_ccert"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT	0
+extern bool var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT	"smtpd_tls_req_ccert"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT	0
+extern bool var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD	"smtpd_tls_ccert_verifydepth"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD	5
+extern int var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE	"smtpd_tls_cert_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CERT_FILE	""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE	"smtpd_tls_key_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_KEY_FILE	"$smtpd_tls_cert_file"
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE "smtpd_tls_dcert_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DCERT_FILE ""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE	"smtpd_tls_dkey_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_DKEY_FILE	"$smtpd_tls_dcert_file"
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE	"smtpd_tls_CAfile"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_FILE	""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH	"smtpd_tls_CApath"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CA_PATH	""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST	"smtpd_tls_cipherlist"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CLIST	""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE	"smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_512_FILE	""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE	"smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_1024_FILE	""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL	"smtpd_tls_loglevel"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_LOGLEVEL	0
+extern int var_smtpd_tls_loglevel;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD	"smtpd_tls_received_header"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD	0
+extern bool var_smtpd_tls_received_header;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB	"smtpd_tls_session_cache_database"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHE_DB	""
+extern char *var_smtpd_tls_scache_db;
+
+#define VAR_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME	"smtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout"
+#define DEF_SMTPD_TLS_SCACHTIME	"3600s"
+extern int var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE	"smtp_tls_per_site"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE	""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_per_site;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_USE_TLS	"smtp_use_tls"
+#define DEF_SMTP_USE_TLS	0
+extern bool var_smtp_use_tls;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS	"smtp_enforce_tls"
+#define DEF_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS	0
+extern bool var_smtp_enforce_tls;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN	"smtp_tls_enforce_peername"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN	1
+extern bool var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCERT_VD	"smtp_tls_scert_verifydepth"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCERT_VD	5
+extern int var_smtp_tls_scert_vd;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE	"smtp_tls_cert_file"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CERT_FILE	""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_cert_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE	"smtp_tls_key_file"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_KEY_FILE	"$smtp_tls_cert_file"
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_key_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE "smtp_tls_dcert_file"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_DCERT_FILE ""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_dcert_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE	"smtp_tls_dkey_file"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_DKEY_FILE	"$smtp_tls_dcert_file"
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_dkey_file;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE	"smtp_tls_CAfile"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_FILE	""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_CAfile;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH	"smtp_tls_CApath"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CA_PATH	""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_CApath;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_CLIST	"smtp_tls_cipherlist"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_CLIST	""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_cipherlist;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL	"smtp_tls_loglevel"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_LOGLEVEL	0
+extern int var_smtp_tls_loglevel;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER	"smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER	0
+extern bool var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB	"smtp_tls_session_cache_database"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHE_DB	""
+extern char *var_smtp_tls_scache_db;
+
+#define VAR_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME	"smtp_tls_session_cache_timeout"
+#define DEF_SMTP_TLS_SCACHTIME	"3600s"
+extern int var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout;
+
  /*
   * SASL authentication support, SMTP server side.
   */
@@ -953,6 +1139,16 @@
 #define DEF_LMTP_QUIT_TMOUT	"300s"
 extern int var_lmtp_quit_tmout;
 
+#define VAR_LMTP_BIND_ADDR	"lmtp_bind_address"
+#define DEF_LMTP_BIND_ADDR	""
+extern char *var_lmtp_bind_addr;
+
+#ifdef INET6
+#define VAR_LMTP_BIND_ADDR6	"lmtp_bind_address6"
+#define DEF_LMTP_BIND_ADDR6	""
+extern char *var_lmtp_bind_addr6;
+#endif
+
  /*
   * Cleanup service. Header info that exceeds $header_size_limit bytes forces
   * the start of the message body.
@@ -1088,6 +1284,10 @@
 #define DEF_RELAY_DOMAINS	"$mydestination"
 extern char *var_relay_domains;
 
+#define VAR_RELAY_CCERTS	"relay_clientcerts"
+#define DEF_RELAY_CCERTS	""
+extern char *var_relay_ccerts;
+
 #define VAR_CLIENT_CHECKS	"smtpd_client_restrictions"
 #define DEF_CLIENT_CHECKS	""
 extern char *var_client_checks;
@@ -1167,6 +1367,8 @@
 #define PERMIT_AUTH_DEST	"permit_auth_destination"
 #define REJECT_UNAUTH_DEST	"reject_unauth_destination"
 #define CHECK_RELAY_DOMAINS	"check_relay_domains"
+#define PERMIT_TLS_CLIENTCERTS	"permit_tls_clientcerts"
+#define PERMIT_TLS_ALL_CLIENTCERTS	"permit_tls_all_clientcerts"
 #define VAR_RELAY_CODE		"relay_domains_reject_code"
 #define DEF_RELAY_CODE		554
 extern int var_relay_code;
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_proto.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/mail_proto.h
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mail_proto.h	Sun May 12 16:46:59 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/mail_proto.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #define MAIL_SERVICE_LOCAL	"local"
 #define MAIL_SERVICE_PICKUP	"pickup"
 #define MAIL_SERVICE_QUEUE	"qmgr"
+#define MAIL_SERVICE_TLSMGR	"tlsmgr"
 #define MAIL_SERVICE_RESOLVE	"resolve"
 #define MAIL_SERVICE_REWRITE	"rewrite"
 #define MAIL_SERVICE_VIRTUAL	"virtual"
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mynetworks.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/mynetworks.c
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/mynetworks.c	Sun Feb 25 02:46:07 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/mynetworks.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@
 #include <vstring.h>
 #include <inet_addr_list.h>
 #include <name_mask.h>
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#endif
 
 /* Global library. */
 
@@ -75,6 +80,9 @@
 const char *mynetworks(void)
 {
     static VSTRING *result;
+#ifdef INET6
+    char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+#endif
 
     if (result == 0) {
 	char   *myname = "mynetworks";
@@ -87,6 +95,9 @@
 	int     junk;
 	int     i;
 	int     mask_style;
+#ifdef INET6
+	struct sockaddr *sa;
+#endif
 
 	mask_style = name_mask("mynetworks mask style", mask_styles,
 			       var_mynetworks_style);
@@ -96,8 +107,19 @@
 	my_mask_list = own_inet_mask_list();
 
 	for (i = 0; i < my_addr_list->used; i++) {
+#ifdef INET6
+	    sa = (struct sockaddr *)&my_addr_list->addrs[i];
+	    if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET) {
+		if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6)
+		    vstring_sprintf_append(result, "XAATODOmynetworks ");
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    addr = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr.s_addr);
+	    mask = ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)&my_mask_list->addrs[i])->sin_addr.s_addr);
+#else
 	    addr = ntohl(my_addr_list->addrs[i].s_addr);
 	    mask = ntohl(my_mask_list->addrs[i].s_addr);
+#endif
 
 	    switch (mask_style) {
 
@@ -119,8 +141,15 @@
 		    mask = IN_CLASSD_NET;
 		    shift = IN_CLASSD_NSHIFT;
 		} else {
+#ifdef INET6
+		    if (getnameinfo(sa, SA_LEN(sa), hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0,
+			    NI_NUMERICHOST))
+			strncpy(hbuf, "???", sizeof(hbuf));
+		    msg_fatal("%s: bad address class: %s", myname, hbuf);
+#else
 		    msg_fatal("%s: bad address class: %s",
 			      myname, inet_ntoa(my_addr_list->addrs[i]));
+#endif
 		}
 		break;
 
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/own_inet_addr.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/own_inet_addr.c
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/own_inet_addr.c	Tue Jul 31 20:38:29 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/own_inet_addr.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:47 2002
@@ -39,6 +39,10 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#endif
 
 #ifdef STRCASECMP_IN_STRINGS_H
 #include <strings.h>
@@ -101,10 +105,11 @@
      */
     else {
 	bufp = hosts = mystrdup(var_inet_interfaces);
-	while ((host = mystrtok(&bufp, sep)) != 0)
+	while ((host = mystrtok(&bufp, sep)) != 0) {
 	    if (inet_addr_host(addr_list, host) == 0)
 		msg_fatal("config variable %s: host not found: %s",
 			  VAR_INET_INTERFACES, host);
+	}
 	myfree(hosts);
 
 	/*
@@ -121,15 +126,39 @@
 	    msg_fatal("could not find any active network interfaces");
 	for (nvirtual = 0; nvirtual < addr_list->used; nvirtual++) {
 	    for (nlocal = 0; /* see below */ ; nlocal++) {
-		if (nlocal >= local_addrs.used)
+		if (nlocal >= local_addrs.used) {
+#ifdef INET6
+		    char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+		    if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr_list->addrs[nvirtual],
+		        SS_LEN(addr_list->addrs[nvirtual]), hbuf,
+		        sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
+			strncpy(hbuf, "???", sizeof(hbuf));
+		    msg_fatal("parameter %s: no local interface found for %s",
+			      VAR_INET_INTERFACES, hbuf);
+#else
 		    msg_fatal("parameter %s: no local interface found for %s",
 			      VAR_INET_INTERFACES,
 			      inet_ntoa(addr_list->addrs[nvirtual]));
+#endif
+		}
+#ifdef INET6
+		if (addr_list->addrs[nvirtual].ss_family == 
+		    local_addrs.addrs[nlocal].ss_family &&
+		    SS_LEN(addr_list->addrs[nvirtual]) == 
+		    SS_LEN(local_addrs.addrs[nlocal]) &&
+		    memcmp(&addr_list->addrs[nvirtual],
+		    &local_addrs.addrs[nlocal],
+		    SS_LEN(local_addrs.addrs[nlocal])) == 0) {
+		    inet_addr_list_append(mask_list, (struct sockaddr *)&local_masks.addrs[nlocal]);
+		    break;
+		}
+#else
 		if (addr_list->addrs[nvirtual].s_addr
 		    == local_addrs.addrs[nlocal].s_addr) {
 		    inet_addr_list_append(mask_list, &local_masks.addrs[nlocal]);
 		    break;
 		}
+#endif
 	    }
 	}
 	inet_addr_list_free(&local_addrs);
@@ -139,6 +168,42 @@
 
 /* own_inet_addr - is this my own internet address */
 
+#ifdef INET6
+int     own_inet_addr(struct sockaddr * addr)
+{
+    int     i;
+    char *p, *q;
+    int l;
+    struct sockaddr *sa;
+
+    if (addr_list.used == 0)
+	own_inet_addr_init(&addr_list, &mask_list);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < addr_list.used; i++) {
+	sa = (struct sockaddr *)&addr_list.addrs[i];
+	if (addr->sa_family != sa->sa_family)
+	    continue;
+	switch (addr->sa_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+	    p = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)addr)->sin_addr;
+	    q = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)&addr_list.addrs[i])->sin_addr;
+	    l = sizeof(struct in_addr);
+	    break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+	    /* XXX scope */
+	    p = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr)->sin6_addr;
+	    q = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr_list.addrs[i])->sin6_addr;
+	    l = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    continue;
+	}
+	if (memcmp(p, q, l) == 0)
+	    return (1);
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+#else
 int     own_inet_addr(struct in_addr * addr)
 {
     int     i;
@@ -149,8 +214,8 @@
     for (i = 0; i < addr_list.used; i++)
 	if (addr->s_addr == addr_list.addrs[i].s_addr)
 	    return (1);
-    return (0);
 }
+#endif
 
 /* own_inet_addr_list - return list of addresses */
 
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/own_inet_addr.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/own_inet_addr.h
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/own_inet_addr.h	Sat Feb 24 02:25:32 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/own_inet_addr.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -15,11 +15,18 @@
   * System library.
   */
 #include <netinet/in.h>
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
 
  /*
   * External interface.
   */
+#ifdef INET6
+extern int own_inet_addr(struct sockaddr *);
+#else
 extern int own_inet_addr(struct in_addr *);
+#endif
 extern struct INET_ADDR_LIST *own_inet_addr_list(void);
 extern struct INET_ADDR_LIST *own_inet_mask_list(void);
 
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/peer_name.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/peer_name.c
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/peer_name.c	Sun Jan 28 16:23:02 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/peer_name.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -69,12 +69,32 @@
 PEER_NAME *peer_name(int sock)
 {
     static PEER_NAME peer;
-    struct sockaddr_in sin;
-    SOCKADDR_SIZE len = sizeof(sin);
+    union sockunion {
+	struct {
+	    u_char si_len;
+	    u_char si_family;
+	    u_short si_port;
+	} su_si;
+	struct sockaddr peer_un;
+	struct sockaddr_in peer_un4;
+#ifdef INET6
+	struct sockaddr_in6 peer_un6;
+#endif
+    } p_un;
+#define sun p_un.peer_un
+#define sin p_un.peer_un4
+#ifdef INET6
+#define sin6 p_un.peer_un6
+    static char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+    static char abuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+#else
     struct hostent *hp;
+#endif
+    SOCKADDR_SIZE len = sizeof(p_un);
 
-    if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, &len) == 0) {
-	switch (sin.sin_family) {
+    if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&p_un, &len) == 0) {
+	switch (p_un.peer_un.sa_family) {
+#ifndef INET6
 	case AF_INET:
 	    peer.type = PEER_TYPE_INET;
 	    hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &(sin.sin_addr),
@@ -83,6 +103,24 @@
 			 hp->h_name : "unknown");
 	    peer.addr = inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr);
 	    return (&peer);
+#else
+	case AF_INET:
+	    peer.type = PEER_TYPE_INET;
+	    if (getnameinfo(&sun, len, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0)
+		peer.name = "unknown";
+	    else
+		peer.name = hbuf;
+	    peer.addr = abuf;
+	    return (&peer);
+	case AF_INET6:
+	    peer.type = PEER_TYPE_INET6;
+	    if (getnameinfo(&sun, len, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0)
+		peer.name = "unknown";
+	    else
+		peer.name = hbuf;
+	    peer.addr = abuf;
+	    return (&peer);
+#endif
 	case AF_UNSPEC:
 	case AF_UNIX:
 	    peer.type = PEER_TYPE_LOCAL;
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/peer_name.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/peer_name.h
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/peer_name.h	Fri Dec 11 19:55:32 1998
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/peer_name.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
 #define PEER_TYPE_UNKNOWN	0
 #define PEER_TYPE_INET		1
 #define PEER_TYPE_LOCAL		2
+#ifdef INET6
+#define PEER_TYPE_INET6		3
+#endif
 
 extern PEER_NAME *peer_name(int);
 
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/pfixtls.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/pfixtls.c
--- postfix-1.1.11.20020613-orig/src/global/pfixtls.c	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11.20020613/src/global/pfixtls.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,2742 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*	pfixtls
+/* SUMMARY
+/*	interface to openssl routines
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*	#include <pfixtls.h>
+/*
+/*	const long scache_db_version;
+/*	const long openssl_version;
+/*
+/*	int pfixtls_serverengine;
+/*
+/*	int pfixtls_clientengine;
+/*
+/*	int pfixtls_timed_read(fd, buf, len, timeout, unused_context)
+/*	int fd;
+/*	void *buf;
+/*	unsigned len;
+/*	int timeout;
+/*	void *context;
+/*
+/*	int pfixtls_timed_write(fd, buf, len, timeout, unused_context);
+/*	int fd;
+/*	void *buf;
+/*	unsigned len;
+/*	int timeout;
+/*	void *context;
+/*
+/*	int pfixtls_init_serverengine(verifydepth, askcert);
+/*	int verifydepth;
+/*	int askcert;
+/*
+/*	int pfixtls_start_servertls(stream, timeout, peername, peeraddr,
+/*				    tls_info, requirecert);
+/*	VSTREAM *stream;
+/*	int timeout;
+/*	const char *peername;
+/*	const char *peeraddr;
+/*	tls_info_t *tls_info;
+/*	int requirecert;
+/*
+/*	int pfixtls_stop_servertls(stream, failure, tls_info);
+/*	VSTREAM *stream;
+/*	int failure;
+/*	tls_info_t *tls_info;
+/*	
+/*	int pfixtls_init_clientengine(verifydepth);
+/*	int verifydepth;
+/*
+/*	int pfixtls_start_clienttls(stream, timeout, peername, peeraddr,
+/*				    tls_info);
+/*	VSTREAM *stream;
+/*	int timeout;
+/*	const char *peername;
+/*	const char *peeraddr;
+/*	tls_info_t *tls_info;
+/*
+/*	int pfixtls_stop_clienttls(stream, failure, tls_info);
+/*	VSTREAM *stream;
+/*	int failure;
+/*	tls_info_t *tls_info;
+/*
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/*	This module is the interface between Postfix and the OpenSSL library.
+/*
+/*	pfixtls_timed_read() reads the requested number of bytes calling
+/*	SSL_read(). pfixtls_time_read() will only be called indirect
+/*	as a VSTREAM_FN function.
+/*	pfixtls_timed_write() is the corresponding write function.
+/*
+/*	pfixtls_init_serverengine() is called once when smtpd is started
+/*	in order to initialize as much of the TLS stuff as possible.
+/*	The certificate handling is also decided during the setup phase,
+/*	so that a peer specific handling is not possible.
+/*
+/*	pfixtls_init_clientengine() is the corresponding function called
+/*	in smtp. Here we take the peer's (server's) certificate in any
+/*	case.
+/*
+/*	pfixtls_start_servertls() activates the TLS feature for the VSTREAM
+/*	passed as argument. We expect that all buffers are flushed and the
+/*	TLS handshake can begin	immediately. Information about the peer
+/*	is stored into the tls_info structure passed as argument.
+/*
+/*	pfixtls_stop_servertls() sends the "close notify" alert via
+/*	SSL_shutdown() to the peer and resets all connection specific
+/*	TLS data. As RFC2487 does not specify a seperate shutdown, it
+/*	is supposed that the underlying TCP connection is shut down
+/*	immediately afterwards, so we don't care about additional data
+/*	coming through the channel.
+/*	If the failure flag is set, the session is cleared from the cache.
+/*
+/*	pfixtls_start_clienttls() and pfixtls_stop_clienttls() are the
+/*	corresponding functions for smtp.
+/*
+/*	Once the TLS connection is initiated, information about the TLS
+/*	state is available via the tls_info structure:
+/*	protocol holds the protocol name (SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1),
+/*	tls_info->cipher_name the cipher name (e.g. RC4/MD5),
+/*	tls_info->cipher_usebits the number of bits actually used (e.g. 40),
+/*	tls_info->cipher_algbits the number of bits the algorithm is based on
+/*	(e.g. 128).
+/*	The last two values may be different when talking to a crippled
+/*	- ahem - export controled peer (e.g. 40/128).
+/*
+/*	The status of the peer certificate verification is available in
+/*	pfixtls_peer_verified. It is set to 1, when the certificate could
+/*	be verified.
+/*	If the peer offered a certifcate, part of the certificate data are
+/*	available as:
+/*	tls_info->peer_subject X509v3-oneline with the DN of the peer
+/*	tls_info->peer_CN extracted CommonName of the peer
+/*	tls_info->peer_issuer  X509v3-oneline with the DN of the issuer
+/*	tls_info->peer_CN extracted CommonName of the issuer
+/*	tls_info->PEER_FINGERPRINT fingerprint of the certificate
+/*
+/* DESCRIPTION (SESSION CACHING)
+/*	In order to achieve high performance when using a lot of connections
+/*	with TLS, session caching is implemented. It reduces both the CPU load
+/*	(less cryptograpic operations) and the network load (the amount of
+/*	certificate data exchanged is reduced).
+/*	Since postfix uses a setup of independent processes for receiving
+/*	and sending email, the processes must exchange the session information.
+/*	Several connections at the same time between the identical peers can
+/*	occur, so uniqueness and race conditions have to be taken into
+/*	account.
+/*	I have checked both Apache-SSL (Ben Laurie), using a seperate "gcache"
+/*	process and Apache mod_ssl (Ralf S. Engelshall), using shared memory
+/*	between several identical processes spawned from one parent.
+/*
+/*	Postfix/TLS uses a database approach based on the internal "dict"
+/*	interface. Since the session cache information is approximately
+/*	1300 bytes binary data, it will not fit into the dbm/ndbm model.
+/*	It also needs write access to the database, ruling out most other
+/*	interface, leaving Berkeley DB, which however cannot handle concurrent
+/*	access by several processes. Hence a modified SDBM (public domain DBM)
+/*	with enhanced buffer size is used and concurrent write capability
+/*	is used. SDBM is part of Postfix/TLS.
+/*
+/*	Realization:
+/*	Both (client and server) session cache are realized by individual
+/*	cache databases. A common database would not make sense, since the
+/*	key criteria are different (session ID for server, peername for
+/*	client).
+/*
+/*	Server side:
+/*	Session created by OpenSSL have a 32 byte session id, yielding a
+/*	64 char file name. I consider these sessions to be unique. If they
+/*	are not, the last session will win, overwriting the older one in
+/*	the database. Remember: everything that is lost is a temporary
+/*	information and not more than a renegotiation will happen.
+/*	Originating from the same client host, several sessions can come
+/*	in (e.g. from several users sending mail with Netscape at the same
+/*	time), so the session id is the correct identifier; the hostname
+/*	is of no importance, here.
+/*
+/*	Client side:
+/*	We cannot recall sessions based on their session id, because we would
+/*	have to check every session on disk for a matching server name, so
+/*	the lookup has to be done based on the FQDN of the peer (receiving
+/*	host).
+/*	With regard to uniqueness, we might experience several open connections
+/*	to the same server at the same time. This is even very likely to
+/*	happen, since we might have several mails for the same destination
+/*	in the queue, when a queue run is started. So several smtp's might
+/*	negotiate sessions at the same time. We can however only save one
+/*	session for one host.
+/*	Like on the server side, the "last write" wins. The reason is
+/*	quite simple. If we don't want to overwrite old sessions, an old
+/*	session file will just stay in place until it is expired. In the
+/*	meantime we would lose "fresh" session however. So we will keep the
+/*	fresh one instead to avoid unnecessary renegotiations.
+/*
+/*	Session lifetime:
+/*	RFC2246 recommends a session lifetime of less than 24 hours. The
+/*	default is 300 seconds (5 minutes) for OpenSSL and is also used
+/*	this way in e.g. mod_ssl. The typical usage for emails might be
+/*	humans typing in emails and sending them, which might take just
+/*	a while, so I think 3600 seconds (1 hour) is a good compromise.
+/*	If the environment is save (the cached session contains secret
+/*	key data), one might even consider using a longer timeout. Anyway,
+/*	since everlasting sessions must be avoided, the session timeout
+/*	is done based on the creation date of the session and so each
+/*	session will timeout eventually.
+/*
+/*	Connection failures:
+/*	RFC2246 requires us to remove sessions if something went wrong.
+/*	Since the in-memory session cache of other smtp[d] processes cannot
+/*	be controlled by simple means, we completely rely on the disc
+/*	based session caching and remove all sessions from memory after
+/*	connection closure.
+/*
+/*	Cache cleanup:
+/*	Since old entries have to be removed from the session cache, a
+/*	cleanup process is needed that runs through the collected session
+/*	files on regular basis. The task is performed by tlsmgr based on
+/*	the timestamp created by pfixtls and included in the saved session,
+/*	so that tlsmgr has not to care about the SSL_SESSION internal data.
+/*
+/* BUGS
+/*	The memory allocation policy of the OpenSSL library is not well
+/*	documented, especially when loading sessions from disc. Hence there
+/*	might be memory leaks.
+/*
+/* LICENSE
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*	Lutz Jaenicke
+/*	BTU Cottbus
+/*	Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
+/*	Universitaetsplatz 3-4
+/*	D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
+/*--*/
+
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>			/* gettimeofday, not in POSIX */
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include <iostuff.h>
+#include <mymalloc.h>
+#include <vstring.h>
+#include <vstream.h>
+#include <dict.h>
+#include <myflock.h>
+#include <stringops.h>
+#include <msg.h>
+#include <connect.h>
+
+/* Application-specific. */
+
+#include "mail_params.h"
+#include "pfixtls.h"
+
+#define STR	vstring_str
+
+const tls_info_t tls_info_zero = {
+    0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, 0
+};
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+
+/* OpenSSL library. */
+
+#include <openssl/lhash.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/ssl.h>
+
+/* We must keep some of the info available */
+static const char hexcodes[] = "0123456789ABCDEF";
+
+/*
+ * When saving sessions, we want to make sure, that the lenght of the key
+ * is somehow limited. When saving client sessions, the hostname is used
+ * as key. According to HP-UX 10.20, MAXHOSTNAMELEN=64. Maybe new standards
+ * will increase this value, but as this will break compatiblity with existing
+ * implementations, we won't see this for long. We therefore choose a limit
+ * of 64 bytes.
+ * The length of the (TLS) session id can be up to 32 bytes according to
+ * RFC2246, so it fits well into the 64bytes limit.
+ */
+#define ID_MAXLENGTH	64		/* Max ID length in bytes */
+
+/*
+ * The session_id_context is set, such that the client knows which services
+ * on a host share the same session information (on the postfix host may
+ * as well run a TLS-enabled webserver.
+ */
+static char server_session_id_context[] = "Postfix/TLS"; /* anything will do */
+static int TLScontext_index = -1;
+static int TLSpeername_index = -1;
+static int do_dump = 0;
+static DH *dh_512 = NULL, *dh_1024 = NULL;
+static SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+
+static int rand_exch_fd = -1;
+
+static DICT *scache_db = NULL;
+const long scache_db_version = 0x00000003L;
+const long openssl_version = OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER;
+
+
+int     pfixtls_serverengine = 0;
+static int pfixtls_serveractive = 0;	/* available or not */
+
+int     pfixtls_clientengine = 0;
+static int pfixtls_clientactive = 0;	/* available or not */
+
+/*
+ * Define a maxlength for certificate onelines. The length is checked by
+ * all routines when copying.
+ */
+#define CCERT_BUFSIZ 256
+
+typedef struct {
+  SSL *con;
+  BIO *internal_bio;			/* postfix/TLS side of pair */
+  BIO *network_bio;			/* netsork side of pair */
+  char peer_subject[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+  char peer_issuer[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+  char peer_CN[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+  char issuer_CN[CCERT_BUFSIZ];
+  unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+  char fingerprint[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 3];
+  char peername_save[129];
+  int enforce_verify_errors;
+  int enforce_CN;
+} TLScontext_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+    int pid;
+    struct timeval tv;
+} randseed_t;
+
+static randseed_t randseed;
+
+/*
+ * Finally some "backup" DH-Parameters to be loaded, if no parameters are
+ * explicitely loaded from file.
+ */
+static unsigned char dh512_p[] = {
+    0x88, 0x3F, 0x00, 0xAF, 0xFC, 0x0C, 0x8A, 0xB8, 0x35, 0xCD, 0xE5, 0xC2,
+    0x0F, 0x55, 0xDF, 0x06, 0x3F, 0x16, 0x07, 0xBF, 0xCE, 0x13, 0x35, 0xE4,
+    0x1C, 0x1E, 0x03, 0xF3, 0xAB, 0x17, 0xF6, 0x63, 0x50, 0x63, 0x67, 0x3E,
+    0x10, 0xD7, 0x3E, 0xB4, 0xEB, 0x46, 0x8C, 0x40, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x91, 0xA5,
+    0x6E, 0x01, 0x45, 0xDE, 0xC9, 0xB1, 0x1F, 0x64, 0x54, 0xFA, 0xD9, 0xAB,
+    0x4F, 0x70, 0xBA, 0x5B,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dh512_g[] = {
+    0x02,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dh1024_p[] = {
+    0xB0, 0xFE, 0xB4, 0xCF, 0xD4, 0x55, 0x07, 0xE7, 0xCC, 0x88, 0x59, 0x0D,
+    0x17, 0x26, 0xC5, 0x0C, 0xA5, 0x4A, 0x92, 0x23, 0x81, 0x78, 0xDA, 0x88,
+    0xAA, 0x4C, 0x13, 0x06, 0xBF, 0x5D, 0x2F, 0x9E, 0xBC, 0x96, 0xB8, 0x51,
+    0x00, 0x9D, 0x0C, 0x0D, 0x75, 0xAD, 0xFD, 0x3B, 0xB1, 0x7E, 0x71, 0x4F,
+    0x3F, 0x91, 0x54, 0x14, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x30, 0x25, 0x1C, 0xEB, 0xDF, 0x72,
+    0x9C, 0x4C, 0xF1, 0x89, 0x0D, 0x68, 0x3F, 0x94, 0x8E, 0xA4, 0xFB, 0x76,
+    0x89, 0x18, 0xB2, 0x91, 0x16, 0x90, 0x01, 0x99, 0x66, 0x8C, 0x53, 0x81,
+    0x4E, 0x27, 0x3D, 0x99, 0xE7, 0x5A, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0xD5, 0xEC, 0xE2, 0x7E,
+    0xFA, 0xED, 0x01, 0x18, 0xC2, 0x78, 0x25, 0x59, 0x06, 0x5C, 0x39, 0xF6,
+    0xCD, 0x49, 0x54, 0xAF, 0xC1, 0xB1, 0xEA, 0x4A, 0xF9, 0x53, 0xD0, 0xDF,
+    0x6D, 0xAF, 0xD4, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0x9B,
+};
+
+static unsigned char dh1024_g[] = {
+    0x02,
+};
+
+/*
+ * DESCRIPTION: Keeping control of the network interface using BIO-pairs.
+ *
+ * When the TLS layer is active, all input/output must be filtered through
+ * it. On the other hand to handle timeout conditions, full control over
+ * the network socket must be kept. This rules out the "normal way" of
+ * connecting the TLS layer directly to the socket.
+ * The TLS layer is realized with a BIO-pair:
+ *
+ *     postfix  |   TLS-engine
+ *       |      |
+ *       +--------> SSL_operations()
+ *              |     /\    ||
+ *              |     ||    \/
+ *              |   BIO-pair (internal_bio)
+ *       +--------< BIO-pair (network_bio)
+ *       |      |
+ *     socket   |
+ *
+ * The normal postfix operations connect to the SSL operations to send
+ * and retrieve (cleartext) data. Inside the TLS-engine the data are converted
+ * to/from TLS protocol. The TLS functionality itself is only connected to
+ * the internal_bio and hence only has status information about this internal
+ * interface.
+ * Thus, if the SSL_operations() return successfully (SSL_ERROR_NONE) or want
+ * to read (SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) there may as well be data inside the buffering
+ * BIO-pair. So whenever an SSL_operation() returns without a fatal error,
+ * the BIO-pair internal buffer must be flushed to the network.
+ * NOTE: This is especially true in the SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ case: the TLS-layer
+ * might want to read handshake data, that will never come since its own
+ * written data will only reach the peer after flushing the buffer!
+ *
+ * The BIO-pair buffer size has been set to 8192 bytes, this is an arbitrary
+ * value that can hold more data than the typical PMTU, so that it does
+ * not force the generation of packets smaller than necessary.
+ * It is also larger than the default VSTREAM_BUFSIZE (4096, see vstream.h),
+ * so that large write operations could be handled within one call.
+ * The internal buffer in the network/network_bio handling layer has been
+ * set to the same value, since this seems to be reasonable. The code is
+ * however able to handle arbitrary values smaller or larger than the
+ * buffer size in the BIO-pair.
+ */
+
+const ssize_t BIO_bufsiz = 8192;
+
+/*
+ * The interface layer between network and BIO-pair. The BIO-pair buffers
+ * the data to/from the TLS layer. Hence, at any time, there may be data
+ * in the buffer that must be written to the network. This writing has
+ * highest priority because the handshake might fail otherwise.
+ * Only then a read_request can be satisfied.
+ */
+static int network_biopair_interop(int fd, int timeout, BIO *network_bio)
+{
+    int want_write;
+    int num_write;
+    int write_pos;
+    int from_bio;
+    int want_read;
+    int num_read;
+    int to_bio;
+#define NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE 8192
+    char buffer[8192];
+
+    while ((want_write = BIO_ctrl_pending(network_bio)) > 0) {
+	if (want_write > NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE)
+	    want_write = NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE;
+	from_bio = BIO_read(network_bio, buffer, want_write);
+
+	/*
+	 * Write the complete contents of the buffer. Since TLS performs
+	 * underlying handshaking, we cannot afford to leave the buffer
+	 * unflushed, as we could run into a deadlock trap (the peer
+	 * waiting for a final byte and we already waiting for his reply
+	 * in read position).
+	 */
+        write_pos = 0;
+	do {
+	    if (timeout > 0 && write_wait(fd, timeout) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+	    num_write = write(fd, buffer + write_pos, from_bio - write_pos);
+	    if (num_write <= 0)
+		return (-1);	/* something happened to the socket */
+	    write_pos += num_write;
+	} while (write_pos < from_bio);
+   }
+
+   while ((want_read = BIO_ctrl_get_read_request(network_bio)) > 0) {
+	if (want_read > NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE)
+	    want_read = NETLAYER_BUFFERSIZE;
+	if (timeout > 0 && read_wait(fd, timeout) < 0)
+	    return (-1);
+	num_read = read(fd, buffer, want_read);
+	if (num_read <= 0)
+	    return (-1);	/* something happened to the socket */
+	to_bio = BIO_write(network_bio, buffer, num_read);
+	if (to_bio != num_read)
+		msg_fatal("to_bio != num_read");
+    }
+
+    return (0);
+}
+
+static void pfixtls_print_errors(void);
+
+ /*
+  * Function to perform the handshake for SSL_accept(), SSL_connect(),
+  * and SSL_shutdown() and perform the SSL_read(), SSL_write() operations.
+  * Call the underlying network_biopair_interop-layer to make sure the
+  * write buffer is flushed after every operation (that did not fail with
+  * a fatal error).
+  */
+static int do_tls_operation(int fd, int timeout, TLScontext_t *TLScontext,
+			int (*hsfunc)(SSL *),
+			int (*rfunc)(SSL *, void *, int),
+			int (*wfunc)(SSL *, const void *, int),
+			char *buf, int num)
+{
+    int status;
+    int err;
+    int retval = 0;
+    int biop_retval;
+    int done = 0;
+
+    while (!done) {
+	if (hsfunc)
+	    status = hsfunc(TLScontext->con);
+	else if (rfunc)
+	    status = rfunc(TLScontext->con, buf, num);
+	else
+	    status = wfunc(TLScontext->con, (const char *)buf, num);
+	err = SSL_get_error(TLScontext->con, status);
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x0090581fL)
+	/*
+	 * There is a bug up to and including OpenSSL-0.9.5a: if an error
+	 * occurs while checking the peers certificate due to some certificate
+	 * error (e.g. as happend with a RSA-padding error), the error is put
+	 * onto the error stack. If verification is not enforced, this error
+	 * should be ignored, but the error-queue is not cleared, so we
+	 * can find this error here. The bug has been fixed on May 28, 2000.
+	 *
+	 * This bug so far has only manifested as
+	 * 4800:error:0407006A:rsa routines:RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1:block type is not 01:rsa_pk1.c:100:
+	 * 4800:error:04067072:rsa routines:RSA_EAY_PUBLIC_DECRYPT:padding check failed:rsa_eay.c:396:
+	 * 4800:error:0D079006:asn1 encoding routines:ASN1_verify:bad get asn1 object call:a_verify.c:109:
+	 * so that we specifically test for this error. We print the errors
+	 * to the logfile and automatically clear the error queue. Then we
+	 * retry to get another error code. We cannot do better, since we
+	 * can only retrieve the last entry of the error-queue without
+	 * actually cleaning it on the way.
+	 *
+	 * This workaround is secure, as verify_result is set to "failed"
+	 * anyway.
+	 */
+	if (err == SSL_ERROR_SSL) {
+	    if (ERR_peek_error() == 0x0407006AL) {
+		pfixtls_print_errors();	/* Keep information for the logfile */
+		msg_info("OpenSSL <= 0.9.5a workaround called: certificate errors ignored");
+		err = SSL_get_error(TLScontext->con, status);
+	    }
+	}
+#endif
+
+	switch (err) {
+	case SSL_ERROR_NONE:		/* success */
+	    retval = status;
+	    done = 1;			/* no break, flush buffer before */
+					/* leaving */
+	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
+	case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
+	    biop_retval = network_biopair_interop(fd, timeout,
+		TLScontext->network_bio);
+	    if (biop_retval < 0)
+		return (-1);		/* fatal network error */
+	    break;
+	case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:	/* connection was closed cleanly */
+	case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:		
+	case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
+	default:
+	    retval = status;
+	    done = 1;
+	    ;
+	}
+    };
+    return retval;
+}
+
+int pfixtls_timed_read(int fd, void *buf, unsigned buf_len, int timeout, 
+		       void *context)
+{
+    int     i;
+    int     ret;
+    char    mybuf[40];
+    char   *mybuf2;
+    TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+
+    TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)context;
+    if (!TLScontext)
+      msg_fatal("Called tls_timed_read() without TLS-context");
+ 
+    ret = do_tls_operation(fd, timeout, TLScontext, NULL, SSL_read, NULL,
+			  (char *)buf, buf_len);
+    if ((pfixtls_serveractive && var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 4) ||
+        (pfixtls_clientactive && var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 4)) {
+	mybuf2 = (char *) buf;
+	if (ret > 0) {
+	    i = 0;
+	    while ((i < 39) && (i < ret) && (mybuf2[i] != 0)) {
+		mybuf[i] = mybuf2[i];
+		i++;
+	    }
+	    mybuf[i] = '\0';
+	    msg_info("Read %d chars: %s", ret, mybuf);
+	}
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+int pfixtls_timed_write(int fd, void *buf, unsigned len, int timeout,
+			void *context)
+{
+    int     i;
+    char    mybuf[40];
+    char   *mybuf2;
+    TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+
+    TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)context;
+    if (!TLScontext)
+      msg_fatal("Called tls_timed_write() without TLS-context");
+
+    if ((pfixtls_serveractive && var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 4) ||
+	(pfixtls_clientactive && var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 4)) {
+	mybuf2 = (char *) buf;
+	if (len > 0) {
+	    i = 0;
+	    while ((i < 39) && (i < len) && (mybuf2[i] != 0)) {
+		mybuf[i] = mybuf2[i];
+		i++;
+	    }
+	    mybuf[i] = '\0';
+	    msg_info("Write %d chars: %s", len, mybuf);
+	}
+    }
+    return (do_tls_operation(fd, timeout, TLScontext, NULL, NULL, SSL_write,
+			     buf, len));
+}
+
+/* Add some more entropy to the pool by adding the actual time */
+
+static void pfixtls_stir_seed(void)
+{
+    GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
+    RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Skeleton taken from OpenSSL crypto/err/err_prn.c.
+ * Query the error stack and print the error string into the logging facility.
+ * Clear the error stack on the way.
+ */
+
+static void pfixtls_print_errors(void)
+{
+    unsigned long l;
+    char    buf[256];
+    const char   *file;
+    const char   *data;
+    int     line;
+    int     flags;
+    unsigned long es;
+
+    es = CRYPTO_thread_id();
+    while ((l = ERR_get_error_line_data(&file, &line, &data, &flags)) != 0) {
+	if (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING)
+	    msg_info("%lu:%s:%s:%d:%s:", es, ERR_error_string(l, buf),
+		     file, line, data);
+	else
+	    msg_info("%lu:%s:%s:%d:", es, ERR_error_string(l, buf),
+		     file, line);
+    }
+}
+
+ /*
+  * Set up the cert things on the server side. We do need both the
+  * private key (in key_file) and the cert (in cert_file).
+  * Both files may be identical.
+  *
+  * This function is taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c
+  */
+
+static int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX * ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file)
+{
+    if (cert_file != NULL) {
+	if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, cert_file) <= 0) {
+	    msg_info("unable to get certificate from '%s'", cert_file);
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    return (0);
+	}
+	if (key_file == NULL)
+	    key_file = cert_file;
+	if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file,
+					SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) {
+	    msg_info("unable to get private key from '%s'", key_file);
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    return (0);
+	}
+	/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
+         * the SSL context */
+	if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
+	    msg_info("Private key does not match the certificate public key");
+	    return (0);
+	}
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c */
+
+static RSA *tmp_rsa_cb(SSL * s, int export, int keylength)
+{
+    static RSA *rsa_tmp = NULL;
+
+    if (rsa_tmp == NULL) {
+	rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(keylength, RSA_F4, NULL, NULL);
+    }
+    return (rsa_tmp);
+}
+
+
+static DH *get_dh512(void)
+{
+    DH *dh;
+
+    if (dh_512 == NULL) {
+	/* No parameter file loaded, use the compiled in parameters */
+	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
+	dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh512_p, sizeof(dh512_p), NULL);
+	dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh512_g, sizeof(dh512_g), NULL);
+	if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
+	    return(NULL);
+	else
+	    dh_512 = dh;
+    }
+    return (dh_512);
+}
+
+static DH *get_dh1024(void)
+{
+    DH *dh;
+
+    if (dh_1024 == NULL) {
+	/* No parameter file loaded, use the compiled in parameters */
+	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return(NULL);
+	dh->p = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_p, sizeof(dh1024_p), NULL);
+	dh->g = BN_bin2bn(dh1024_g, sizeof(dh1024_g), NULL);
+	if ((dh->p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL))
+	    return(NULL);
+	else
+	    dh_1024 = dh;
+    }
+    return (dh_1024);
+}
+
+/* partly inspired by mod_ssl */
+
+static DH *tmp_dh_cb(SSL *s, int export, int keylength)
+{
+    DH *dh_tmp = NULL;
+   
+    if (export) {
+	if (keylength == 512)
+	    dh_tmp = get_dh512();	/* export cipher */
+	else if (keylength == 1024)
+	    dh_tmp = get_dh1024();	/* normal */
+	else
+	    dh_tmp = get_dh1024();	/* not on-the-fly (too expensive) */
+					/* so use the 1024bit instead */
+    }
+    else {
+	dh_tmp = get_dh1024();		/* sign-only certificate */
+    }
+    return (dh_tmp);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Skeleton taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c
+ *
+ * The verify_callback is called several times (directly or indirectly) from
+ * crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. It is called as a last check for several issues,
+ * so this verify_callback() has the famous "last word". If it does return "0",
+ * the handshake is immediately shut down and the connection fails.
+ *
+ * Postfix/TLS has two modes, the "use" mode and the "enforce" mode:
+ *
+ * In the "use" mode we never want the connection to fail just because there is
+ * something wrong with the certificate (as we would have sent happily without
+ * TLS).  Therefore the return value is always "1".
+ *
+ * In the "enforce" mode we can shut down the connection as soon as possible.
+ * In server mode TLS itself may be enforced (e.g. to protect passwords),
+ * but certificates are optional. In this case the handshake must not fail
+ * if we are unhappy with the certificate and return "1" in any case.
+ * Only if a certificate is required the certificate must pass the verification
+ * and failure to do so will result in immediate termination (return 0).
+ * In the client mode the decision is made with respect to the peername
+ * enforcement. If we strictly enforce the matching of the expected peername
+ * the verification must fail immediatly on verification errors. We can also
+ * immediatly check the expected peername, as it is the CommonName at level 0.
+ * In all other cases, the problem is logged, so the SSL_get_verify_result()
+ * will inform about the verification failure, but the handshake (and SMTP
+ * connection will continue).
+ *
+ * The only error condition not handled inside the OpenSSL-Library is the
+ * case of a too-long certificate chain, so we check inside verify_callback().
+ * We only take care of this problem, if "ok = 1", because otherwise the
+ * verification already failed because of another problem and we don't want
+ * to overwrite the other error message. And if the verification failed,
+ * there is no such thing as "more failed", "most failed"... :-)
+ */
+
+static int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX * ctx)
+{
+    char    buf[256];
+    char   *CN_lowercase;
+    char   *peername_left;
+    X509   *err_cert;
+    int     err;
+    int     depth;
+    int     verify_depth;
+    int     hostname_matched;
+    SSL    *con;
+    TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+
+    err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
+    err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+    depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx);
+
+    con = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx());
+    TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(con, TLScontext_index);
+
+    X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, 256);
+    if (((pfixtls_serverengine) && (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)) ||
+	((pfixtls_clientengine) && (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)))
+	msg_info("Peer cert verify depth=%d %s", depth, buf);
+
+    verify_depth = SSL_get_verify_depth(con);
+    if (ok && (verify_depth >= 0) && (depth > verify_depth)) {
+	ok = 0;
+	err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG;
+	X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
+    }
+    if (!ok) {
+	msg_info("verify error:num=%d:%s", err,
+		 X509_verify_cert_error_string(err));
+    }
+
+    if (ok && (depth == 0) && pfixtls_clientengine) {
+	/*
+	 * Check out the name certified against the hostname expected.
+	 * In case it does not match, print an information about the result.
+	 * If a matching is enforced, bump out with a verification error
+	 * immediately.
+	 */
+	buf[0] = '\0';
+	if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert),
+                          NID_commonName, buf, 256)) {
+	    msg_info("Could not parse server's subject CN");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	}
+	CN_lowercase = lowercase(buf);
+	hostname_matched = 0;
+	if (!strcmp(TLScontext->peername_save, CN_lowercase))
+	    hostname_matched = 1;
+	else if ((strlen(CN_lowercase) > 2) &&
+		 (CN_lowercase[0] == '*') && (CN_lowercase[1] == '.')) {
+	    /*
+	     * Allow wildcard certificate matching. The proposed rules in
+	     * RFCs (2818: HTTP/TLS, 2830: LDAP/TLS) are different, RFC2874
+	     * does not specify a rule, so here the strict rule is applied.
+	     * An asterisk '*' is allowed as the leftmost component and may
+	     * replace the left most part of the hostname. Matching is done
+	     * by removing '*.' from the wildcard name and the `name.` from
+	     * the peername and compare what is left.
+	     */
+	    peername_left = strchr(TLScontext->peername_save, '.');
+	    if (peername_left) {
+		if (!strcmp(peername_left + 1, CN_lowercase + 2))
+		    hostname_matched = 1;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (!hostname_matched) {
+		msg_info("Peer verification: CommonName in certificate does not match: %s != %s", CN_lowercase, TLScontext->peername_save);
+	    if (TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors && TLScontext->enforce_CN) {
+		err = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
+		X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, err);
+		msg_info("Verify failure: Hostname mismatch");
+		ok = 0;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    switch (ctx->error) {
+    case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT:
+	X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->current_cert), buf, 256);
+	msg_info("issuer= %s", buf);
+	break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD:
+	msg_info("cert not yet valid");
+	break;
+    case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
+    case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD:
+	msg_info("cert has expired");
+	break;
+    }
+    if (((pfixtls_serverengine) && (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)) ||
+	((pfixtls_clientengine) && (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)))
+	msg_info("verify return:%d", ok);
+
+    if (TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors)
+	return (ok); 
+    else
+	return (1);
+}
+
+/* taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c */
+
+static void apps_ssl_info_callback(SSL * s, int where, int ret)
+{
+    char   *str;
+    int     w;
+
+    w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK;
+
+    if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT)
+	str = "SSL_connect";
+    else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT)
+	str = "SSL_accept";
+    else
+	str = "undefined";
+
+    if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) {
+	    msg_info("%s:%s", str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+    } else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) {
+	str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write";
+	if ((ret & 0xff) != SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
+	msg_info("SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s", str,
+		 SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret),
+		 SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret));
+    } else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) {
+	if (ret == 0)
+	    msg_info("%s:failed in %s",
+		     str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+	else if (ret < 0) {
+	    msg_info("%s:error in %s",
+		     str, SSL_state_string_long(s));
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * taken from OpenSSL crypto/bio/b_dump.c, modified to save a lot of strcpy
+ * and strcat by Matti Aarnio.
+ */
+
+#define TRUNCATE
+#define DUMP_WIDTH	16
+
+static int pfixtls_dump(const char *s, int len)
+{
+    int     ret = 0;
+    char    buf[160 + 1];
+    char    *ss;
+    int     i;
+    int     j;
+    int     rows;
+    int     trunc;
+    unsigned char ch;
+
+    trunc = 0;
+
+#ifdef TRUNCATE
+    for (; (len > 0) && ((s[len - 1] == ' ') || (s[len - 1] == '\0')); len--)
+	trunc++;
+#endif
+
+    rows = (len / DUMP_WIDTH);
+    if ((rows * DUMP_WIDTH) < len)
+	rows++;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < rows; i++) {
+	buf[0] = '\0';				/* start with empty string */
+	ss = buf;
+
+	sprintf(ss, "%04x ", i * DUMP_WIDTH);
+	ss += strlen(ss);
+	for (j = 0; j < DUMP_WIDTH; j++) {
+	    if (((i * DUMP_WIDTH) + j) >= len) {
+		strcpy(ss, "   ");
+	    } else {
+		ch = ((unsigned char) *((char *) (s) + i * DUMP_WIDTH + j))
+		    & 0xff;
+		sprintf(ss, "%02x%c", ch, j == 7 ? '|' : ' ');
+		ss += 3;
+	    }
+	}
+	ss += strlen(ss);
+	*ss++ = ' ';
+	for (j = 0; j < DUMP_WIDTH; j++) {
+	    if (((i * DUMP_WIDTH) + j) >= len)
+		break;
+	    ch = ((unsigned char) *((char *) (s) + i * DUMP_WIDTH + j)) & 0xff;
+	    *ss++ = (((ch >= ' ') && (ch <= '~')) ? ch : '.');
+	    if (j == 7) *ss++ = ' ';
+	}
+	*ss = 0;
+	/* 
+	 * if this is the last call then update the ddt_dump thing so that
+         * we will move the selection point in the debug window
+         */
+	msg_info("%s", buf);
+	ret += strlen(buf);
+    }
+#ifdef TRUNCATE
+    if (trunc > 0) {
+	sprintf(buf, "%04x - <SPACES/NULS>\n", len + trunc);
+	msg_info("%s", buf);
+	ret += strlen(buf);
+    }
+#endif
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+
+
+/* taken from OpenSSL apps/s_cb.c */
+
+static long bio_dump_cb(BIO * bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi,
+			long argl, long ret)
+{
+    if (!do_dump)
+	return (ret);
+
+    if (cmd == (BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
+	msg_info("read from %08X [%08lX] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%X))",
+		 (unsigned int)bio, (unsigned long)argp, argi,
+		 ret, (unsigned int)ret);
+	pfixtls_dump(argp, (int) ret);
+	return (ret);
+    } else if (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN)) {
+	msg_info("write to %08X [%08lX] (%d bytes => %ld (0x%X))",
+		 (unsigned int)bio, (unsigned long)argp, argi,
+	 	 ret, (unsigned int)ret);
+	pfixtls_dump(argp, (int) ret);
+    }
+    return (ret);
+}
+
+
+ /*
+  * Callback to retrieve a session from the external session cache.
+  */
+static SSL_SESSION *get_session_cb(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *SessionID,
+				  int length, int *copy)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *session;
+    char idstring[2 * ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
+    int n;
+    int uselength;
+    int hex_length;
+    const char *session_hex;
+    pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
+    unsigned char nibble, *data, *sess_data;
+
+    if (length > ID_MAXLENGTH)
+	uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH;	/* Limit length of ID */
+    else
+	uselength = length;
+
+    for(n=0 ; n < uselength ; n++)
+	sprintf(idstring + 2 * n, "%02x", SessionID[n]);
+    if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+	msg_info("Trying to reload Session from disc: %s", idstring);
+
+    session = NULL;
+
+    session_hex = dict_get(scache_db, idstring);
+    if (session_hex) {
+	hex_length = strlen(session_hex);
+	data = (unsigned char *)mymalloc(hex_length / 2);
+	if (!data) {
+	    msg_info("could not allocate memory for session reload");
+	    return(NULL);
+	}
+
+	memset(data, 0, hex_length / 2);
+	for (n = 0; n < hex_length; n++) {
+	    if ((session_hex[n] >= '0') && (session_hex[n] <= '9'))
+		nibble = session_hex[n] - '0';
+	    else
+		nibble = session_hex[n] - 'A' + 10;
+	    if (n % 2)
+		data[n / 2] |= nibble;
+	    else
+		data[n / 2] |= (nibble << 4);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * First check the version numbers, since wrong session data might
+	 * hit us hard (SEGFAULT). We also have to check for expiry.
+	 */
+	memcpy(&scache_info, data, sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
+	if ((scache_info.scache_db_version != scache_db_version) ||
+	    (scache_info.openssl_version != openssl_version) ||
+	    (scache_info.timestamp + var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout < time(NULL)))
+	    dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
+	else {
+	    sess_data = data + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
+	    session = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &sess_data,
+			      hex_length / 2 - sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
+	    if (!session)
+		pfixtls_print_errors();
+	}
+	myfree((char *)data);
+    }
+
+    if (session && (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3))
+	msg_info("Successfully reloaded session from disc");
+
+    return (session);
+}
+
+
+static SSL_SESSION *load_clnt_session(const char *hostname,
+				      int enforce_peername)
+{
+    SSL_SESSION *session = NULL;
+    char idstring[ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
+    int n;
+    int uselength;
+    int length;
+    int hex_length;
+    const char *session_hex;
+    pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
+    unsigned char nibble, *data, *sess_data;
+
+    length = strlen(hostname); 
+    if (length > ID_MAXLENGTH)
+	uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH;	/* Limit length of ID */
+    else
+	uselength = length;
+
+    for(n=0 ; n < uselength ; n++)
+	idstring[n] = tolower(hostname[n]);
+    idstring[uselength] = '\0';
+    if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+	msg_info("Trying to reload Session from disc: %s", idstring);
+
+    session_hex = dict_get(scache_db, idstring);
+    if (session_hex) {
+	hex_length = strlen(session_hex);
+	data = (unsigned char *)mymalloc(hex_length / 2);
+	if (!data) {
+	    msg_info("could not allocate memory for session reload");
+	    return(NULL);
+	}
+
+	memset(data, 0, hex_length / 2);
+	for (n = 0; n < hex_length; n++) {
+	    if ((session_hex[n] >= '0') && (session_hex[n] <= '9'))
+		nibble = session_hex[n] - '0';
+	    else
+		nibble = session_hex[n] - 'A' + 10;
+	    if (n % 2)
+		data[n / 2] |= nibble;
+	    else
+		data[n / 2] |= (nibble << 4);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * First check the version numbers, since wrong session data might
+	 * hit us hard (SEGFAULT). We also have to check for expiry.
+	 * When we enforce_peername, we may find an old session, that was
+	 * saved when enforcement was not set. In this case the session will
+	 * be removed and a fresh session will be negotiated.
+	 */
+	memcpy(&scache_info, data, sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
+	if ((scache_info.scache_db_version != scache_db_version) ||
+	    (scache_info.openssl_version != openssl_version) ||
+	    (scache_info.timestamp + var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout < time(NULL)))
+	    dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
+	else if (enforce_peername && (!scache_info.enforce_peername))
+	    dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
+	else {
+	    sess_data = data + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
+	    session = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &sess_data,
+				      hex_length / 2 - sizeof(time_t));
+	    strncpy(SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(session, TLSpeername_index),
+		    idstring, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
+	    if (!session)
+		pfixtls_print_errors();
+	}
+	myfree((char *)data);
+    }
+
+    if (session && (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3))
+        msg_info("Successfully reloaded session from disc");
+
+    return (session);
+}
+
+
+static void create_client_lookup_id(char *idstring, char *hostname)
+{
+    int n, len, uselength;
+
+    len = strlen(hostname);
+    if (len > ID_MAXLENGTH)
+	uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH;	/* Limit length of ID */
+    else
+	uselength = len;
+
+    for (n = 0 ; n < uselength ; n++)
+	idstring[n] = tolower(hostname[n]);
+    idstring[uselength] = '\0';
+}
+
+
+static void create_server_lookup_id(char *idstring, SSL_SESSION *session)
+{
+    int n, uselength;
+
+    if (session->session_id_length > ID_MAXLENGTH)
+	uselength = ID_MAXLENGTH;	/* Limit length of ID */
+    else
+	uselength = session->session_id_length;
+
+    for(n = 0; n < uselength ; n++)
+	sprintf(idstring + 2 * n, "%02x", session->session_id[n]);
+}
+
+
+static void remove_session_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *session)
+{
+    char idstring[2 * ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
+    char *hostname;
+
+    if (pfixtls_clientengine) {
+        hostname = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(session, TLSpeername_index);
+	create_client_lookup_id(idstring, hostname);
+	if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+	    msg_info("Trying to remove session from disc: %s", idstring);
+    }
+    else {
+	create_server_lookup_id(idstring, session);
+	if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+	    msg_info("Trying to remove session from disc: %s", idstring);
+    }
+
+    if (scache_db)
+	dict_del(scache_db, idstring);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * We need space to save the peername into the SSL_SESSION, as we must
+ * look up the external database for client sessions by peername, not
+ * by session id. We therefore allocate place for the peername string,
+ * when a new SSL_SESSION is generated. It is filled later.
+ */
+static int new_peername_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+			     int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+    char *peername;
+
+    peername = (char *)mymalloc(ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
+    if (!peername)
+	return 0;
+    peername[0] = '\0'; 	/* initialize */
+    return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(ad, idx, peername);
+}
+
+/*
+ * When the SSL_SESSION is removed again, we must free the memory to avoid
+ * leaks.
+ */
+static void free_peername_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
+			       int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+    myfree(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, idx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Duplicate application data, when a SSL_SESSION is duplicated
+ */
+static int dup_peername_func(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *from,
+			     void *from_d, int idx, long argl, void *argp)
+{
+    char *peername_old, *peername_new;
+
+    peername_old = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(from, idx);
+    peername_new = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(to, idx);
+    if (!peername_old || !peername_new)
+	return 0;
+    memcpy(peername_new, peername_old, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
+ /*
+  * Save a new session to the external cache
+  */
+static int new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session)
+{
+    char idstring[2 * ID_MAXLENGTH + 1];
+    int n;
+    int dsize;
+    int len;
+    unsigned char *data, *sess_data;
+    pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
+    char *hexdata, *hostname;
+    TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+
+    if (pfixtls_clientengine) {
+        TLScontext = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, TLScontext_index);
+	hostname = TLScontext->peername_save;
+	create_client_lookup_id(idstring, hostname);
+	strncpy(SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(session, TLSpeername_index),
+		hostname, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
+	/*
+	 * Remember, whether peername matching was enforced when the session
+	 * was created. If later enforce mode is enabled, we do not want to
+	 * reuse a session that was not sufficiently checked.
+	 */
+	scache_info.enforce_peername =
+		(TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors && TLScontext->enforce_CN);
+
+	if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+	    msg_info("Trying to save session for hostID to disc: %s", idstring);
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L)
+	    /*
+	     * Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify
+	     * result in sessions for the client side.
+	     * We modify the session directly which is version specific,
+	     * but this bug is version specific, too.
+	     *
+	     * READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before
+	     * beta1 have this bug, it has been fixed during development
+	     * of 0.9.6a. The development version of 0.9.7 can have this
+	     * bug, too. It has been fixed on 2000/11/29.
+	     */
+	    session->verify_result = SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con);
+#endif
+
+    }
+    else {
+	create_server_lookup_id(idstring, session);
+	if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+	    msg_info("Trying to save Session to disc: %s", idstring);
+    }
+
+
+    /*
+     * Get the session and convert it into some "database" useable form.
+     * First, get the length of the session to allocate the memory.
+     */
+    dsize = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, NULL);
+    if (dsize < 0) {
+	msg_info("Could not access session");
+	return 0;
+    }
+    data = (unsigned char *)mymalloc(dsize + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
+    if (!data) {
+	msg_info("could not allocate memory for SSL session");
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * OpenSSL is not robust against wrong session data (might SEGFAULT),
+     * so we secure it against version ids (session cache structure as well
+     * as OpenSSL version).
+     */
+    scache_info.scache_db_version = scache_db_version;
+    scache_info.openssl_version = openssl_version;
+
+    /*
+     * Put a timestamp, so that expiration can be checked without
+     * analyzing the session data itself. (We would need OpenSSL funtions,
+     * since the SSL_SESSION is a private structure.)
+     */
+    scache_info.timestamp = time(NULL);
+
+    memcpy(data, &scache_info, sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t));
+    sess_data = data + sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
+
+    /*
+     * Now, obtain the session. Unfortunately, it is binary and dict_update
+     * cannot handle binary data (it could contain '\0' in it) directly.
+     * To save memory we could use base64 encoding. To make handling easier,
+     * we simply use hex format.
+     */
+    len = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, &sess_data);
+    len += sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
+
+    hexdata = (char *)mymalloc(2 * len + 1);
+
+    if (!hexdata) {
+	msg_info("could not allocate memory for SSL session (HEX)");
+	myfree((char *)data);
+	return 0;
+    }
+    for (n = 0; n < len; n++) {
+	hexdata[n * 2] = hexcodes[(data[n] & 0xf0) >> 4];
+	hexdata[(n * 2) + 1] = hexcodes[(data[n] & 0x0f)];
+    }
+    hexdata[len * 2] = '\0';
+
+    /*
+     * The session id is a hex string, all uppercase. We are using SDBM as
+     * compiled into Postfix with 8kB maximum entry size, so we set a limit
+     * when caching. If the session is not cached, we have to renegotiate,
+     * not more, not less. For a real session, this limit should never be
+     * met
+     */
+    if (strlen(idstring) + strlen(hexdata) < 8000)
+      dict_put(scache_db, idstring, hexdata);
+
+    myfree(hexdata);
+    myfree((char *)data);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+
+ /*
+  * pfixtls_exchange_seed: read bytes from the seed exchange-file (expect
+  * 1024 bytes)and immediately write back random bytes. Do so with EXCLUSIVE
+  * lock, so * that each process will find a completely different (and
+  * reseeded) file.
+  */
+static void pfixtls_exchange_seed(void)
+{
+    unsigned char buffer[1024];
+
+    if (rand_exch_fd == -1)
+	return;
+
+    if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) != 0)
+        msg_info("Could not lock random exchange file: %s",
+                  strerror(errno));
+
+    lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+    if (read(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) < 0)
+        msg_fatal("reading exchange file failed");
+    RAND_seed(buffer, 1024);
+
+    RAND_bytes(buffer, 1024);
+    lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+    if (write(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) != 1024)
+        msg_fatal("Writing exchange file failed");
+
+    if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) != 0)
+        msg_fatal("Could not unlock random exchange file: %s",
+                  strerror(errno));
+}
+
+ /*
+  * This is the setup routine for the SSL server. As smtpd might be called
+  * more than once, we only want to do the initialization one time.
+  *
+  * The skeleton of this function is taken from OpenSSL apps/s_server.c.
+  */
+
+int     pfixtls_init_serverengine(int verifydepth, int askcert)
+{
+    int     off = 0;
+    int     verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+    int     rand_bytes;
+    int     rand_source_dev_fd;
+    int     rand_source_socket_fd;
+    unsigned char buffer[255];
+    char   *CApath;
+    char   *CAfile;
+    char   *s_cert_file;
+    char   *s_key_file;
+    char   *s_dcert_file;
+    char   *s_dkey_file;
+    FILE   *paramfile;
+
+    if (pfixtls_serverengine)
+	return (0);				/* already running */
+
+    if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+	msg_info("starting TLS engine");
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize the OpenSSL library by the book!
+     * To start with, we must initialize the algorithms.
+     * We want cleartext error messages instead of just error codes, so we
+     * load the error_strings.
+     */
+    SSL_load_error_strings();
+    OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+
+ /*
+  * Side effect, call a non-existing function to disable TLS usage with an
+  * outdated OpenSSL version. There is a security reason (verify_result
+  * is not stored with the session data).
+  */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00905100L)
+    needs_openssl_095_or_later();
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize the PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator with some seed.
+     */
+    randseed.pid = getpid();
+    GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
+    RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
+
+    /*
+     * Access the external sources for random seed. We will only query them
+     * once, this should be sufficient and we will stir our entropy by using
+     * the prng-exchange file anyway.
+     * For reliability, we don't consider failure to access the additional
+     * source fatal, as we can run happily without it (considering that we
+     * still have the exchange-file). We also don't care how much entropy
+     * we get back, as we must run anyway. We simply stir in the buffer
+     * regardless how many bytes are actually in it.
+     */
+    if (*var_tls_daemon_rand_source) {
+	if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "dev:", 4)) {
+	    /*
+	     * Source is a random device
+	     */
+	    rand_source_dev_fd = open(var_tls_daemon_rand_source + 4, 0, 0);
+	    if (rand_source_dev_fd == -1) 
+		msg_info("Could not open entropy device %s",
+			  var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+	    else {
+		if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
+		    var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
+	        read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+		RAND_seed(buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+		close(rand_source_dev_fd);
+	    }
+	} else if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "egd:", 4)) {
+	    /*
+	     * Source is a EGD compatible socket
+	     */
+	    rand_source_socket_fd = unix_connect(var_tls_daemon_rand_source +4,
+						 BLOCKING, 10);
+	    if (rand_source_socket_fd == -1)
+		msg_info("Could not connect to %s", var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+	    else {
+		if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
+		    var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
+		buffer[0] = 1;
+		buffer[1] = var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
+		if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
+		    msg_info("Could not talk to %s",
+			     var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+		else if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
+		    msg_info("Could not read info from %s",
+			     var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+		else {
+		    rand_bytes = buffer[0];
+		    read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes);
+		    RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+		}
+		close(rand_source_socket_fd);
+	    }
+	} else {
+	    RAND_load_file(var_tls_daemon_rand_source,
+			   var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (*var_tls_rand_exch_name) {
+	rand_exch_fd = open(var_tls_rand_exch_name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);
+	if (rand_exch_fd != -1)
+	    pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+    }
+
+    randseed.pid = getpid();
+    GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
+    RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
+
+    /*
+     * The SSL/TLS speficications require the client to send a message in
+     * the oldest specification it understands with the highest level it
+     * understands in the message.
+     * Netscape communicator can still communicate with SSLv2 servers, so it
+     * sends out a SSLv2 client hello. To deal with it, our server must be
+     * SSLv2 aware (even if we don't like SSLv2), so we need to have the
+     * SSLv23 server here. If we want to limit the protocol level, we can
+     * add an option to not use SSLv2/v3/TLSv1 later.
+     */
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_server_method());
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+	pfixtls_print_errors();
+	return (-1);
+    };
+
+    /*
+     * Here we might set SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1.
+     * Of course, the last one would not make sense, since RFC2487 is only
+     * defined for TLS, but we also want to accept Netscape communicator
+     * requests, and it only supports SSLv3.
+     */
+    off |= SSL_OP_ALL;		/* Work around all known bugs */
+    SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, off);
+
+    /*
+     * Set the info_callback, that will print out messages during
+     * communication on demand.
+     */
+    if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+	SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
+
+    /*
+     * Set the list of ciphers, if explicitely given; otherwise the
+     * (reasonable) default list is kept.
+     */
+    if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist) != 0)
+	if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, var_smtpd_tls_cipherlist) == 0) {
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+
+    /*
+     * Now we must add the necessary certificate stuff: A server key, a
+     * server certificate, and the CA certificates for both the server
+     * cert and the verification of client certificates.
+     * As provided by OpenSSL we support two types of CA certificate handling:
+     * One possibility is to add all CA certificates to one large CAfile,
+     * the other possibility is a directory pointed to by CApath, containing
+     * seperate files for each CA pointed on by softlinks named by the hash
+     * values of the certificate.
+     * The first alternative has the advantage, that the file is opened and
+     * read at startup time, so that you don't have the hassle to maintain
+     * another copy of the CApath directory for chroot-jail. On the other
+     * hand, the file is not really readable.
+     */
+    if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_CAfile) == 0)
+	CAfile = NULL;
+    else
+	CAfile = var_smtpd_tls_CAfile;
+    if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_CApath) == 0)
+	CApath = NULL;
+    else
+	CApath = var_smtpd_tls_CApath;
+
+    if (CAfile || CApath) {
+	if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) {
+	    msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load CA data");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+	if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
+	    msg_info("TLS engine: cannot set verify paths");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now we load the certificate and key from the files and check,
+     * whether the cert matches the key (internally done by set_cert_stuff().
+     * We cannot run without (we do not support ADH anonymous Diffie-Hellman
+     * ciphers as of now).
+     * We can use RSA certificates ("cert") and DSA certificates ("dcert"),
+     * both can be made available at the same time. The CA certificates for
+     * both are handled in the same setup already finished.
+     * Which one is used depends on the cipher negotiated (that is: the first
+     * cipher listed by the client which does match the server). A client with
+     * RSA only (e.g. Netscape) will use the RSA certificate only.
+     * A client with openssl-library will use RSA first if not especially
+     * changed in the cipher setup.
+     */
+    if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_cert_file) == 0)
+	s_cert_file = NULL;
+    else
+	s_cert_file = var_smtpd_tls_cert_file;
+    if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_key_file) == 0)
+	s_key_file = NULL;
+    else
+	s_key_file = var_smtpd_tls_key_file;
+
+    if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file) == 0)
+	s_dcert_file = NULL;
+    else
+	s_dcert_file = var_smtpd_tls_dcert_file;
+    if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file) == 0)
+	s_dkey_file = NULL;
+    else
+	s_dkey_file = var_smtpd_tls_dkey_file;
+
+    if (s_cert_file) {
+	if (!set_cert_stuff(ctx, s_cert_file, s_key_file)) {
+	    msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load RSA cert/key data");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+    if (s_dcert_file) {
+	if (!set_cert_stuff(ctx, s_dcert_file, s_dkey_file)) {
+	    msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load DSA cert/key data");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+    if (!s_cert_file && !s_dcert_file) {
+	msg_info("TLS engine: do need at least RSA _or_ DSA cert/key data");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Sometimes a temporary RSA key might be needed by the OpenSSL
+     * library. The OpenSSL doc indicates, that this might happen when
+     * export ciphers are in use. We have to provide one, so well, we
+     * just do it.
+     */
+    SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, tmp_rsa_cb);
+
+    /*
+     * We might also need dh parameters, which can either be loaded from
+     * file (preferred) or we simply take the compiled in values.
+     * First, set the callback that will select the values when requested,
+     * then load the (possibly) available DH parameters from files.
+     * We are generous with the error handling, since we do have default
+     * values compiled in, so we will not abort but just log the error message.
+     */
+    SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(ctx, tmp_dh_cb);
+    if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file) != 0) {
+	if ((paramfile = fopen(var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, "r")) != NULL) {
+	    dh_1024 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	    if (dh_1024 == NULL) {
+		msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 1024bit DH parameters");
+		pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    }
+	}
+	else {
+	    msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 1024bit DH parameters: %s: %s",
+		     var_smtpd_tls_dh1024_param_file, strerror(errno));
+	}
+    }
+    if (strlen(var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file) != 0) {
+	if ((paramfile = fopen(var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, "r")) != NULL) {
+	    dh_512 = PEM_read_DHparams(paramfile, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	    if (dh_512 == NULL) {
+		msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 512bit DH parameters");
+		pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    }
+	}
+	else {
+	    msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load 512bit DH parameters: %s: %s",
+		     var_smtpd_tls_dh512_param_file, strerror(errno));
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If we want to check client certificates, we have to indicate it
+     * in advance. By now we only allow to decide on a global basis.
+     * If we want to allow certificate based relaying, we must ask the
+     * client to provide one with SSL_VERIFY_PEER. The client now can
+     * decide, whether it provides one or not. We can enforce a failure
+     * of the negotiation with SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, if we
+     * do not allow a connection without one.
+     * In the "server hello" following the initialization by the "client hello"
+     * the server must provide a list of CAs it is willing to accept.
+     * Some clever clients will then select one from the list of available
+     * certificates matching these CAs. Netscape Communicator will present
+     * the list of certificates for selecting the one to be sent, or it will
+     * issue a warning, if there is no certificate matching the available
+     * CAs.
+     *
+     * With regard to the purpose of the certificate for relaying, we might
+     * like a later negotiation, maybe relaying would already be allowed
+     * for other reasons, but this would involve severe changes in the
+     * internal postfix logic, so we have to live with it the way it is.
+     */
+    if (askcert)
+	verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
+    SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_flags, verify_callback);
+    SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile));
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize the session cache. We only want external caching to
+     * synchronize between server sessions, so we set it to a minimum value
+     * of 1. If the external cache is disabled, we won't cache at all.
+     * The recall of old sessions "get" and save to disk of just created
+     * sessions "new" is handled by the appropriate callback functions.
+     *
+     * We must not forget to set a session id context to identify to which
+     * kind of server process the session was related. In our case, the
+     * context is just the name of the patchkit: "Postfix/TLS".
+     */
+    SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 1);
+    SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout);
+    SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (void*)&server_session_id_context,
+                sizeof(server_session_id_context));
+
+    /*
+     * The session cache is realized by an external database file, that
+     * must be opened before going to chroot jail. Since the session cache
+     * data can become quite large, "[n]dbm" cannot be used as it has a
+     * size limit that is by far to small.
+     */
+    if (*var_smtpd_tls_scache_db) {
+	/*
+	 * Insert a test against other dbms here, otherwise while writing
+	 * a session (content to large), we will receive a fatal error!
+	 */
+	if (strncmp(var_smtpd_tls_scache_db, "sdbm:", 5))
+	    msg_warn("Only sdbm: type allowed for %s",
+		     var_smtpd_tls_scache_db);
+	else
+	    scache_db = dict_open(var_smtpd_tls_scache_db, O_RDWR,
+	      DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE | DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_SYNC_UPDATE);
+	if (scache_db) {
+	    SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,
+			SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
+	    SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(ctx, get_session_cb);
+	    SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, new_session_cb);
+	    SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(ctx, remove_session_cb);
+	}
+	else
+	    msg_warn("Could not open session cache %s",
+		     var_smtpd_tls_scache_db);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Finally create the global index to access TLScontext information
+     * inside verify_callback.
+     */
+    TLScontext_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "TLScontext ex_data index",
+					    NULL, NULL, NULL);
+
+    pfixtls_serverengine = 1;
+    return (0);
+}
+
+ /*
+  * This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect
+  * that the buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was
+  * send to the client, so that we can immediately can start the TLS
+  * handshake process.
+  */
+int     pfixtls_start_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
+				const char *peername, const char *peeraddr,
+				tls_info_t *tls_info, int requirecert)
+{
+    int     sts;
+    int     j;
+    int verify_flags;
+    unsigned int n;
+    TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+    SSL_SESSION *session;
+    SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+    X509   *peer;
+
+    if (!pfixtls_serverengine) {		/* should never happen */
+	msg_info("tls_engine not running");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1)
+	msg_info("setting up TLS connection from %s[%s]", peername, peeraddr);
+
+    /*
+     * Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL
+     * structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later
+     * retrieve the information inside the verify_callback().
+     */
+    TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)mymalloc(sizeof(TLScontext_t));
+    if (!TLScontext) {
+	msg_fatal("Could not allocate 'TLScontext' with mymalloc");
+    }
+    if ((TLScontext->con = (SSL *) SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) {
+	msg_info("Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()");
+	pfixtls_print_errors();
+	myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) {
+	msg_info("Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'");
+	pfixtls_print_errors();
+	SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+	myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Set the verification parameters to be checked in verify_callback().
+     */
+    if (requirecert) {
+	verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE;
+	verify_flags |= SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT;
+	TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 1;
+        SSL_set_verify(TLScontext->con, verify_flags, verify_callback);
+    }
+    else {
+	TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 0;
+    }
+    TLScontext->enforce_CN = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * The TLS connection is realized by a BIO_pair, so obtain the pair.
+     */
+    if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&TLScontext->internal_bio, BIO_bufsiz,
+			  &TLScontext->network_bio, BIO_bufsiz)) {
+	msg_info("Could not obtain BIO_pair");
+	pfixtls_print_errors();
+	SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+	myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit
+     * more.
+     */
+    pfixtls_stir_seed();
+    pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize the SSL connection to accept state. This should not be
+     * necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library
+     * and maintaining compatibility never hurts.
+     */
+    SSL_set_accept_state(TLScontext->con);
+
+    /*
+     * Connect the SSL-connection with the postfix side of the BIO-pair for
+     * reading and writing.
+     */
+     SSL_set_bio(TLScontext->con, TLScontext->internal_bio,
+		 TLScontext->internal_bio);
+
+    /*
+     * If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is
+     * dumped: 3 will dump the SSL negotiation, 4 will dump everything.
+     *
+     * We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called?
+     * Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically
+     * created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes.
+     */
+    if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+	BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), bio_dump_cb);
+
+
+    /* Dump the negotiation for loglevels 3 and 4 */
+    if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+	do_dump = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Now we expect the negotiation to begin. This whole process is like a
+     * black box for us. We totally have to rely on the routines build into
+     * the OpenSSL library. The only thing we can do we already have done
+     * by choosing our own callbacks for session caching and certificate
+     * verification.
+     *
+     * Error handling:
+     * If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message and remove
+     * everything that might be there. A session has to be removed anyway,
+     * because RFC2246 requires it.
+     */
+    sts = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
+			   SSL_accept, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+    if (sts <= 0) {
+	msg_info("SSL_accept error from %s[%s]: %d", peername, peeraddr, sts);
+	pfixtls_print_errors();
+	SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+	myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /* Only loglevel==4 dumps everything */
+    if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel < 4)
+	do_dump = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Lets see, whether a peer certificate is available and what is
+     * the actual information. We want to save it for later use.
+     */
+    peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con);
+    if (peer != NULL) {
+	if (SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con) == X509_V_OK)
+	    tls_info->peer_verified = 1;
+
+	X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(peer),
+			  TLScontext->peer_subject, CCERT_BUFSIZ);
+	if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+	    msg_info("subject=%s", TLScontext->peer_subject);
+	tls_info->peer_subject = TLScontext->peer_subject;
+	X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
+			  TLScontext->peer_issuer, CCERT_BUFSIZ);
+	if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+	    msg_info("issuer=%s", TLScontext->peer_issuer);
+	tls_info->peer_issuer = TLScontext->peer_issuer;
+	if (X509_digest(peer, EVP_md5(), TLScontext->md, &n)) {
+	    for (j = 0; j < (int) n; j++) {
+		TLScontext->fingerprint[j * 3] =
+			hexcodes[(TLScontext->md[j] & 0xf0) >> 4];
+		TLScontext->fingerprint[(j * 3) + 1] =
+			hexcodes[(TLScontext->md[j] & 0x0f)];
+		if (j + 1 != (int) n)
+		    TLScontext->fingerprint[(j * 3) + 2] = ':';
+		else
+		    TLScontext->fingerprint[(j * 3) + 2] = '\0';
+	    }
+	    if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1)
+		msg_info("fingerprint=%s", TLScontext->fingerprint);
+	    tls_info->peer_fingerprint = TLScontext->fingerprint;
+	}
+
+	TLScontext->peer_CN[0] = '\0';
+	if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(peer),
+			NID_commonName, TLScontext->peer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+	    msg_info("Could not parse client's subject CN");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	}
+	tls_info->peer_CN = TLScontext->peer_CN;
+
+	TLScontext->issuer_CN[0] = '\0';
+	if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
+			NID_commonName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+	    msg_info("Could not parse client's issuer CN");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	}
+	if (!TLScontext->issuer_CN[0]) {
+	    /* No issuer CN field, use Organization instead */
+	    if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
+		NID_organizationName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+		msg_info("Could not parse client's issuer Organization");
+		pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    }
+	}
+	tls_info->issuer_CN = TLScontext->issuer_CN;
+
+	if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1) {
+	    if (tls_info->peer_verified)
+		msg_info("Verified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
+			 TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
+	    else
+		msg_info("Unverified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
+			 TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
+	}
+
+	X509_free(peer);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * At this point we should have a certificate when required.
+     * We may however have a cached session, so the callback would never
+     * be called. We therefore double-check to make sure and remove the
+     * session, if applicable.
+     */
+    if (requirecert) {
+	if (!tls_info->peer_verified || !tls_info->peer_CN) {
+	    msg_info("Re-used session without peer certificate removed");
+	    session = SSL_get_session(TLScontext->con);
+	    SSL_CTX_remove_session(ctx, session);
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging
+     */
+    tls_info->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con);
+    cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con);
+    tls_info->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+    tls_info->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher,
+						 &(tls_info->cipher_algbits));
+
+    pfixtls_serveractive = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * The TLS engine is active, switch to the pfixtls_timed_read/write()
+     * functions and store the context.
+     */
+    vstream_control(stream,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, pfixtls_timed_read,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, pfixtls_timed_write,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *)TLScontext,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_END);
+
+    msg_info("TLS connection established from %s[%s]: %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits)",
+	     peername, peeraddr,
+	     tls_info->protocol, tls_info->cipher_name,
+	     tls_info->cipher_usebits, tls_info->cipher_algbits);
+    pfixtls_stir_seed();
+
+    return (0);
+}
+
+ /*
+  * Shut down the TLS connection, that does mean: remove all the information
+  * and reset the flags! This is needed if the actual running smtpd is to
+  * be restarted. We do not give back any value, as there is nothing to
+  * be reported.
+  * Since our session cache is external, we will remove the session from
+  * memory in any case. The SSL_CTX_flush_sessions might be redundant here,
+  * I however want to make sure nothing is left.
+  * RFC2246 requires us to remove sessions if something went wrong, as
+  * indicated by the "failure" value, so we remove it from the external
+  * cache, too. 
+  */
+int     pfixtls_stop_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
+			       tls_info_t *tls_info)
+{
+    TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+    int retval;
+
+    if (pfixtls_serveractive) {
+	TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)vstream_context(stream);
+	/*
+	 * Perform SSL_shutdown() twice, as the first attempt may return
+	 * to early: it will only send out the shutdown alert but it will
+	 * not wait for the peer's shutdown alert. Therefore, when we are
+	 * the first party to send the alert, we must call SSL_shutdown()
+	 * again.
+	 * On failure we don't want to resume the session, so we will not
+	 * perform SSL_shutdown() and the session will be removed as being
+	 * bad.
+	 */
+	if (!failure) {
+            retval = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout,
+				TLScontext, SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+	    if (retval == 0)
+		do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
+				SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Free the SSL structure and the BIOs. Warning: the internal_bio is
+	 * connected to the SSL structure and is automatically freed with
+	 * it. Do not free it again (core dump)!!
+	 * Only free the network_bio.
+	 */
+	SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+	BIO_free(TLScontext->network_bio);
+	myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+        vstream_control(stream,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *) NULL,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_END);
+	SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, time(NULL));
+
+	pfixtls_stir_seed();
+	pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+
+	*tls_info = tls_info_zero;
+	pfixtls_serveractive = 0;
+
+    }
+
+    return (0);
+}
+
+
+ /*
+  * This is the setup routine for the SSL client. As smtpd might be called
+  * more than once, we only want to do the initialization one time.
+  *
+  * The skeleton of this function is taken from OpenSSL apps/s_client.c.
+  */
+
+int     pfixtls_init_clientengine(int verifydepth)
+{
+    int     off = 0;
+    int     verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_NONE;
+    int     rand_bytes;
+    int     rand_source_dev_fd;
+    int     rand_source_socket_fd;
+    unsigned char buffer[255];
+    char   *CApath;
+    char   *CAfile;
+    char   *c_cert_file;
+    char   *c_key_file;
+
+
+    if (pfixtls_clientengine)
+	return (0);				/* already running */
+
+    if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+	msg_info("starting TLS engine");
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize the OpenSSL library by the book!
+     * To start with, we must initialize the algorithms.
+     * We want cleartext error messages instead of just error codes, so we
+     * load the error_strings.
+     */ 
+    SSL_load_error_strings();
+    OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms();
+
+ /*
+  * Side effect, call a non-existing function to disable TLS usage with an
+  * outdated OpenSSL version. There is a security reason (verify_result
+  * is not stored with the session data).
+  */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00905100L)
+    needs_openssl_095_or_later();
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize the PRNG Pseudo Random Number Generator with some seed.
+     */
+    randseed.pid = getpid();
+    GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
+    RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
+
+    /*
+     * Access the external sources for random seed. We will only query them
+     * once, this should be sufficient and we will stir our entropy by using
+     * the prng-exchange file anyway.
+     * For reliability, we don't consider failure to access the additional
+     * source fatal, as we can run happily without it (considering that we
+     * still have the exchange-file). We also don't care how much entropy
+     * we get back, as we must run anyway. We simply stir in the buffer
+     * regardless how many bytes are actually in it.
+     */
+    if (*var_tls_daemon_rand_source) {
+	if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "dev:", 4)) {
+	    /*
+	     * Source is a random device
+	     */
+	    rand_source_dev_fd = open(var_tls_daemon_rand_source + 4, 0, 0);
+	    if (rand_source_dev_fd == -1) 
+		msg_info("Could not open entropy device %s",
+			  var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+	    else {
+		if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
+		    var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
+	        read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+		RAND_seed(buffer, var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+		close(rand_source_dev_fd);
+	    }
+	} else if (!strncmp(var_tls_daemon_rand_source, "egd:", 4)) {
+	    /*
+	     * Source is a EGD compatible socket
+	     */
+	    rand_source_socket_fd = unix_connect(var_tls_daemon_rand_source +4,
+						 BLOCKING, 10);
+	    if (rand_source_socket_fd == -1)
+		msg_info("Could not connect to %s", var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+	    else {
+		if (var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes > 255)
+		    var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes = 255;
+		buffer[0] = 1;
+		buffer[1] = var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes;
+		if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
+		    msg_info("Could not talk to %s",
+			     var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+		else if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
+		    msg_info("Could not read info from %s",
+			     var_tls_daemon_rand_source);
+		else {
+		    rand_bytes = buffer[0];
+		    read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes);
+		    RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+		}
+		close(rand_source_socket_fd);
+	    }
+	} else {
+	    RAND_load_file(var_tls_daemon_rand_source,
+			   var_tls_daemon_rand_bytes);
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (*var_tls_rand_exch_name) {
+	rand_exch_fd = open(var_tls_rand_exch_name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);
+	if (rand_exch_fd != -1)
+	    pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+    }
+
+    randseed.pid = getpid();
+    GETTIMEOFDAY(&randseed.tv);
+    RAND_seed(&randseed, sizeof(randseed_t));
+
+    /*
+     * The SSL/TLS speficications require the client to send a message in
+     * the oldest specification it understands with the highest level it
+     * understands in the message.
+     * RFC2487 is only specified for TLSv1, but we want to be as compatible
+     * as possible, so we will start off with a SSLv2 greeting allowing
+     * the best we can offer: TLSv1.
+     * We can restrict this with the options setting later, anyhow.
+     */
+    ctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method());
+    if (ctx == NULL) {
+	pfixtls_print_errors();
+	return (-1);
+    };
+
+    /*
+     * Here we might set SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1.
+     * Of course, the last one would not make sense, since RFC2487 is only
+     * defined for TLS, but we don't know what is out there. So leave things
+     * completely open, as of today.
+     */
+    off |= SSL_OP_ALL;		/* Work around all known bugs */
+    SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, off);
+
+    /*
+     * Set the info_callback, that will print out messages during
+     * communication on demand.
+     */
+    if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+	SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback);
+
+    /*
+     * Set the list of ciphers, if explicitely given; otherwise the
+     * (reasonable) default list is kept.
+     */
+    if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_cipherlist) != 0)
+	if (SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, var_smtp_tls_cipherlist) == 0) {
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+
+    /*
+     * Now we must add the necessary certificate stuff: A client key, a
+     * client certificate, and the CA certificates for both the client
+     * cert and the verification of server certificates.
+     * In fact, we do not need a client certificate,  so the certificates
+     * are only loaded (and checked), if supplied. A clever client would
+     * handle multiple client certificates and decide based on the list
+     * of acceptable CAs, sent by the server, which certificate to submit.
+     * OpenSSL does however not do this and also has no callback hoods to
+     * easily realize it.
+     *
+     * As provided by OpenSSL we support two types of CA certificate handling:
+     * One possibility is to add all CA certificates to one large CAfile,
+     * the other possibility is a directory pointed to by CApath, containing
+     * seperate files for each CA pointed on by softlinks named by the hash
+     * values of the certificate.
+     * The first alternative has the advantage, that the file is opened and
+     * read at startup time, so that you don't have the hassle to maintain
+     * another copy of the CApath directory for chroot-jail. On the other
+     * hand, the file is not really readable.
+     */ 
+    if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_CAfile) == 0)
+	CAfile = NULL;
+    else
+	CAfile = var_smtp_tls_CAfile;
+    if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_CApath) == 0)
+	CApath = NULL;
+    else
+	CApath = var_smtp_tls_CApath;
+    if (CAfile || CApath) {
+	if (!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath)) {
+	    msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load CA data");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+	if (!SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(ctx)) {
+	    msg_info("TLS engine: cannot set verify paths");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_cert_file) == 0)
+	c_cert_file = NULL;
+    else
+	c_cert_file = var_smtp_tls_cert_file;
+    if (strlen(var_smtp_tls_key_file) == 0)
+	c_key_file = NULL;
+    else
+	c_key_file = var_smtp_tls_key_file;
+    if (c_cert_file || c_key_file)
+	if (!set_cert_stuff(ctx, c_cert_file, c_key_file)) {
+	    msg_info("TLS engine: cannot load cert/key data");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    return (-1);
+	}
+
+    /*
+     * Sometimes a temporary RSA key might be needed by the OpenSSL
+     * library. The OpenSSL doc indicates, that this might happen when
+     * export ciphers are in use. We have to provide one, so well, we
+     * just do it.
+     */
+    SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(ctx, tmp_rsa_cb);
+
+    /*
+     * Finally, the setup for the server certificate checking, done
+     * "by the book".
+     */
+    SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify_flags, verify_callback);
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize the session cache. We only want external caching to
+     * synchronize between server sessions, so we set it to a minimum value
+     * of 1. If the external cache is disabled, we won't cache at all.
+     *
+     * In case of the client, there is no callback used in OpenSSL, so
+     * we must call the session cache functions manually during the process.
+     */
+    SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 1);
+    SSL_CTX_set_timeout(ctx, var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout);
+
+    /*
+     * The session cache is realized by an external database file, that
+     * must be opened before going to chroot jail. Since the session cache
+     * data can become quite large, "[n]dbm" cannot be used as it has a
+     * size limit that is by far to small.
+     */
+    if (*var_smtp_tls_scache_db) {
+	/*
+	 * Insert a test against other dbms here, otherwise while writing
+	 * a session (content to large), we will receive a fatal error!
+	 */
+	if (strncmp(var_smtp_tls_scache_db, "sdbm:", 5))
+	    msg_warn("Only sdbm: type allowed for %s",
+		     var_smtp_tls_scache_db);
+	else
+	    scache_db = dict_open(var_smtp_tls_scache_db, O_RDWR,
+	      DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE | DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_SYNC_UPDATE);
+	if (!scache_db)
+	    msg_warn("Could not open session cache %s",
+		     var_smtp_tls_scache_db);
+	/*
+	 * It is practical to have OpenSSL automatically save newly created
+	 * sessions for us by callback. Therefore we have to enable the
+	 * internal session cache for the client side. Disable automatic
+	 * clearing, as smtp has limited lifetime anyway and we can call
+	 * the cleanup routine at will.
+	 */
+	SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,
+			SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR);
+	SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, new_session_cb);
+    }
+   
+    /*
+     * Finally create the global index to access TLScontext information
+     * inside verify_callback.
+     */
+    TLScontext_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, "TLScontext ex_data index",
+					    NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    TLSpeername_index = SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(0,
+					    "TLSpeername ex_data index",
+					    new_peername_func,
+					    dup_peername_func,
+					    free_peername_func);
+
+    pfixtls_clientengine = 1;
+    return (0);
+}
+
+ /*
+  * This is the actual startup routine for the connection. We expect
+  * that the buffers are flushed and the "220 Ready to start TLS" was
+  * received by us, so that we can immediately can start the TLS
+  * handshake process.
+  */
+int     pfixtls_start_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
+			        int enforce_peername,
+				const char *peername,
+				tls_info_t *tls_info)
+{
+    int     sts;
+    SSL_SESSION *session, *old_session;
+    SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+    X509   *peer;
+    int     verify_flags;
+    TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+
+    if (!pfixtls_clientengine) {		/* should never happen */
+	msg_info("tls_engine not running");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (var_smtpd_tls_loglevel >= 1)
+	msg_info("setting up TLS connection to %s", peername);
+
+    /*
+     * Allocate a new TLScontext for the new connection and get an SSL
+     * structure. Add the location of TLScontext to the SSL to later
+     * retrieve the information inside the verify_callback().
+     */
+    TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)mymalloc(sizeof(TLScontext_t));
+    if (!TLScontext) {
+	msg_fatal("Could not allocate 'TLScontext' with mymalloc");
+    }
+    if ((TLScontext->con = (SSL *) SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) {
+	msg_info("Could not allocate 'TLScontext->con' with SSL_new()");
+	pfixtls_print_errors();
+	myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (!SSL_set_ex_data(TLScontext->con, TLScontext_index, TLScontext)) {
+	msg_info("Could not set application data for 'TLScontext->con'");
+	pfixtls_print_errors();
+	SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+	myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Set the verification parameters to be checked in verify_callback().
+     */
+    if (enforce_peername) {
+	verify_flags = SSL_VERIFY_PEER;
+	TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 1;
+	TLScontext->enforce_CN = 1;
+        SSL_set_verify(TLScontext->con, verify_flags, verify_callback);
+    }
+    else {
+	TLScontext->enforce_verify_errors = 0;
+	TLScontext->enforce_CN = 0;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The TLS connection is realized by a BIO_pair, so obtain the pair.
+     */
+    if (!BIO_new_bio_pair(&TLScontext->internal_bio, BIO_bufsiz,
+			  &TLScontext->network_bio, BIO_bufsiz)) {
+	msg_info("Could not obtain BIO_pair");
+	pfixtls_print_errors();
+	SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+	myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    old_session = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * Find out the hashed HostID for the client cache and try to
+     * load the session from the cache.
+     */
+    strncpy(TLScontext->peername_save, peername, ID_MAXLENGTH + 1);
+    TLScontext->peername_save[ID_MAXLENGTH] = '\0';  /* just in case */
+    (void)lowercase(TLScontext->peername_save);
+    if (scache_db) {
+	old_session = load_clnt_session(peername, enforce_peername);
+	if (old_session) {
+	   SSL_set_session(TLScontext->con, old_session);
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906011L) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x00907000L)
+	    /*
+	     * Ugly Hack: OpenSSL before 0.9.6a does not store the verify
+	     * result in sessions for the client side.
+	     * We modify the session directly which is version specific,
+	     * but this bug is version specific, too.
+	     *
+	     * READ: 0-09-06-01-1 = 0-9-6-a-beta1: all versions before
+	     * beta1 have this bug, it has been fixed during development
+	     * of 0.9.6a. The development version of 0.9.7 can have this
+	     * bug, too. It has been fixed on 2000/11/29.
+	     */
+	    SSL_set_verify_result(TLScontext->con, old_session->verify_result);
+#endif
+	   
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Before really starting anything, try to seed the PRNG a little bit
+     * more.
+     */
+    pfixtls_stir_seed();
+    pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+
+    /*
+     * Initialize the SSL connection to connect state. This should not be
+     * necessary anymore since 0.9.3, but the call is still in the library
+     * and maintaining compatibility never hurts.
+     */
+    SSL_set_connect_state(TLScontext->con);
+
+    /*
+     * Connect the SSL-connection with the postfix side of the BIO-pair for
+     * reading and writing.
+     */
+    SSL_set_bio(TLScontext->con, TLScontext->internal_bio,
+		TLScontext->internal_bio);
+
+    /*
+     * If the debug level selected is high enough, all of the data is
+     * dumped: 3 will dump the SSL negotiation, 4 will dump everything.
+     *
+     * We do have an SSL_set_fd() and now suddenly a BIO_ routine is called?
+     * Well there is a BIO below the SSL routines that is automatically
+     * created for us, so we can use it for debugging purposes.
+     */
+    if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+	BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(TLScontext->con), bio_dump_cb);
+
+
+    /* Dump the negotiation for loglevels 3 and 4 */
+    if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+	do_dump = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Now we expect the negotiation to begin. This whole process is like a
+     * black box for us. We totally have to rely on the routines build into
+     * the OpenSSL library. The only thing we can do we already have done
+     * by choosing our own callback certificate verification.
+     *
+     * Error handling:
+     * If the SSL handhake fails, we print out an error message and remove
+     * everything that might be there. A session has to be removed anyway,
+     * because RFC2246 requires it. 
+     */
+    sts = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
+			   SSL_connect, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+    if (sts <= 0) {
+	msg_info("SSL_connect error to %s: %d", peername, sts);
+	pfixtls_print_errors();
+	session = SSL_get_session(TLScontext->con);
+	if (session) {
+	    SSL_CTX_remove_session(ctx, session);
+	    if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 2)
+		msg_info("SSL session removed");
+	}
+	if ((old_session) && (!SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con)))
+	    SSL_SESSION_free(old_session);	/* Must also be removed */
+	SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+	myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+	return (-1);
+    }
+
+    if (!SSL_session_reused(TLScontext->con)) {
+	SSL_SESSION_free(old_session);	/* Remove unused session */
+    }
+    else if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 3)
+	msg_info("Reusing old session");
+
+    /* Only loglevel==4 dumps everything */
+    if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel < 4)
+	do_dump = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Lets see, whether a peer certificate is available and what is
+     * the actual information. We want to save it for later use.
+     */
+    peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(TLScontext->con);
+    if (peer != NULL) {
+	if (SSL_get_verify_result(TLScontext->con) == X509_V_OK)
+	    tls_info->peer_verified = 1;
+
+	TLScontext->peer_CN[0] = '\0';
+	if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_subject_name(peer),
+			NID_commonName, TLScontext->peer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+	    msg_info("Could not parse server's subject CN");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	}
+	tls_info->peer_CN = TLScontext->peer_CN;
+
+	TLScontext->issuer_CN[0] = '\0';
+	if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
+			NID_commonName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+	    msg_info("Could not parse server's issuer CN");
+	    pfixtls_print_errors();
+	}
+	if (!TLScontext->issuer_CN[0]) {
+	    /* No issuer CN field, use Organization instead */
+	    if (!X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_get_issuer_name(peer),
+		NID_organizationName, TLScontext->issuer_CN, CCERT_BUFSIZ)) {
+		msg_info("Could not parse server's issuer Organization");
+		pfixtls_print_errors();
+	    }
+	}
+	tls_info->issuer_CN = TLScontext->issuer_CN;
+
+	if (var_smtp_tls_loglevel >= 1) {
+	    if (tls_info->peer_verified)
+		msg_info("Verified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
+			 TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
+	    else
+		msg_info("Unverified: subject_CN=%s, issuer=%s",
+			 TLScontext->peer_CN, TLScontext->issuer_CN);
+	}
+	X509_free(peer);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Finally, collect information about protocol and cipher for logging
+     */ 
+    tls_info->protocol = SSL_get_version(TLScontext->con);
+    cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(TLScontext->con);
+    tls_info->cipher_name = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher);
+    tls_info->cipher_usebits = SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(cipher,
+						 &(tls_info->cipher_algbits));
+
+    pfixtls_clientactive = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * The TLS engine is active, switch to the pfixtls_timed_read/write()
+     * functions.
+     */
+    vstream_control(stream,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, pfixtls_timed_read,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, pfixtls_timed_write,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *)TLScontext,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_END);
+
+    msg_info("TLS connection established to %s: %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits)",
+	     peername,
+	     tls_info->protocol, tls_info->cipher_name,
+	     tls_info->cipher_usebits, tls_info->cipher_algbits);
+
+    pfixtls_stir_seed();
+
+    return (0);
+}
+
+ /*
+  * Shut down the TLS connection, that does mean: remove all the information
+  * and reset the flags! This is needed if the actual running smtp is to
+  * be restarted. We do not give back any value, as there is nothing to
+  * be reported.
+  * Since our session cache is external, we will remove the session from
+  * memory in any case. The SSL_CTX_flush_sessions might be redundant here,
+  * I however want to make sure nothing is left.
+  * RFC2246 requires us to remove sessions if something went wrong, as
+  * indicated by the "failure" value,so we remove it from the external
+  * cache, too.
+  */
+int     pfixtls_stop_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
+			       tls_info_t *tls_info)
+{
+    TLScontext_t *TLScontext;
+    int retval;
+
+    if (pfixtls_clientactive) {
+	TLScontext = (TLScontext_t *)vstream_context(stream);
+	/*
+	 * Perform SSL_shutdown() twice, as the first attempt may return
+	 * to early: it will only send out the shutdown alert but it will
+	 * not wait for the peer's shutdown alert. Therefore, when we are
+	 * the first party to send the alert, we must call SSL_shutdown()
+	 * again.
+	 * On failure we don't want to resume the session, so we will not
+	 * perform SSL_shutdown() and the session will be removed as being
+	 * bad.
+	 */
+	if (!failure) {
+	    retval = do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout,
+				TLScontext, SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+	    if (retval == 0)
+		do_tls_operation(vstream_fileno(stream), timeout, TLScontext,
+				SSL_shutdown, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Free the SSL structure and the BIOs. Warning: the internal_bio is
+	 * connected to the SSL structure and is automatically freed with
+	 * it. Do not free it again (core dump)!!
+	 * Only free the network_bio.
+	 */
+	SSL_free(TLScontext->con);
+	BIO_free(TLScontext->network_bio);
+	myfree((char *)TLScontext);
+	vstream_control(stream,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_READ_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_WRITE_FN, (VSTREAM_FN) NULL,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_CONTEXT, (void *) NULL,
+		    VSTREAM_CTL_END);
+	SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(ctx, time(NULL));
+
+	pfixtls_stir_seed();
+	pfixtls_exchange_seed();
+
+	*tls_info = tls_info_zero;
+	pfixtls_clientactive = 0;
+
+    }
+
+    return (0);
+}
+
+
+#endif /* HAS_SSL */
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/pfixtls.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/pfixtls.h
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/pfixtls.h	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/pfixtls.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*      pfixtls 3h
+/* SUMMARY
+/*      TLS routines
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*      include "pfixtls.h"
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* .nf
+/*--*/
+
+#ifndef PFIXTLS_H_INCLUDED
+#define PFIXTLS_H_INCLUDED
+
+typedef struct {
+    int     peer_verified;
+    char   *peer_subject;
+    char   *peer_issuer;
+    char   *peer_fingerprint;
+    char   *peer_CN;
+    char   *issuer_CN;
+    const char *protocol;
+    const char *cipher_name;
+    int     cipher_usebits;
+    int     cipher_algbits;
+} tls_info_t;
+
+extern const tls_info_t tls_info_zero;
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+
+typedef struct {
+    long scache_db_version;
+    long openssl_version;
+    time_t timestamp;		/* We could add other info here... */
+    int enforce_peername;
+} pfixtls_scache_info_t;
+
+extern const long scache_db_version;
+extern const long openssl_version;
+
+int     pfixtls_timed_read(int fd, void *buf, unsigned len, int timout,
+			   void *unused_timeout);
+int     pfixtls_timed_write(int fd, void *buf, unsigned len, int timeout,
+			    void *unused_timeout);
+
+extern int pfixtls_serverengine;
+int     pfixtls_init_serverengine(int verifydepth, int askcert);
+int     pfixtls_start_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
+				const char *peername, const char *peeraddr,
+				tls_info_t *tls_info, int require_cert);
+int     pfixtls_stop_servertls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
+			       tls_info_t *tls_info);
+
+extern int pfixtls_clientengine;
+int     pfixtls_init_clientengine(int verifydepth);
+int     pfixtls_start_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout,
+				int enforce_peername,
+				const char *peername,
+				tls_info_t *tls_info);
+int     pfixtls_stop_clienttls(VSTREAM *stream, int timeout, int failure,
+			       tls_info_t *tls_info);
+
+#endif /* PFIXTLS_H_INCLUDED */
+#endif
+
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*	Lutz Jaenicke
+/*	BTU Cottbus
+/*	Allgemeine Elektrotechnik
+/*	Universitaetsplatz 3-4
+/*	D-03044 Cottbus, Germany
+/*--*/
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/resolve_local.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/resolve_local.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/resolve_local.c	Thu Jan 31 20:56:29 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/resolve_local.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
 
 #ifndef INADDR_NONE
 #define INADDR_NONE 0xffffffff
@@ -79,7 +80,12 @@
 {
     char   *saved_addr = mystrdup(addr);
     char   *dest;
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0;
+    int error;
+#else
     struct in_addr ipaddr;
+#endif
     int     len;
 
 #define RETURN(x) { myfree(saved_addr); return(x); }
@@ -111,9 +117,25 @@
     if (*dest == '[' && dest[len - 1] == ']') {
 	dest++;
 	dest[len -= 2] = 0;
+#ifdef INET6
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+	error = getaddrinfo(dest, NULL, &hints, &res0);
+	if (!error) {
+	    for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
+		if (own_inet_addr(res->ai_addr)) {
+		    freeaddrinfo(res0);
+		    RETURN(1);
+		}
+	    }
+	    freeaddrinfo(res0);
+	}
+#else
 	if ((ipaddr.s_addr = inet_addr(dest)) != INADDR_NONE
 	    && own_inet_addr(&ipaddr))
 	    RETURN(1);
+#endif
     }
 
     /*
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.c	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+#include <netdb.h>
+
+#ifdef STRCASECMP_IN_STRINGS_H
+#include <strings.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include <msg.h>
+#include <mymalloc.h>
+#include <inet_addr_list.h>
+#include <inet_addr_local.h>
+#include <inet_addr_host.h>
+#include <stringops.h>
+
+/* Global library. */
+
+#include <mail_params.h>
+#include <wildcard_inet_addr.h>
+
+/* Application-specific. */
+static INET_ADDR_LIST addr_list;
+
+/* wildcard_inet_addr_init - initialize my own address list */
+
+static void wildcard_inet_addr_init(INET_ADDR_LIST *addr_list)
+{
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0;
+    char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+    int error;
+#ifdef NI_WITHSCOPEID
+    const int niflags = NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_WITHSCOPEID;
+#else
+    const int niflags = NI_NUMERICHOST;
+#endif
+
+    inet_addr_list_init(addr_list);
+
+    memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+    hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+    hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+    hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+    error = getaddrinfo(NULL, "0", &hints, &res0);
+    if (error)
+	msg_fatal("could not get list of wildcard addresses");
+    for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
+	if (res->ai_family != AF_INET && res->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+	    continue;
+	if (getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf),
+	    NULL, 0, niflags) != 0)
+	    continue;
+	if (inet_addr_host(addr_list, hbuf) == 0)
+	    continue; /* msg_fatal("config variable %s: host not found: %s",
+		      VAR_INET_INTERFACES, hbuf); */
+    }
+    freeaddrinfo(res0);
+#else
+    if (inet_addr_host(addr_list, "0.0.0.0") == 0)
+	msg_fatal("config variable %s: host not found: %s",
+		  VAR_INET_INTERFACES, "0.0.0.0");
+#endif
+}
+
+/* wildcard_inet_addr_list - return list of addresses */
+
+INET_ADDR_LIST *wildcard_inet_addr_list(void)
+{
+    if (addr_list.used == 0)
+	wildcard_inet_addr_init(&addr_list);
+
+    return (&addr_list);
+}
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.h
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.h	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/global/wildcard_inet_addr.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#ifndef _WILDCARD_INET_ADDR_H_INCLUDED_
+#define _WILDCARD_INET_ADDR_H_INCLUDED_
+
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*	wildcard_inet_addr_list 3h
+/* SUMMARY
+/*	grab the list of wildcard IP addresses.
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*	#include <own_inet_addr.h>
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* .nf
+/*--*/
+
+ /*
+  * System library.
+  */
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+
+ /*
+  * External interface.
+  */
+extern struct INET_ADDR_LIST *wildcard_inet_addr_list(void);
+
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	foo
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*	Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino
+/*--*/
+
+#endif
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/lmtp/lmtp.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/lmtp/lmtp.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/lmtp/lmtp.c	Sat May 11 02:07:05 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/lmtp/lmtp.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -190,6 +190,12 @@
 /* .IP \fBlmtp_quit_timeout\fR
 /*	Timeout for sending the \fBQUIT\fR command, and for
 /*	receiving the server response.
+/* .IP \fBlmtp_bind_address\fR
+/*	Numerical source network address (IPv4) to bind to when making
+/*	a connection.
+/* .IP \fBlmtp_bind_address6\fR
+/*	Numerical source network address (IPv6) to bind to when making
+/*	a connection.
 /* SEE ALSO
 /*	bounce(8) non-delivery status reports
 /*	local(8) local mail delivery
@@ -276,6 +282,8 @@
 char   *var_lmtp_sasl_opts;
 char   *var_lmtp_sasl_passwd;
 bool    var_lmtp_sasl_enable;
+char   *var_lmtp_bind_addr;
+char   *var_lmtp_bind_addr6;
 
  /*
   * Global variables.
@@ -514,6 +522,10 @@
 	VAR_ERROR_RCPT, DEF_ERROR_RCPT, &var_error_rcpt, 1, 0,
 	VAR_LMTP_SASL_PASSWD, DEF_LMTP_SASL_PASSWD, &var_lmtp_sasl_passwd, 0, 0,
 	VAR_LMTP_SASL_OPTS, DEF_LMTP_SASL_OPTS, &var_lmtp_sasl_opts, 0, 0,
+	VAR_LMTP_BIND_ADDR, DEF_LMTP_BIND_ADDR, &var_lmtp_bind_addr, 0, 0,
+#ifdef INET6
+	VAR_LMTP_BIND_ADDR6, DEF_LMTP_BIND_ADDR6, &var_lmtp_bind_addr6, 0, 0,
+#endif
 	0,
     };
     static CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = {
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/lmtp/lmtp_connect.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/lmtp/lmtp_connect.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/lmtp/lmtp_connect.c	Thu Mar 22 02:01:46 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/lmtp/lmtp_connect.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -92,11 +92,13 @@
 #include <iostuff.h>
 #include <timed_connect.h>
 #include <stringops.h>
+#include <inet_addr_list.h>
 
 /* Global library. */
 
 #include <mail_params.h>
 #include <mail_proto.h>
+#include <own_inet_addr.h>
 
 /* DNS library. */
 
@@ -166,13 +168,42 @@
 			              const char *destination, VSTRING *why)
 {
     char   *myname = "lmtp_connect_addr";
-    struct sockaddr_in sin;
-    int     sock;
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+#else
+    struct sockaddr ss;
+#endif
+    struct sockaddr *sa;
+    struct sockaddr_in *sin;
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
+#endif
+    SOCKADDR_SIZE salen;
+#ifdef INET6
+    char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+#else
+    char hbuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
+#endif
+    int     sock = -1;
+    INET_ADDR_LIST *addr_list;
+    char   *bind_addr;
+
+    sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
+    sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&ss;
+#ifdef INET6
+    sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ss;
+#endif
 
     /*
      * Sanity checks.
      */
-    if (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) {
+#ifdef INET6
+    if (((addr->type==T_A) && (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin->sin_addr))) ||
+	((addr->type==T_AAAA) && (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr))))
+#else
+    if (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin->sin_addr))
+#endif
+    {
 	msg_warn("%s: skip address with length %d", myname, addr->data_len);
 	lmtp_errno = LMTP_RETRY;
 	return (0);
@@ -181,25 +212,168 @@
     /*
      * Initialize.
      */
-    memset((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
-    sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
+    switch (addr->type) {
+#ifdef INET6
+    case T_AAAA:
+	bind_addr = var_lmtp_bind_addr6;
+	memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6));
+	sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+	salen = sizeof(*sin6);
+	break;
+#endif
+    default: /* T_A: */
+	bind_addr = var_lmtp_bind_addr;
+	memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
+	sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
+	salen = sizeof(*sin);
+	break;
+    };
+#ifdef HAS_SALEN
+    sa->sa_len = salen;
+#endif
 
-    if ((sock = socket(sin.sin_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+    if ((sock = socket(sa->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
 	msg_fatal("%s: socket: %m", myname);
 
     /*
+     * Allow the sysadmin to specify the source address
+     */
+
+    if (*bind_addr) {
+#ifndef INET6
+	struct sockaddr_in sin;
+
+	memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
+	sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
+#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
+	sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
+#endif
+	sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(bind_addr);
+	if (sin.sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_NONE)
+	    msg_fatal("%s: bad %s parameter: %s",
+		      myname, VAR_LMTP_BIND_ADDR, var_smtp_bind_addr);
+	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0)
+	    msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+	if (msg_verbose)
+	    msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+#else
+	char hbufl[NI_MAXHOST];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE|AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	snprintf(hbufl, sizeof(hbufl)-1, "%s", bind_addr);
+	if (getaddrinfo(hbufl, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0) {
+	    (void)getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, hbufl,
+		sizeof(hbufl), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
+	    if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0)
+		msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, hbufl);
+	    freeaddrinfo(res);
+	    if (msg_verbose)
+		msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, hbufl);
+	}
+#endif
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If running on a virtual host, start connections from the
+     * right address.
+     */
+
+    else if ((addr_list = own_inet_addr_list())->used == 1) {
+#ifndef INET6
+	struct sockaddr_in sin;
+	unsigned long inaddr; /* XXX BAD!*/
+
+	memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
+	sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
+#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
+	sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
+#endif
+	memcpy((char *)&sin.sin_addr, addr_list->addrs, sizeof(sin.sin_addr));
+	inaddr = (unsigned long)ntohl(sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
+	if (!IN_CLASSA(inaddr)
+	    /* XXX Are the two following lines correct? */
+	    || !(((inaddr & IN_CLASSA_NET) >> IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT) ==
+	    IN_LOOPBACKNET)) {
+	    if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0)
+		msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+	    if (msg_verbose)
+		msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+	}
+#else
+	char hbufl[NI_MAXHOST];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL, *loopback = NULL;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	if (getaddrinfo(NULL, "0", &hints, &loopback) != 0)
+	    loopback = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * getnameinfo -> getaddrinfo loop is here so that we can
+	 * get rid of port
+	 */
+	(void)getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)addr_list->addrs,
+	    SA_LEN((struct sockaddr *)addr_list->addrs),
+	    hbufl, sizeof(hbufl), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
+	hbufl[sizeof(hbufl) - 1] = 0;
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE|AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	if (getaddrinfo(hbufl, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0 &&
+	    !(res->ai_addrlen == loopback->ai_addrlen &&
+	    memcmp(res->ai_addr, loopback->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) == 0)) {
+	    if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0)
+		msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, hbufl);
+	    if (msg_verbose)
+		msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, hbufl);
+	}
+	if (res)
+	    freeaddrinfo(res);
+	if (loopback)
+	    freeaddrinfo(loopback);
+#endif
+    }
+
+    /*
      * Connect to the LMTP server.
      */
-    sin.sin_port = port;
-    memcpy((char *) &sin.sin_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin.sin_addr));
+    switch (addr->type) {
+#ifdef INET6
+    case T_AAAA:
+	/* XXX scope-unfriendly */
+	memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6));
+	sin6->sin6_port = port;
+	sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+	salen = sizeof(*sin6);
+	memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr));
+	inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &sin6->sin6_addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
+	break;
+#endif
+    default: /* T_A: */
+	memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
+	sin->sin_port = port;
+	sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
+	salen = sizeof(*sin6);
+	memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin->sin_addr));
+	inet_ntop(AF_INET, &sin->sin_addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
+	break;
+    }
+#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
+    sa->sa_len = salen;
+#endif
 
     if (msg_verbose)
 	msg_info("%s: trying: %s[%s] port %d...",
-		 myname, addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr), ntohs(port));
+		 myname, addr->name, hbuf, ntohs(port));
 
-    return (lmtp_connect_sock(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin),
-			      addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr),
-			      destination, why));
+    return (lmtp_connect_sock(sock, (struct sockaddr *)sa, salen,
+			      addr->name, hbuf, destination, why));
 }
 
 /* lmtp_connect_sock - connect a socket over some transport */
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/master/master_ent.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/master/master_ent.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/master/master_ent.c	Sun Dec 23 20:08:58 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/master/master_ent.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -284,8 +284,13 @@
 	    inet_addr_host(MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv), host);
 	    serv->listen_fd_count = MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->used;
 	} else if (strcasecmp(var_inet_interfaces, DEF_INET_INTERFACES) == 0) {
+#ifdef INET6
+		MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv) = wildcard_inet_addr_list();
+		serv->listen_fd_count = MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->used;
+#else
 	    MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv) = 0;	/* wild-card */
 	    serv->listen_fd_count = 1;
+#endif
 	} else {
 	    MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv) = own_inet_addr_list();	/* virtual */
 	    serv->listen_fd_count = MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->used;
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/master/master_listen.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/master/master_listen.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/master/master_listen.c	Tue May  1 00:47:57 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/master/master_listen.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -64,13 +64,22 @@
 
 #include "master.h"
 
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#endif 
+
 /* master_listen_init - enable connection requests */
 
 void    master_listen_init(MASTER_SERV *serv)
 {
     char   *myname = "master_listen_init";
     char   *end_point;
-    int     n;
+    int     n,m,tmpfd;
+#ifdef INET6
+    char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+    SOCKADDR_SIZE salen;
+#endif
 
     /*
      * Find out what transport we should use, then create one or more
@@ -111,18 +120,31 @@
 	    serv->listen_fd[0] =
 		inet_listen(MASTER_INET_PORT(serv),
 			    serv->max_proc > var_proc_limit ?
-			    serv->max_proc : var_proc_limit, NON_BLOCKING);
+			    serv->max_proc : var_proc_limit, NON_BLOCKING, 1);
 	    close_on_exec(serv->listen_fd[0], CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
 	} else {				/* virtual or host:port */
-	    for (n = 0; n < serv->listen_fd_count; n++) {
+	    for (m = n = 0; n < serv->listen_fd_count; n++) {
+#ifdef INET6
+		if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->addrs[n],
+			SA_LEN((struct sockaddr *)&MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->addrs[n]), 
+			hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
+		    strncpy(hbuf, "?????", sizeof(hbuf));
+		}
+		end_point = concatenate(hbuf, ":", MASTER_INET_PORT(serv), (char *) 0);
+#else
 		end_point = concatenate(inet_ntoa(MASTER_INET_ADDRLIST(serv)->addrs[n]),
 				   ":", MASTER_INET_PORT(serv), (char *) 0);
-		serv->listen_fd[n]
+#endif
+		tmpfd
 		    = inet_listen(end_point, serv->max_proc > var_proc_limit ?
-			     serv->max_proc : var_proc_limit, NON_BLOCKING);
-		close_on_exec(serv->listen_fd[n], CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
+			     serv->max_proc : var_proc_limit, NON_BLOCKING, 0);
+		if (tmpfd >= 0) {
+		    serv->listen_fd[m] = tmpfd;
+		    close_on_exec(serv->listen_fd[m++], CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
+		}
 		myfree(end_point);
 	    }
+	    serv->listen_fd_count=m;
 	}
 	break;
     default:
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/qmgr/qmgr_message.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/qmgr/qmgr_message.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/qmgr/qmgr_message.c	Tue Jun 11 01:55:20 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/qmgr/qmgr_message.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -507,7 +507,11 @@
 	 * every front-ent program.
 	 */
 	if ((at = strrchr(recipient->address, '@')) != 0
+#ifdef INET6
+	    && (at + 1)[strspn(at + 1, "[]0123456789.:abcdef")] != 0
+#else
 	    && (at + 1)[strspn(at + 1, "[]0123456789.")] != 0
+#endif
 	    && valid_hostname(at + 1, DONT_GRIPE) == 0) {
 	    qmgr_bounce_recipient(message, recipient,
 				  "bad host/domain syntax: \"%s\"", at + 1);
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/qmqpd/qmqpd_peer.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/qmqpd/qmqpd_peer.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/qmqpd/qmqpd_peer.c	Thu Jul  5 22:09:35 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/qmqpd/qmqpd_peer.c	Wed Jun 26 15:29:19 2002
@@ -70,6 +70,11 @@
     )
 #endif
 
+#ifdef INET6
+#define GAI_STRERROR(error) \
+	((error = EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(error) : strerror(errno))
+#endif
+
 /* Utility library. */
 
 #include <msg.h>
@@ -79,7 +84,6 @@
 
 /* Global library. */
 
-
 /* Application-specific. */
 
 #include "qmqpd.h"
@@ -88,16 +92,23 @@
 
 void    qmqpd_peer_init(QMQPD_STATE *state)
 {
-    struct sockaddr_in sin;
-    SOCKADDR_SIZE len = sizeof(sin);
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+#else
+    struct sockaddr ss;
+    struct in_addr *in;
     struct hostent *hp;
-    int     i;
+#endif
+    struct sockaddr *sa;
+    SOCKADDR_SIZE len;
+
+    sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
+    len = sizeof(ss);
 
     /*
      * Look up the peer address information.
      */
-    if (getpeername(vstream_fileno(state->client),
-		    (struct sockaddr *) & sin, &len) >= 0) {
+    if (getpeername(vstream_fileno(state->client), sa, &len) >= 0) {
 	errno = 0;
     }
 
@@ -112,16 +123,50 @@
     /*
      * Look up and "verify" the client hostname.
      */
-    else if (errno == 0 && sin.sin_family == AF_INET) {
-	state->addr = mystrdup(inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
-	hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &(sin.sin_addr),
-			   sizeof(sin.sin_addr), AF_INET);
-	if (hp == 0) {
+    else if (errno == 0 && (sa->sa_family == AF_INET
+#ifdef INET6
+	     || sa->sa_family == AF_INET6
+#endif
+             )) {
+#ifdef INET6
+	char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+	char abuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *rnull = NULL;
+#else
+	char abuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
+	char *hbuf;
+#endif
+	int error = -1;
+
+#ifdef INET6
+	(void)getnameinfo(sa, len, abuf, sizeof(abuf), NULL, 0,
+			  NI_NUMERICHOST);
+#else
+	in = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr;
+	inet_ntop(AF_INET, in, abuf, sizeof(abuf));
+#endif
+
+	state->addr = mystrdup(abuf);
+#ifdef INET6
+	error = getnameinfo(sa, len, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0,
+			    NI_NAMEREQD);
+#else
+	hbuf = NULL;
+	hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)in, sizeof(*in), AF_INET);
+	if (hp) {
+	    error = 0;
+	    hbuf = mystrdup(hp->h_name);
+	    state->name = mystrdup("unknown");
+	} else {
+	    error = 1;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (error) {
 	    state->name = mystrdup("unknown");
-	} else if (!valid_hostname(hp->h_name, DONT_GRIPE)) {
+	} else if (!valid_hostname(hbuf, DONT_GRIPE)) {
 	    state->name = mystrdup("unknown");
 	} else {
-	    state->name = mystrdup(hp->h_name);	/* hp->name is clobbered!! */
+	    state->name = mystrdup(hbuf);	/* hp->name is clobbered!! */
 
 	    /*
 	     * Reject the hostname if it does not list the peer address.
@@ -131,16 +176,31 @@
 	state->name = mystrdup("unknown"); \
     }
 
+#ifdef INET6
+	    memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	    hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+	    hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	    error = getaddrinfo(state->name, NULL, &hints, &rnull);
+	    if (error) {
+		msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: %s",
+		         state->addr, state->name, GAI_STRERROR(error));
+		REJECT_PEER_NAME(state);
+	    }
+	    /* memcmp() isn't needed if we use getaddrinfo */
+	    if (rnull)
+		freeaddrinfo(rnull);
+#else
 	    hp = gethostbyname(state->name);	/* clobbers hp->name!! */
 	    if (hp == 0) {
 		msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: %s",
 			 state->addr, state->name, HSTRERROR(h_errno));
 		REJECT_PEER_NAME(state);
-	    } else if (hp->h_length != sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) {
+	    } else if (hp->h_length != sizeof(*in)) {
 		msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: bad address size %d",
 			 state->addr, state->name, hp->h_length);
 		REJECT_PEER_NAME(state);
 	    } else {
+		int i;
 		for (i = 0; /* void */ ; i++) {
 		    if (hp->h_addr_list[i] == 0) {
 			msg_warn("%s: address not listed for hostname %s",
@@ -148,12 +208,12 @@
 			REJECT_PEER_NAME(state);
 			break;
 		    }
-		    if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i],
-			       (char *) &sin.sin_addr,
-			       sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) == 0)
+		    if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i], (char *)in,
+			       sizeof(*in)) == 0)
 			break;			/* keep peer name */
 		}
 	    }
+#endif
 	}
     }
 
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/Makefile.in	Tue Jun 11 03:14:03 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/Makefile.in	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
 smtp.o: ../../include/iostuff.h
 smtp.o: ../../include/attr.h
 smtp.o: ../../include/mail_server.h
+smtp.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtp.o: smtp.h
 smtp.o: smtp_sasl.h
 smtp_addr.o: smtp_addr.c
@@ -103,6 +104,7 @@
 smtp_addr.o: ../../include/argv.h
 smtp_addr.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
 smtp_addr.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
+smtp_addr.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtp_addr.o: smtp_addr.h
 smtp_chat.o: smtp_chat.c
 smtp_chat.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -123,6 +125,7 @@
 smtp_chat.o: ../../include/cleanup_user.h
 smtp_chat.o: ../../include/mail_error.h
 smtp_chat.o: ../../include/name_mask.h
+smtp_chat.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtp_chat.o: smtp.h
 smtp_connect.o: smtp_connect.c
 smtp_connect.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -139,10 +142,12 @@
 smtp_connect.o: ../../include/mail_params.h
 smtp_connect.o: ../../include/own_inet_addr.h
 smtp_connect.o: ../../include/dns.h
+smtp_connect.o: ../../include/get_port.h
 smtp_connect.o: smtp.h
 smtp_connect.o: ../../include/argv.h
 smtp_connect.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
 smtp_connect.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
+smtp_connetc.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtp_connect.o: smtp_addr.h
 smtp_proto.o: smtp_proto.c
 smtp_proto.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -174,6 +179,7 @@
 smtp_proto.o: ../../include/attr.h
 smtp_proto.o: ../../include/mime_state.h
 smtp_proto.o: ../../include/header_opts.h
+smtp_proto.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtp_proto.o: smtp.h
 smtp_proto.o: ../../include/argv.h
 smtp_proto.o: smtp_sasl.h
@@ -219,9 +225,12 @@
 smtp_session.o: ../../include/stringops.h
 smtp_session.o: ../../include/vstring.h
 smtp_session.o: smtp.h
+smtp_session.o: ../../include/mail_params.h
+smtp_session.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtp_session.o: ../../include/argv.h
 smtp_session.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
 smtp_session.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
+smtp_session.o: ../../include/maps.h
 smtp_state.o: smtp_state.c
 smtp_state.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
 smtp_state.o: ../../include/mymalloc.h
@@ -235,6 +244,7 @@
 smtp_state.o: ../../include/argv.h
 smtp_state.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
 smtp_state.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
+smtp_state.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtp_state.o: smtp_sasl.h
 smtp_trouble.o: smtp_trouble.c
 smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
@@ -254,6 +264,7 @@
 smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/name_mask.h
 smtp_trouble.o: smtp.h
 smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/argv.h
+smtp_trouble.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtp_unalias.o: smtp_unalias.c
 smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
 smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/htable.h
@@ -266,3 +277,4 @@
 smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/argv.h
 smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/deliver_request.h
 smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/recipient_list.h
+smtp_unalias.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/sasl_problem_diff postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/sasl_problem_diff
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/sasl_problem_diff	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/sasl_problem_diff	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+--- smtp_proto.c.old	Wed May 15 14:01:56 2002
++++ smtp_proto.c	Fri May 24 21:13:50 2002
+@@ -372,8 +372,13 @@
+ 		    else if (strcasecmp(word, "STARTTLS") == 0)
+ 			state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS;
+ #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+-		    else if (var_smtp_sasl_enable && strcasecmp(word, "AUTH") == 0)
++		    else if (var_smtp_sasl_enable && strcasecmp(word, "AUTH") == 0) {
++			if (state->sasl_mechanism_list) {
++			    myfree(state->sasl_mechanism_list);
++			    state->sasl_mechanism_list = 0;
++			}
+ 			smtp_sasl_helo_auth(state, words);
++			}
+ #endif
+ 		}
+ 	    }
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp.c	Mon May 27 01:07:04 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -100,7 +100,11 @@
 /* .IP \fBsmtp_never_send_ehlo\fR
 /*	Never send EHLO at the start of a connection.
 /* .IP \fBsmtp_bind_address\fR
-/*	Numerical source network address to bind to when making a connection.
+/*	Numerical source network address (IPv4) to bind to when making
+/*	a connection.
+/* .IP \fBsmtp_bind_address6\fR
+/*	Numerical source network address (IPv6) to bind to when making
+/*	a connection.
 /* .IP \fBsmtp_line_length_limit\fR
 /*	Length limit for SMTP message content lines. Zero means no limit.
 /*	Some SMTP servers misbehave on long lines.
@@ -240,6 +244,7 @@
 #include <debug_peer.h>
 #include <mail_error.h>
 #include <deliver_pass.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
 
 /* Single server skeleton. */
 
@@ -256,6 +261,7 @@
   */
 int     var_smtp_conn_tmout;
 int     var_smtp_helo_tmout;
+int     var_smtp_starttls_tmout;
 int     var_smtp_mail_tmout;
 int     var_smtp_rcpt_tmout;
 int     var_smtp_data0_tmout;
@@ -277,11 +283,20 @@
 char   *var_smtp_sasl_passwd;
 bool    var_smtp_sasl_enable;
 char   *var_smtp_bind_addr;
+#ifdef INET6
+char   *var_smtp_bind_addr6;
+#endif
 bool    var_smtp_rand_addr;
 int     var_smtp_pix_thresh;
 int     var_smtp_pix_delay;
 int     var_smtp_line_limit;
 char   *var_smtp_helo_name;
+int     var_smtp_use_tls;
+int     var_smtp_enforce_tls;
+int     var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername;
+char   *var_smtp_tls_per_site;
+int     var_smtp_tls_scert_vd;
+int     var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer;
 
  /*
   * Global variables. smtp_errno is set by the address lookup routines and by
@@ -391,6 +406,7 @@
 
 static void pre_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
 {
+
     debug_peer_init();
 
     if (var_smtp_sasl_enable)
@@ -400,6 +416,14 @@
 	msg_warn("%s is true, but SASL support is not compiled in",
 		 VAR_SMTP_SASL_ENABLE);
 #endif
+    /*
+     * Initialize the TLS data before entering the chroot jail
+     */
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    if (var_smtp_use_tls || var_smtp_enforce_tls || var_smtp_tls_per_site[0])
+	pfixtls_init_clientengine(var_smtp_tls_scert_vd);
+    smtp_tls_list_init();
+#endif
 }
 
 /* pre_accept - see if tables have changed */
@@ -434,7 +458,11 @@
 	VAR_SMTP_SASL_PASSWD, DEF_SMTP_SASL_PASSWD, &var_smtp_sasl_passwd, 0, 0,
 	VAR_SMTP_SASL_OPTS, DEF_SMTP_SASL_OPTS, &var_smtp_sasl_opts, 0, 0,
 	VAR_SMTP_BIND_ADDR, DEF_SMTP_BIND_ADDR, &var_smtp_bind_addr, 0, 0,
+#ifdef INET6
+	VAR_SMTP_BIND_ADDR6, DEF_SMTP_BIND_ADDR6, &var_smtp_bind_addr6, 0, 0,
+#endif
 	VAR_SMTP_HELO_NAME, DEF_SMTP_HELO_NAME, &var_smtp_helo_name, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE, DEF_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE, &var_smtp_tls_per_site, 0, 0,
 	0,
     };
     static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
@@ -448,6 +476,7 @@
 	VAR_SMTP_QUIT_TMOUT, DEF_SMTP_QUIT_TMOUT, &var_smtp_quit_tmout, 1, 0,
 	VAR_SMTP_PIX_THRESH, DEF_SMTP_PIX_THRESH, &var_smtp_pix_thresh, 0, 0,
 	VAR_SMTP_PIX_DELAY, DEF_SMTP_PIX_DELAY, &var_smtp_pix_delay, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT, DEF_SMTP_STARTTLS_TMOUT, &var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 1, 0,
 	0,
     };
     static CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = {
@@ -463,6 +492,10 @@
 	VAR_SMTP_NEVER_EHLO, DEF_SMTP_NEVER_EHLO, &var_smtp_never_ehlo,
 	VAR_SMTP_SASL_ENABLE, DEF_SMTP_SASL_ENABLE, &var_smtp_sasl_enable,
 	VAR_SMTP_RAND_ADDR, DEF_SMTP_RAND_ADDR, &var_smtp_rand_addr,
+	VAR_SMTP_USE_TLS, DEF_SMTP_USE_TLS, &var_smtp_use_tls,
+	VAR_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS, DEF_SMTP_ENFORCE_TLS, &var_smtp_enforce_tls,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN, DEF_SMTP_TLS_ENFORCE_PN, &var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername,
+	VAR_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER, DEF_SMTP_TLS_NOTEOFFER, &var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer,
 	0,
     };
 
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp.h
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp.h	Thu May 23 21:18:02 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
   * Global library.
   */
 #include <deliver_request.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
 
  /*
   * State information associated with each SMTP delivery. We're bundling the
@@ -79,9 +80,14 @@
     char   *addr;			/* mail exchanger */
     char   *namaddr;			/* mail exchanger */
     int     best;			/* most preferred host */
+    int     tls_use_tls;		/* can do TLS */
+    int     tls_enforce_tls;		/* must do TLS */
+    int     tls_enforce_peername;	/* cert must match */
+    tls_info_t tls_info;		/* TLS connection state */
 } SMTP_SESSION;
 
-extern SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(VSTREAM *, char *, char *);
+extern void smtp_tls_list_init(void);
+extern SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(char *, VSTREAM *, char *, char *);
 extern void smtp_session_free(SMTP_SESSION *);
 
  /*
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_addr.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_addr.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_addr.c	Sun Jul  8 17:05:26 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_addr.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -134,18 +134,68 @@
 static void smtp_print_addr(char *what, DNS_RR *addr_list)
 {
     DNS_RR *addr;
-    struct in_addr in_addr;
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+#else
+    struct sockaddr ss;
+#endif
+    struct sockaddr_in *sin;
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
+    char   hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+#else
+    char   hbuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
+#endif
 
     msg_info("begin %s address list", what);
     for (addr = addr_list; addr; addr = addr->next) {
-	if (addr->data_len > sizeof(addr)) {
-	    msg_warn("skipping address length %d", addr->data_len);
-	} else {
-	    memcpy((char *) &in_addr, addr->data, sizeof(in_addr));
-	    msg_info("pref %4d host %s/%s",
-		     addr->pref, addr->name,
-		     inet_ntoa(in_addr));
+	if (addr->class != C_IN) {
+	    msg_warn("skipping unsupported address (class=%u)", addr->class);
+	    continue;
 	}
+	switch (addr->type) {
+	case T_A:
+	    if (addr->data_len != sizeof(sin->sin_addr)) {
+		msg_warn("skipping invalid address (AAAA, len=%u)",
+		    addr->data_len);
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&ss;
+	    memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
+	    sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
+#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
+	    sin->sin_len = sizeof(*sin);
+#endif
+	    memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin->sin_addr));
+	    break;
+#ifdef INET6
+	case T_AAAA:
+	    if (addr->data_len != sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr)) {
+		msg_warn("skipping invalid address (AAAA, len=%u)",
+		    addr->data_len);
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ss;
+	    memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6));
+	    sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
+	    sin6->sin6_len = sizeof(*sin6);
+#endif
+	    memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr));
+	    break;
+#endif
+	default:
+	    msg_warn("skipping unsupported address (type=%u)", addr->type);
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+#ifdef INET6
+	(void)getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&ss, SS_LEN(ss),
+	    hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
+#else
+	(void)inet_ntop(AF_INET, &sin->sin_addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
+#endif
+	msg_info("pref %4d host %s/%s", addr->pref, addr->name, hbuf);
     }
     msg_info("end %s address list", what);
 }
@@ -155,15 +205,23 @@
 static DNS_RR *smtp_addr_one(DNS_RR *addr_list, char *host, unsigned pref, VSTRING *why)
 {
     char   *myname = "smtp_addr_one";
+#ifndef INET6
     struct in_addr inaddr;
-    DNS_FIXED fixed;
     DNS_RR *addr = 0;
     DNS_RR *rr;
     struct hostent *hp;
+#else
+    struct addrinfo hints, *res0, *res;
+    int error = -1;
+    char *addr;
+    size_t addrlen;
+#endif
+    DNS_FIXED fixed;
 
     if (msg_verbose)
 	msg_info("%s: host %s", myname, host);
 
+#ifndef INET6
     /*
      * Interpret a numerical name as an address.
      */
@@ -216,6 +274,48 @@
 	smtp_errno = SMTP_FAIL;
 	break;
     }
+#else
+    memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+    hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+    hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+    error = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &res0);
+    if (error) {
+	switch (error) {
+	case EAI_AGAIN:
+	    smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    vstring_sprintf(why, "[%s]: %s",host,gai_strerror(error));
+	    smtp_errno = SMTP_FAIL;
+	    break;
+	}
+	return (addr_list);
+    }
+    for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
+	memset((char *) &fixed, 0, sizeof(fixed));
+	switch(res->ai_family) {
+	case AF_INET6:
+	    /* XXX not scope friendly */
+	    fixed.type = T_AAAA;
+	    addr = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)res->ai_addr)->sin6_addr;
+	    addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
+	    break;
+	case AF_INET:
+	    fixed.type = T_A;
+	    addr = (char *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)res->ai_addr)->sin_addr;
+	    addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr);
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    msg_warn("%s: unknown address family %d for %s",
+	        myname, res->ai_family, host);
+	    continue;
+	}
+	addr_list = dns_rr_append(addr_list,
+	    dns_rr_create(host, &fixed, pref, addr, addrlen));
+    }
+    if (res0)
+	freeaddrinfo(res0);
+#endif
     return (addr_list);
 }
 
@@ -251,6 +351,9 @@
     INET_ADDR_LIST *self;
     DNS_RR *addr;
     int     i;
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct sockaddr *sa;
+#endif
 
     /*
      * Find the first address that lists any address that this mail system is
@@ -260,12 +363,36 @@
 
     self = own_inet_addr_list();
     for (addr = addr_list; addr; addr = addr->next) {
-	for (i = 0; i < self->used; i++)
+	for (i = 0; i < self->used; i++) {
+#ifdef INET6
+	    sa = (struct sockaddr *)&self->addrs[i];
+	    switch(addr->type) {
+	    case T_AAAA:
+		/* XXX scope */
+		if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET6)
+		    break;
+		if (memcmp(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_addr,
+			addr->data, sizeof(struct in6_addr)) == 0) {
+		    return(addr);
+		}
+		break;
+	    case T_A:
+		if (sa->sa_family != AF_INET)
+		    break;
+		if (memcmp(&((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr,
+			addr->data, sizeof(struct in_addr)) == 0) {
+		    return(addr);
+		}
+		break;
+	    }
+#else
 	    if (INADDRP(addr->data)->s_addr == self->addrs[i].s_addr) {
 		if (msg_verbose)
 		    msg_info("%s: found at pref %d", myname, addr->pref);
 		return (addr);
 	    }
+#endif
+	}
     }
 
     /*
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c	Sun Jul  8 21:40:03 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_connect.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
 /* System library. */
 
 #include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
@@ -110,12 +111,14 @@
 #include <inet_addr_list.h>
 #include <iostuff.h>
 #include <timed_connect.h>
+#include <get_port.h>
 #include <stringops.h>
 
 /* Global library. */
 
 #include <mail_params.h>
 #include <own_inet_addr.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
 
 /* DNS library. */
 
@@ -128,23 +131,50 @@
 
 /* smtp_connect_addr - connect to explicit address */
 
-static SMTP_SESSION *smtp_connect_addr(DNS_RR *addr, unsigned port,
+static SMTP_SESSION *smtp_connect_addr(char *dest, DNS_RR *addr, unsigned port,
 				               VSTRING *why)
 {
     char   *myname = "smtp_connect_addr";
-    struct sockaddr_in sin;
-    int     sock;
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+#else
+    struct sockaddr ss;
+#endif
+    struct sockaddr *sa;
+    struct sockaddr_in *sin;
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
+#endif
+    SOCKADDR_SIZE salen;
+#ifdef INET6
+    char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+#else
+    char hbuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
+#endif
+    int     sock = -1;
     INET_ADDR_LIST *addr_list;
     int     conn_stat;
     int     saved_errno;
     VSTREAM *stream;
     int     ch;
-    unsigned long inaddr;
+    char    *bind_addr;
+
+    sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
+    sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)&ss;
+#ifdef INET6
+    sin6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&ss;
+#endif
 
     /*
      * Sanity checks.
      */
-    if (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) {
+#ifdef INET6
+    if (((addr->type==T_A) && (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin->sin_addr))) ||
+	((addr->type==T_AAAA) && (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr))))
+#else
+    if (addr->data_len > sizeof(sin->sin_addr))
+#endif
+    {
 	msg_warn("%s: skip address with length %d", myname, addr->data_len);
 	smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
 	return (0);
@@ -153,18 +183,42 @@
     /*
      * Initialize.
      */
-    memset((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
-    sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
-
-    if ((sock = socket(sin.sin_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
-	msg_fatal("%s: socket: %m", myname);
-
+    switch (addr->type) {
+#ifdef INET6
+    case T_AAAA:
+	bind_addr = var_smtp_bind_addr6;
+	memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6));
+	sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+	salen = sizeof(*sin6);
+	break;
+#endif
+    default: /* T_A: */
+	bind_addr = var_smtp_bind_addr;
+	memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
+	sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
+	salen = sizeof(*sin);
+	break;
+    }
+#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
+    sa->sa_len = salen;
+#endif
+    if ((sock = socket(sa->sa_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+	msg_warn("%s: socket: %m", myname);
+		    
     /*
      * Allow the sysadmin to specify the source address, for example, as "-o
      * smtp_bind_address=x.x.x.x" in the master.cf file.
      */
-    if (*var_smtp_bind_addr) {
-	sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(var_smtp_bind_addr);
+    if (*bind_addr) {
+#ifndef INET6
+	struct sockaddr_in sin;
+
+	memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
+	sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
+#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
+	sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
+#endif
+	sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(bind_addr);
 	if (sin.sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_NONE)
 	    msg_fatal("%s: bad %s parameter: %s",
 		      myname, VAR_SMTP_BIND_ADDR, var_smtp_bind_addr);
@@ -172,6 +226,25 @@
 	    msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
 	if (msg_verbose)
 	    msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+#else
+	char hbufl[NI_MAXHOST];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE|AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	snprintf(hbufl, sizeof(hbufl)-1, "%s", bind_addr);
+	if (getaddrinfo(hbufl, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0) {
+	    (void)getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, hbufl,
+	        sizeof(hbufl), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
+	    if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0)
+		msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, hbufl);
+	    freeaddrinfo(res);
+	    if (msg_verbose)
+		msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, hbufl);
+	}
+#endif
     }
 
     /*
@@ -179,8 +252,17 @@
      * the mail appears to come from the "right" machine address.
      */
     else if ((addr_list = own_inet_addr_list())->used == 1) {
+#ifndef INET6
+	struct sockaddr_in sin;
+	unsigned long inaddr;	/*XXX BAD!*/
+
+	memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
+	sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
+#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
+	sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
+#endif
 	memcpy((char *) &sin.sin_addr, addr_list->addrs, sizeof(sin.sin_addr));
-	inaddr = ntohl(sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
+	inaddr = (unsigned long)ntohl(sin.sin_addr.s_addr);
 	if (!IN_CLASSA(inaddr)
 	    || !(((inaddr & IN_CLASSA_NET) >> IN_CLASSA_NSHIFT) == IN_LOOPBACKNET)) {
 	    if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0)
@@ -188,30 +270,85 @@
 	    if (msg_verbose)
 		msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
 	}
+#else
+	char hbufl[NI_MAXHOST];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL, *loopback = NULL;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	if (getaddrinfo(NULL, "0", &hints, &loopback) != 0)
+	    loopback = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * getnameinfo -> getaddrinfo loop is here so that we can
+	 * get rid of port.
+	 */
+	(void)getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)addr_list->addrs, SA_LEN((struct sockaddr *)addr_list->addrs),
+	    hbufl, sizeof(hbufl), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
+	hbufl[sizeof(hbufl)-1] = 0;
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = sa->sa_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE|AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	if (getaddrinfo(hbufl, NULL, &hints, &res) == 0 &&
+	    !(res->ai_addrlen == loopback->ai_addrlen &&
+	      memcmp(res->ai_addr, loopback->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) == 0)) {
+	    if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0)
+		msg_warn("%s: bind %s: %m", myname, hbufl);
+	    if (msg_verbose)
+		msg_info("%s: bind %s", myname, hbufl);
+	}
+	if (res)
+	    freeaddrinfo(res);
+	if (loopback)
+	    freeaddrinfo(loopback);
+#endif
     }
 
     /*
      * Connect to the SMTP server.
      */
-    sin.sin_port = port;
-    memcpy((char *) &sin.sin_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin.sin_addr));
+    switch (addr->type) {
+#ifdef INET6
+    case T_AAAA:
+	/* XXX scope unfriendly */
+	memset(sin6, 0, sizeof(*sin6));
+	sin6->sin6_port = port;
+	sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+	salen = sizeof(*sin6);
+	memcpy(&sin6->sin6_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin6->sin6_addr));
+	inet_ntop(AF_INET6, &sin6->sin6_addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
+	break;
+#endif
+    default: /* T_A */
+	memset(sin, 0, sizeof(*sin));
+	sin->sin_port = port;
+	sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
+	salen = sizeof(*sin);
+	memcpy(&sin->sin_addr, addr->data, sizeof(sin->sin_addr));
+	inet_ntop(AF_INET, &sin->sin_addr, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf));
+	break;
+    }
+#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
+    sa->sa_len = salen;
+#endif
 
     if (msg_verbose)
 	msg_info("%s: trying: %s[%s] port %d...",
-		 myname, addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr), ntohs(port));
+		 myname, addr->name, hbuf, ntohs(port));
     if (var_smtp_conn_tmout > 0) {
 	non_blocking(sock, NON_BLOCKING);
-	conn_stat = timed_connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin,
-				  sizeof(sin), var_smtp_conn_tmout);
+	conn_stat = timed_connect(sock, sa, salen, var_smtp_conn_tmout);
 	saved_errno = errno;
 	non_blocking(sock, BLOCKING);
 	errno = saved_errno;
     } else {
-	conn_stat = connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin));
+	conn_stat = connect(sock, sa, salen);
     }
     if (conn_stat < 0) {
 	vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s[%s]: %m",
-			addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+			addr->name, hbuf);
 	smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
 	close(sock);
 	return (0);
@@ -221,8 +358,8 @@
      * Skip this host if it takes no action within some time limit.
      */
     if (read_wait(sock, var_smtp_helo_tmout) < 0) {
-	vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s[%s]: read timeout",
-			addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+	vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s [%s]: read timeout",
+			addr->name, hbuf);
 	smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
 	close(sock);
 	return (0);
@@ -233,8 +370,8 @@
      */
     stream = vstream_fdopen(sock, O_RDWR);
     if ((ch = VSTREAM_GETC(stream)) == VSTREAM_EOF) {
-	vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s[%s]: server dropped connection",
-			addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+	vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s [%s]: server dropped connection",
+			addr->name, hbuf);
 	smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
 	vstream_fclose(stream);
 	return (0);
@@ -246,7 +383,7 @@
      */
     if (ch == '4' && var_smtp_skip_4xx_greeting) {
 	vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s[%s]: server refused mail service",
-			addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+			addr->name, hbuf);
 	smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
 	vstream_fclose(stream);
 	return (0);
@@ -257,12 +394,12 @@
      */
     if (ch == '5' && var_smtp_skip_5xx_greeting) {
 	vstring_sprintf(why, "connect to %s[%s]: server refused mail service",
-			addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
+			addr->name, hbuf);
 	smtp_errno = SMTP_RETRY;
 	vstream_fclose(stream);
 	return (0);
     }
-    return (smtp_session_alloc(stream, addr->name, inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr)));
+    return (smtp_session_alloc(dest, stream, addr->name, hbuf));
 }
 
 /* smtp_connect_host - direct connection to host */
@@ -272,7 +409,7 @@
     SMTP_SESSION *session = 0;
     DNS_RR *addr_list;
     DNS_RR *addr;
-
+    
     /*
      * Try each address in the specified order until we find one that works.
      * The addresses belong to the same A record, so we have no information
@@ -280,7 +417,7 @@
      */
     addr_list = smtp_host_addr(host, why);
     for (addr = addr_list; addr; addr = addr->next) {
-	if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(addr, port, why)) != 0) {
+	if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(host, addr, port, why)) != 0) {
 	    session->best = 1;
 	    break;
 	}
@@ -309,7 +446,7 @@
      */
     addr_list = smtp_domain_addr(name, why, found_myself);
     for (addr = addr_list; addr; addr = addr->next) {
-	if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(addr, port, why)) != 0) {
+	if ((session = smtp_connect_addr(name, addr, port, why)) != 0) {
 	    session->best = (addr->pref == addr_list->pref);
 	    break;
 	}
@@ -379,6 +516,7 @@
 	    msg_fatal("unknown service: %s/%s", service, protocol);
 	*portp = sp->s_port;
     }
+
     return (buf);
 }
 
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c	Sat Jun  1 15:07:27 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_proto.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@
 #include <quote_821_local.h>
 #include <mail_proto.h>
 #include <mime_state.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
 
 /* Application-specific. */
 
@@ -170,6 +171,8 @@
     char   *words;
     char   *word;
     int     n;
+    int     oldfeatures;
+    int     rval;
 
     /*
      * Prepare for disaster.
@@ -231,7 +234,8 @@
 				   session->namaddr,
 				   translit(resp->str, "\n", " ")));
     }
-
+    if (var_smtp_always_ehlo)
+	state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_ESMTP;
     /*
      * Pick up some useful features offered by the SMTP server. XXX Until we
      * have a portable routine to convert from string to off_t with proper
@@ -243,6 +247,7 @@
      * MicroSoft implemented AUTH based on an old draft.
      */
     lines = resp->str;
+    oldfeatures = state->features;		/* remember */
     while ((words = mystrtok(&lines, "\n")) != 0) {
 	if (mystrtok(&words, "- ") && (word = mystrtok(&words, " \t=")) != 0) {
 	    if (strcasecmp(word, "8BITMIME") == 0)
@@ -259,6 +264,8 @@
 			state->size_limit = off_cvt_string(word);
 		}
 	    }
+	    else if (strcasecmp(word, "STARTTLS") == 0)
+		state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS;
 #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
 	    else if (var_smtp_sasl_enable && strcasecmp(word, "AUTH") == 0)
 		smtp_sasl_helo_auth(state, words);
@@ -276,6 +283,128 @@
 	msg_info("server features: 0x%x size %.0f",
 		 state->features, (double) state->size_limit);
 
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    if ((state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS) &&
+	(var_smtp_tls_note_starttls_offer) &&
+	(!(session->tls_enforce_tls || session->tls_use_tls)))
+ 	msg_info("Host offered STARTTLS: [%s]", session->host);
+    if ((session->tls_enforce_tls) &&
+	!(state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS))
+    {
+	/*
+	 * We are enforced to use TLS but it is not offered, so we will give
+	 * up on this host. We won't even try STARTTLS, because we could
+	 * receive a "500 command unrecognized" which would bounce the
+	 * message. We instead want to delay until STARTTLS becomes
+	 * available.
+	 */
+	return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450, "Could not start TLS: not offered"));
+    }
+    if ((session->tls_enforce_tls) && !pfixtls_clientengine) {
+	/*
+	 * We would like to start client TLS, but our own TLS-engine is
+	 * not running.
+	 */
+	return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450,
+		 "Could not start TLS: our TLS-engine not running"));
+    }
+    if ((state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS) &&
+	((session->tls_use_tls && pfixtls_clientengine) ||
+	 (session->tls_enforce_tls))) {
+	/*
+         * Try to use the TLS feature
+         */
+	smtp_chat_cmd(state, "STARTTLS");
+	if ((resp = smtp_chat_resp(state))->code / 100 != 2) {
+	    state->features &= ~SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS;
+	    /*
+	     * At this point a political decision is necessary. If we
+	     * enforce usage of tls, we have to close the connection
+	     * now.
+	     */
+	    if (session->tls_enforce_tls)
+		return (smtp_site_fail(state, resp->code,
+					 "host %s refused to start TLS: %s",
+					   session->host,
+					   translit(resp->str, "\n", " ")));
+	} else {
+	    if (rval = pfixtls_start_clienttls(session->stream,
+					       var_smtp_starttls_tmout,
+					       session->tls_enforce_peername,
+					       session->host,
+					       &(session->tls_info)))
+		return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450,
+				 "Could not start TLS: client failure"));
+
+
+	    /*
+	     * Now the connection is established and maybe we do have a
+	     * validated cert with a CommonName in it.
+	     * In enforce_peername state, the handshake would already have
+	     * been terminated so the check here is for logging only!
+	     */
+	    if (session->tls_info.peer_CN != NULL) {
+		if (!session->tls_info.peer_verified) {
+		    msg_info("Peer certficate could not be verified");
+		    if (session->tls_enforce_tls) {
+			pfixtls_stop_clienttls(session->stream,
+					       var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 1,
+					       &(session->tls_info));
+			return(smtp_site_fail(state, 450, "TLS-failure: Could not verify certificate"));
+		    }
+		}
+	    } else if (session->tls_enforce_tls) {
+		pfixtls_stop_clienttls(session->stream,
+				       var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 1,
+				       &(session->tls_info));
+		return (smtp_site_fail(state, 450, "TLS-failure: Cannot verify hostname"));
+	    }
+
+	    /*
+	     * At this point we have to re-negotiate the "EHLO" to reget
+	     * the feature-list
+	     */
+	    state->features = oldfeatures;
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+	    if (state->sasl_mechanism_list) {
+		myfree(state->sasl_mechanism_list);
+		state->sasl_mechanism_list = 0;
+	    }
+#endif
+	    if (state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_ESMTP) {
+		smtp_chat_cmd(state, "EHLO %s", var_myhostname);
+		if ((resp = smtp_chat_resp(state))->code / 100 != 2)
+		    state->features &= ~SMTP_FEATURE_ESMTP;
+	    }
+	    lines = resp->str;
+	    (void) mystrtok(&lines, "\n");
+	    while ((words = mystrtok(&lines, "\n")) != 0) {
+		if (mystrtok(&words, "- ") &&
+		    (word = mystrtok(&words, " \t=")) != 0) {
+		    if (strcasecmp(word, "8BITMIME") == 0)
+			state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_8BITMIME;
+		    else if (strcasecmp(word, "PIPELINING") == 0)
+			state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_PIPELINING;
+		    else if (strcasecmp(word, "SIZE") == 0)
+			state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_SIZE;
+		    else if (strcasecmp(word, "STARTTLS") == 0)
+			state->features |= SMTP_FEATURE_STARTTLS;
+#ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
+		    else if (var_smtp_sasl_enable &&
+			     strcasecmp(word, "AUTH") == 0)
+			smtp_sasl_helo_auth(state, words);
+#endif
+		}
+	    }
+	    /*
+	     * Actually, at this point STARTTLS should not be offered
+	     * anymore, so we could check for a protocol violation, but
+	     * what should we do then?
+	     */
+
+	}
+    }
+#endif
 #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
     if (var_smtp_sasl_enable && (state->features & SMTP_FEATURE_AUTH))
 	return (smtp_sasl_helo_login(state));
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_session.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_session.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_session.c	Mon Nov 20 19:06:05 2000
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_session.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -42,15 +42,42 @@
 #include <vstream.h>
 #include <stringops.h>
 
+#include <mail_params.h>
+#include <maps.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
+
 /* Application-specific. */
 
 #include "smtp.h"
 
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+/* static lists */
+static MAPS *tls_per_site;
+
+/* smtp_tls_list_init - initialize lists */
+
+void smtp_tls_list_init(void)
+{
+    tls_per_site = maps_create(VAR_SMTP_TLS_PER_SITE, var_smtp_tls_per_site,
+			       DICT_FLAG_LOCK);
+}
+#endif
+
 /* smtp_session_alloc - allocate and initialize SMTP_SESSION structure */
 
-SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(VSTREAM *stream, char *host, char *addr)
+SMTP_SESSION *smtp_session_alloc(char *dest, VSTREAM *stream, char *host, char *addr)
 {
     SMTP_SESSION *session;
+    const char *lookup;
+    char *lookup_key;
+    int host_dont_use = 0;
+    int host_use = 0;
+    int host_enforce = 0;
+    int host_enforce_peername = 0;
+    int recipient_dont_use = 0;
+    int recipient_use = 0;
+    int recipient_enforce = 0;
+    int recipient_enforce_peername = 0;
 
     session = (SMTP_SESSION *) mymalloc(sizeof(*session));
     session->stream = stream;
@@ -58,6 +85,61 @@
     session->addr = mystrdup(addr);
     session->namaddr = concatenate(host, "[", addr, "]", (char *) 0);
     session->best = 1;
+    session->tls_use_tls = session->tls_enforce_tls = 0;
+    session->tls_enforce_peername = 0;
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    lookup_key = lowercase(mystrdup(host));
+    if (lookup = maps_find(tls_per_site, lookup_key, 0)) {
+	if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "NONE"))
+	    host_dont_use = 1;
+	else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MAY"))
+	    host_use = 1;
+	else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST"))
+	    host_enforce = host_enforce_peername = 1;
+	else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST_NOPEERMATCH"))
+	    host_enforce = 1;
+	else
+	    msg_warn("Unknown TLS state for receiving host %s: '%s', using default policy", session->host, lookup);
+    }
+    myfree(lookup_key);
+    lookup_key = lowercase(mystrdup(dest));
+    if (lookup = maps_find(tls_per_site, dest, 0)) {
+	if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "NONE"))
+	    recipient_dont_use = 1;
+	else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MAY"))
+	    recipient_use = 1;
+	else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST"))
+	    recipient_enforce = recipient_enforce_peername = 1;
+	else if (!strcasecmp(lookup, "MUST_NOPEERMATCH"))
+	    recipient_enforce = 1;
+	else
+	    msg_warn("Unknown TLS state for recipient domain %s: '%s', using default policy", dest, lookup);
+    }
+    myfree(lookup_key);
+
+    if ((var_smtp_enforce_tls && !host_dont_use && !recipient_dont_use) || host_enforce ||
+	 recipient_enforce)
+	session->tls_enforce_tls = session->tls_use_tls = 1;
+
+    /*
+     * Set up peername checking. We want to make sure that a MUST* entry in
+     * the tls_per_site table always has precedence. MUST always must lead to
+     * a peername check, MUST_NOPEERMATCH must always disable it. Only when
+     * no explicit setting has been found, the default will be used.
+     * There is the case left, that both "host" and "recipient" settings
+     * conflict. In this case, the "host" setting wins.
+     */
+    if (host_enforce && host_enforce_peername)
+	session->tls_enforce_peername = 1;
+    else if (recipient_enforce && recipient_enforce_peername)
+	session->tls_enforce_peername = 1;
+    else if (var_smtp_enforce_tls && var_smtp_tls_enforce_peername)
+	session->tls_enforce_peername = 1;
+
+    else if ((var_smtp_use_tls && !host_dont_use && !recipient_dont_use) || host_use || recipient_use)
+      session->tls_use_tls = 1;
+#endif
+    session->tls_info = tls_info_zero;
     return (session);
 }
 
@@ -65,6 +147,11 @@
 
 void    smtp_session_free(SMTP_SESSION *session)
 {
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    vstream_fflush(session->stream);
+    pfixtls_stop_clienttls(session->stream, var_smtp_starttls_tmout, 0,
+			   &(session->tls_info));
+#endif
     vstream_fclose(session->stream);
     myfree(session->host);
     myfree(session->addr);
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_unalias.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_unalias.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtp/smtp_unalias.c	Thu Sep 28 19:06:09 2000
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtp/smtp_unalias.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -86,7 +86,11 @@
     if ((result = htable_find(cache, name)) == 0) {
 	fqdn = vstring_alloc(10);
 	if (dns_lookup_types(name, smtp_unalias_flags, (DNS_RR **) 0,
-			     fqdn, (VSTRING *) 0, T_MX, T_A, 0) != DNS_OK)
+			     fqdn, (VSTRING *) 0, T_MX, T_A,
+#ifdef INET6
+			     T_AAAA,
+#endif
+			     0) != DNS_OK)
 	    vstring_strcpy(fqdn, name);
 	htable_enter(cache, name, result = vstring_export(fqdn));
     }
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/Makefile.in	Tue Jun 11 03:13:44 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/Makefile.in	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@
 smtpd.o: ../../include/quote_flags.h
 smtpd.o: ../../include/lex_822.h
 smtpd.o: ../../include/mail_server.h
+smtpd.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtpd.o: smtpd_token.h
 smtpd.o: smtpd.h
 smtpd.o: smtpd_check.h
@@ -162,6 +163,7 @@
 smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/cleanup_user.h
 smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/mail_error.h
 smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/name_mask.h
+smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtpd_chat.o: smtpd.h
 smtpd_chat.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
 smtpd_chat.o: smtpd_chat.h
@@ -197,6 +199,7 @@
 smtpd_check.o: ../../include/mail_addr_find.h
 smtpd_check.o: ../../include/match_parent_style.h
 smtpd_check.o: ../../include/strip_addr.h
+smtpd_check.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtpd_check.o: smtpd.h
 smtpd_check.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
 smtpd_check.o: smtpd_sasl_glue.h
@@ -213,6 +216,7 @@
 smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/vstream.h
 smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/argv.h
 smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
+smtpd_peer.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtpd_sasl_glue.o: smtpd_sasl_glue.c
 smtpd_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
 smtpd_sasl_glue.o: ../../include/msg.h
@@ -266,6 +270,7 @@
 smtpd_state.o: ../../include/vstring.h
 smtpd_state.o: ../../include/argv.h
 smtpd_state.o: ../../include/mail_stream.h
+smtpd_state.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
 smtpd_state.o: smtpd_chat.h
 smtpd_state.o: smtpd_sasl_glue.h
 smtpd_token.o: smtpd_token.c
@@ -275,3 +280,4 @@
 smtpd_token.o: smtpd_token.h
 smtpd_token.o: ../../include/vstring.h
 smtpd_token.o: ../../include/vbuf.h
+smtpd_token.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd.c	Tue May 28 19:08:56 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@
 #include <string_list.h>
 #include <quote_822_local.h>
 #include <lex_822.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
 
 /* Single-threaded server skeleton. */
 
@@ -338,6 +339,7 @@
   */
 int     var_smtpd_rcpt_limit;
 int     var_smtpd_tmout;
+char   *var_relay_ccerts;
 int     var_smtpd_soft_erlim;
 int     var_smtpd_hard_erlim;
 int     var_queue_minfree;		/* XXX use off_t */
@@ -385,6 +387,15 @@
 char   *var_smtpd_noop_cmds;
 char   *var_smtpd_null_key;
 int     var_smtpd_hist_thrsh;
+int     var_smtpd_starttls_tmout;
+int     var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode;
+int     var_smtpd_use_tls;
+int     var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+int     var_smtpd_tls_auth_only;
+int     var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert;
+int     var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert;
+int     var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd;
+int     var_smtpd_tls_received_header;
 
  /*
   * Silly little macros.
@@ -489,11 +500,21 @@
     if (var_disable_vrfy_cmd == 0)
 	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-VRFY");
     smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-ETRN");
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    if ((state->tls_use_tls || state->tls_enforce_tls) && (!state->tls_active))
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-STARTTLS");
+#endif
 #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
     if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable) {
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+      if (!state->tls_auth_only || state->tls_active) {
+#endif
 	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-AUTH %s", state->sasl_mechanism_list);
 	if (var_broken_auth_clients)
 	    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-AUTH=%s", state->sasl_mechanism_list);
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+      }
+#endif
     }
 #endif
     smtpd_chat_reply(state, "250-%s", VERP_CMD);
@@ -918,11 +939,76 @@
     state->rcpt_count = 0;
 }
 
+/* CN_sanitize - make sure, the CN-string is well behaved */
+
+static void CN_sanitize(char *CNstring)
+{
+    int i;
+    int len;
+    int parencount;
+
+    /*
+     * The information included in the CN (CommonName) of the peer and its
+     * issuer can be included into the Received: header line. The characters
+     * allowed as well as comment nesting are limited by RFC822.
+     */
+
+    len = strlen(CNstring);
+    /*
+     * The Received: header can only contain characters. Make sure that only
+     * acceptable characters are printed. Maybe we could allow more, but
+     * not everything makes sense inside a CommonName.
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) 
+	if (!((CNstring[i] >= 'A') && (CNstring[i] <='Z')) &&
+	    !((CNstring[i] >= 'a') && (CNstring[i] <='z')) &&
+	    !((CNstring[i] >= '0') && (CNstring[i] <='9')) &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '(') && (CNstring[i] != ')') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '[') && (CNstring[i] != ']') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '{') && (CNstring[i] != '}') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '<') && (CNstring[i] != '>') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '?') && (CNstring[i] != '!') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != ';') && (CNstring[i] != ':') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '"') && (CNstring[i] != '\'') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '/') && (CNstring[i] != '|') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '+') && (CNstring[i] != '&') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '~') && (CNstring[i] != '@') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '#') && (CNstring[i] != '$') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '%') && (CNstring[i] != '&') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '^') && (CNstring[i] != '*') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '_') && (CNstring[i] != '-') &&
+	    (CNstring[i] != '.') && (CNstring[i] != ' '))
+	    CNstring[i] = '?';
+
+    /*
+     * This information will go into the Received: header inside a comment.
+     * Since comments can be nested, parentheses '(' and ')' must match.
+     */
+    parencount = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+	if (CNstring[i] == '(')
+	    parencount++;
+	else if (CNstring[i] == ')')
+	    parencount--;
+    }
+    /*
+     * The necessary condition is violated. Do YOU know, where to correct?
+     * I don't know, so I will practically remove all parentheses.
+     */
+    if (parencount != 0) {
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+	    if ((CNstring[i] == '(') || (CNstring[i] == ')'))
+		CNstring[i] = '/';
+    }
+}
+
 /* data_cmd - process DATA command */
 
 static int data_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *unused_argv)
 {
     char   *start;
+    char   *peer_CN;
+    char   *issuer_CN;
     int     len;
     int     curr_rec_type;
     int     prev_rec_type;
@@ -961,6 +1047,35 @@
 		"Received: from %s (%s [%s])",
 		state->helo_name ? state->helo_name : state->name,
 		state->name, state->addr);
+    if (var_smtpd_tls_received_header && state->tls_active) {
+	rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+		    "\t(using %s with cipher %s (%d/%d bits))",
+		    state->tls_info.protocol, state->tls_info.cipher_name,
+		    state->tls_info.cipher_usebits,
+		    state->tls_info.cipher_algbits);
+	if (state->tls_info.peer_CN) {
+            peer_CN = mystrdup(state->tls_info.peer_CN);
+	    CN_sanitize(peer_CN);
+            issuer_CN = mystrdup(state->tls_info.issuer_CN);
+	    CN_sanitize(issuer_CN);
+	    if (state->tls_info.peer_verified)
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			"\t(Client CN \"%s\", Issuer \"%s\" (verified OK))",
+			peer_CN, issuer_CN);
+	    else
+		rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			"\t(Client CN \"%s\", Issuer \"%s\" (not verified))",
+			peer_CN, issuer_CN);
+	    myfree(issuer_CN);
+	    myfree(peer_CN);
+	}
+	else if (var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert)
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			"\t(Client did not present a certificate)");
+	else
+	    rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
+			"\t(No client certificate requested)");
+    }
     if (state->rcpt_count == 1 && state->recipient) {
 	rec_fprintf(state->cleanup, REC_TYPE_NORM,
 		    "\tby %s (%s) with %s id %s",
@@ -1310,6 +1425,77 @@
     }
 }
 
+static int starttls_cmd(SMTPD_STATE *state, int argc, SMTPD_TOKEN *argv)
+{
+    char   *err;
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    if (argc != 1) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "501 Syntax: STARTTLS");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (state->tls_active != 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "554 Error: TLS already active");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (state->tls_use_tls == 0) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 Error: command not implemented");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    if (!pfixtls_serverengine) {
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "454 TLS not available due to temporary reason");
+	return (0);
+    }
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "220 Ready to start TLS");
+    vstream_fflush(state->client);
+    /*
+     * When deciding about continuing the handshake, we will stop when a
+     * client certificate was _required_ and none was presented or the
+     * verification failed. This however does only make sense when TLS is
+     * enforced. Otherwise we would happily perform perform the SMTP
+     * transaction without any STARTTLS at all! So only have the handshake
+     * fail when TLS is also enforced.
+     */
+    if (pfixtls_start_servertls(state->client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
+				state->name, state->addr, &(state->tls_info),
+			(var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert && state->tls_enforce_tls))) {
+	/*
+         * Typically the connection is hanging at this point, so
+         * we should try to shut it down by force! Unfortunately this
+         * problem is not addressed in postfix!
+         */
+	return (-1);
+    }
+    state->tls_active = 1;
+    helo_reset(state);
+    mail_reset(state);
+    rcpt_reset(state);
+    return (0);
+#else
+    state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+    smtpd_chat_reply(state, "502 Error: command not implemented");
+    return (-1);
+#endif
+}
+
+static void tls_reset(SMTPD_STATE *state)
+{
+    int failure = 0;
+
+    if (state->reason && state->where && strcmp(state->where, SMTPD_AFTER_DOT))
+	failure = 1;
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    vstream_fflush(state->client);
+    if (state->tls_active)
+	pfixtls_stop_servertls(state->client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
+			       failure, &(state->tls_info));
+#endif
+    state->tls_active = 0;
+}
+
  /*
   * The table of all SMTP commands that we know. Set the junk limit flag on
   * any command that can be repeated an arbitrary number of times without
@@ -1328,6 +1514,10 @@
     "HELO", helo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,
     "EHLO", ehlo_cmd, SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT,
 
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    "STARTTLS", starttls_cmd, 0,
+#endif
+
 #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
     "AUTH", smtpd_sasl_auth_cmd, 0,
 #endif
@@ -1438,9 +1628,28 @@
 		state->error_count++;
 		continue;
 	    }
+	    if (state->tls_enforce_tls &&
+		!state->tls_active &&
+		cmdp->action != starttls_cmd &&
+		cmdp->action != noop_cmd &&
+		cmdp->action != ehlo_cmd &&
+		cmdp->action != quit_cmd) {
+		smtpd_chat_reply(state,
+				 "530 Must issue a STARTTLS command first");
+		state->error_count++;
+		continue;
+	    }
 	    state->where = cmdp->name;
-	    if (cmdp->action(state, argc, argv) != 0)
+	    if (cmdp->action(state, argc, argv) != 0) {
 		state->error_count++;
+		/*
+		 * Die after TLS negotiation failure, as there is no
+		 * stable way to recover from a possible mixture of
+		 * TLS and SMTP protocol from the client.
+		 */
+		if (cmdp->action == starttls_cmd)
+		    break;
+	    }
 	    if ((cmdp->flags & SMTPD_CMD_FLAG_LIMIT)
 		&& state->junk_cmds++ > var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit)
 		state->error_count++;
@@ -1464,6 +1673,7 @@
      * Cleanup whatever information the client gave us during the SMTP
      * dialog.
      */
+    tls_reset(state);
     helo_reset(state);
 #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
     if (var_smtpd_sasl_enable)
@@ -1496,6 +1706,46 @@
      * machines.
      */
     smtpd_state_init(&state, stream);
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE((&state))) {
+	state.tls_use_tls = 0;
+	state.tls_enforce_tls = 0;
+	state.tls_auth_only = 0;
+    }
+    else {
+	state.tls_use_tls = var_smtpd_use_tls | var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+	state.tls_enforce_tls = var_smtpd_enforce_tls;
+	if (var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode) {
+	    /*
+	     * TLS has been set to wrapper mode, meaning that we run on a
+	     * seperate port and we must switch to TLS layer before actually
+	     * performing the SMTP protocol. This implies enforce-mode.
+	     */
+	    state.tls_use_tls = state.tls_enforce_tls = 1;
+	    if (pfixtls_start_servertls(state.client, var_smtpd_starttls_tmout,
+					state.name, state.addr, &state.tls_info,
+					var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert)) {
+	    /*
+	     * Typically the connection is hanging at this point, so
+	     * we should try to shut it down by force! Unfortunately this
+	     * problem is not addressed in postfix!
+	     */
+		return;
+	    }
+	    state.tls_active = 1;
+	}
+	if (var_smtpd_tls_auth_only || state.tls_enforce_tls)
+	    state.tls_auth_only = 1;
+    }
+#else
+    state.tls_use_tls = 0;
+    state.tls_enforce_tls = 0;
+    state.tls_auth_only = 0;
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Provide the SMTP service.
+     */
 
     /*
      * See if we need to turn on verbose logging for this client.
@@ -1513,10 +1763,6 @@
 	smtpd_chat_reply(&state, "220 %s", var_smtpd_banner);
 	msg_info("connect from %s[%s]", state.name, state.addr);
     }
-
-    /*
-     * Provide the SMTP service.
-     */
     smtpd_proto(&state);
 
     /*
@@ -1542,7 +1788,6 @@
 
 static void pre_jail_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
 {
-
     /*
      * Initialize blacklist/etc. patterns before entering the chroot jail, in
      * case they specify a filename pattern.
@@ -1558,6 +1803,12 @@
 	msg_warn("%s is true, but SASL support is not compiled in",
 		 VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE);
 #endif
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    if (var_smtpd_use_tls || var_smtpd_enforce_tls || var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode)
+	pfixtls_init_serverengine(var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd,
+				  var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert);
+#endif
 }
 
 /* main - the main program */
@@ -1580,6 +1831,7 @@
 	VAR_NON_FQDN_CODE, DEF_NON_FQDN_CODE, &var_non_fqdn_code, 0, 0,
 	VAR_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, DEF_SMTPD_JUNK_CMD, &var_smtpd_junk_cmd_limit, 1, 0,
 	VAR_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, DEF_SMTPD_HIST_THRSH, &var_smtpd_hist_thrsh, 1, 0,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_CCERT_VD, &var_smtpd_tls_ccert_vd, 0, 0,
 	0,
     };
     static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
@@ -1595,6 +1847,13 @@
 	VAR_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, DEF_ALLOW_UNTRUST_ROUTE, &var_allow_untrust_route,
 	VAR_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, DEF_SMTPD_SASL_ENABLE, &var_smtpd_sasl_enable,
 	VAR_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, DEF_BROKEN_AUTH_CLNTS, &var_broken_auth_clients,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_WRAPPER, &var_smtpd_tls_wrappermode,
+	VAR_SMTPD_USE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_USE_TLS, &var_smtpd_use_tls,
+	VAR_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, DEF_SMTPD_ENFORCE_TLS, &var_smtpd_enforce_tls,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_AUTH_ONLY, &var_smtpd_tls_auth_only,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_ACERT, &var_smtpd_tls_ask_ccert,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RCERT, &var_smtpd_tls_req_ccert,
+	VAR_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, DEF_SMTPD_TLS_RECHEAD, &var_smtpd_tls_received_header,
 	0,
     };
     static CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = {
@@ -1623,6 +1882,7 @@
 	VAR_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, DEF_SMTPD_SND_AUTH_MAPS, &var_smtpd_snd_auth_maps, 0, 0,
 	VAR_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, DEF_SMTPD_NOOP_CMDS, &var_smtpd_noop_cmds, 0, 0,
 	VAR_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, DEF_SMTPD_NULL_KEY, &var_smtpd_null_key, 0, 0,
+	VAR_RELAY_CCERTS, DEF_RELAY_CCERTS, &var_relay_ccerts, 0, 0,
 	0,
     };
 
@@ -1638,3 +1898,4 @@
 		       MAIL_SERVER_PRE_ACCEPT, pre_accept,
 		       0);
 }
+
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd.h
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd.h	Fri Mar 29 22:10:13 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
   * Global library.
   */
 #include <mail_stream.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
 
  /*
   * Variables that keep track of conversation state. There is only one SMTP
@@ -81,6 +82,11 @@
     VSTRING *sasl_decoded;
 #endif
     int     warn_if_reject;
+    int     tls_active;
+    int     tls_use_tls;
+    int     tls_enforce_tls;
+    int     tls_auth_only;
+    tls_info_t tls_info;
 } SMTPD_STATE;
 
 extern void smtpd_state_init(SMTPD_STATE *, VSTREAM *);
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c	Mon Jun 10 22:14:39 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_check.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -280,6 +280,7 @@
 
 #include <namadr_list.h>
 #include <domain_list.h>
+#include <string_list.h>
 #include <mail_params.h>
 #include <canon_addr.h>
 #include <resolve_clnt.h>
@@ -345,6 +346,9 @@
 static DOMAIN_LIST *relay_domains;
 static NAMADR_LIST *mynetworks;
 static NAMADR_LIST *perm_mx_networks;
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+static MAPS *relay_ccerts;
+#endif
 
  /*
   * How to do parent domain wildcard matching, if any.
@@ -530,6 +534,10 @@
     perm_mx_networks =
 	namadr_list_init(match_parent_style(VAR_PERM_MX_NETWORKS),
 			 var_perm_mx_networks);
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    relay_ccerts = maps_create(VAR_RELAY_CCERTS, var_relay_ccerts,
+			       DICT_FLAG_LOCK);
+#endif
 
     /*
      * Pre-parse and pre-open the recipient maps.
@@ -932,7 +940,11 @@
 	msg_info("%s: %s", myname, name);
 
     dns_status = dns_lookup_types(name, 0, (DNS_RR **) 0, (VSTRING *) 0,
-				  (VSTRING *) 0, T_A, T_MX, 0);
+				  (VSTRING *) 0, T_A, T_MX,
+#ifdef INET6
+				  T_AAAA,
+#endif
+				  0);
     if (dns_status != DNS_OK)
 	return (smtpd_check_reject(state, MAIL_ERROR_POLICY,
 				   "%d <%s>: %s rejected: Host not found",
@@ -954,7 +966,11 @@
 	msg_info("%s: %s", myname, name);
 
     dns_status = dns_lookup_types(name, 0, (DNS_RR **) 0, (VSTRING *) 0,
-				  (VSTRING *) 0, T_A, T_MX, 0);
+				  (VSTRING *) 0, T_A, T_MX,
+#ifdef INET6
+				  T_AAAA,
+#endif
+				  0);
     if (dns_status != DNS_OK)
 	return (smtpd_check_reject(state, MAIL_ERROR_POLICY,
 				   "%d <%s>: %s rejected: Domain not found",
@@ -966,6 +982,36 @@
 
 static int permit_auth_destination(SMTPD_STATE *state, char *recipient);
 
+/* permit_tls_clientcerts - OK/DUNNO for message relaying */
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+static int permit_tls_clientcerts(SMTPD_STATE *state, int permit_all_certs)
+{
+    char   *low_name;
+    const char *found;
+
+    if (state->tls_info.peer_verified && permit_all_certs) {
+	if (msg_verbose)
+	    msg_info("Relaying allowed for all verified client certificates");
+	return(SMTPD_CHECK_OK);
+    }
+
+    if (state->tls_info.peer_verified && state->tls_info.peer_fingerprint) {
+	low_name = lowercase(mystrdup(state->tls_info.peer_fingerprint));
+	found = maps_find(relay_ccerts, low_name, DICT_FLAG_FIXED);
+	myfree(low_name);
+	if (found) {
+	    if (msg_verbose)
+		msg_info("Relaying allowed for certified client: %s", found);
+	    return (SMTPD_CHECK_OK);
+	} else if (msg_verbose)
+	    msg_info("relay_clientcerts: No match for fingerprint '%s'",
+		     state->tls_info.peer_fingerprint);
+    }
+    return (SMTPD_CHECK_DUNNO);
+}
+#endif
+
 /* check_relay_domains - OK/FAIL for message relaying */
 
 static int check_relay_domains(SMTPD_STATE *state, char *recipient,
@@ -1145,6 +1191,49 @@
 
 static int has_my_addr(const char *host)
 {
+#ifdef INET6
+    char   *myname = "has_my_addr";
+    struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0;
+    int error;
+    char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+    if (msg_verbose)
+	msg_info("%s: host %s", myname, host);
+
+    /*
+     * If we can't lookup the host, play safe and assume it is OK.
+     */
+#define YUP	1
+#define NOPE	0
+
+    memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+    hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+    hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+    error = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &res0);
+    if (error) {
+	if (msg_verbose)
+	    msg_info("%s: host %s: %s", myname, host, gai_strerror(error));
+	return (YUP);
+    }
+    for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
+	if (msg_verbose) {
+	    if (getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf),
+		    NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
+		strncpy(hbuf, "???", sizeof(hbuf));
+	    }
+	    msg_info("%s: addr %s", myname, hbuf);
+	}
+	if (own_inet_addr(res->ai_addr)) {
+	    freeaddrinfo(res0);
+	    return (YUP);
+	}
+    }
+    freeaddrinfo(res0);
+    if (msg_verbose)
+	msg_info("%s: host %s: no match", myname, host);
+
+    return (NOPE);
+#else
     char   *myname = "has_my_addr";
     struct in_addr addr;
     char  **cpp;
@@ -1180,6 +1269,7 @@
 	msg_info("%s: host %s: no match", myname, host);
 
     return (NOPE);
+#endif
 }
 
 /* i_am_mx - is this machine listed as MX relay */
@@ -1834,7 +1924,7 @@
 static int reject_maps_rbl(SMTPD_STATE *state)
 {
     char   *myname = "reject_maps_rbl";
-    ARGV   *octets = argv_split(state->addr, ".");
+    ARGV   *octets;
     VSTRING *query = vstring_alloc(100);
     char   *saved_domains = mystrdup(var_maps_rbl_domains);
     char   *bp = saved_domains;
@@ -1846,17 +1936,29 @@
     int     dns_status = DNS_FAIL;
     int     i;
     int     result;
+    struct  in_addr a;
     VSTRING *why;
 
     if (msg_verbose)
 	msg_info("%s: %s", myname, state->addr);
 
-    /*
-     * IPv4 only for now
-     */
-#ifdef INET6
+#ifndef INET6
+    /* IPv4 only for now */
     if (inet_pton(AF_INET, state->addr, &a) != 1)
 	return SMTPD_CHECK_DUNNO;
+    octets = argv_split(state->addr, ".");
+#else
+    /* IPv4 and IPv6-mapped IPv4 only for now */
+    if (inet_pton(AF_INET, state->addr, &a) == 1)
+        octets = argv_split(state->addr, ".");
+    else {
+      struct in6_addr a6;
+      if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, state->addr, &a6) != 1)
+	  return SMTPD_CHECK_DUNNO;
+      if (!IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6) || (strrchr(state->addr,':') == NULL))
+	  return SMTPD_CHECK_DUNNO;
+      octets = argv_split(strrchr(state->addr,':')+1, ".");
+    }
 #endif
 
     /*
@@ -2154,6 +2256,12 @@
 #else
 		msg_warn("restriction `%s' ignored: no SASL support", name);
 #endif
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+	} else if (strcasecmp(name, PERMIT_TLS_ALL_CLIENTCERTS) == 0) {
+	  status = permit_tls_clientcerts(state, 1);
+	} else if (strcasecmp(name, PERMIT_TLS_CLIENTCERTS) == 0) {
+	  status = permit_tls_clientcerts(state, 0);
+#endif
 	} else if (strcasecmp(name, REJECT_UNKNOWN_RCPTDOM) == 0) {
 	    if (state->recipient)
 		status = reject_unknown_address(state, state->recipient,
@@ -2588,6 +2696,7 @@
 char   *var_rcpt_checks = "";
 char   *var_etrn_checks = "";
 char   *var_relay_domains = "";
+char   *var_relay_ccerts = "";
 char   *var_mynetworks = "";
 char   *var_notify_classes = "";
 
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_peer.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_peer.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_peer.c	Thu Jul  5 22:09:47 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_peer.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -63,6 +63,15 @@
 #include <netdb.h>
 #include <string.h>
 
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include <msg.h>
+#include <mymalloc.h>
+#include <valid_hostname.h>
+#include <stringops.h>
+
+/* Global library. */
+
  /*
   * Older systems don't have h_errno. Even modern systems don't have
   * hstrerror().
@@ -84,16 +93,11 @@
     )
 #endif
 
-/* Utility library. */
-
-#include <msg.h>
-#include <mymalloc.h>
-#include <valid_hostname.h>
-#include <stringops.h>
-
-/* Global library. */
-
-
+#ifdef INET6
+#define GAI_STRERROR(error) \
+	((error = EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(error) : strerror(errno))
+#endif
+	
 /* Application-specific. */
 
 #include "smtpd.h"
@@ -102,16 +106,23 @@
 
 void    smtpd_peer_init(SMTPD_STATE *state)
 {
-    struct sockaddr_in sin;
-    SOCKADDR_SIZE len = sizeof(sin);
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+#else
+    struct sockaddr ss;
+    struct in_addr *in;
     struct hostent *hp;
-    int     i;
+#endif
+    struct sockaddr *sa;
+    SOCKADDR_SIZE len;
+
+    sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
+    len = sizeof(ss);
 
     /*
      * Look up the peer address information.
      */
-    if (getpeername(vstream_fileno(state->client),
-		    (struct sockaddr *) & sin, &len) >= 0) {
+    if (getpeername(vstream_fileno(state->client), sa, &len) >= 0) {
 	errno = 0;
     }
 
@@ -127,18 +138,51 @@
     /*
      * Look up and "verify" the client hostname.
      */
-    else if (errno == 0 && sin.sin_family == AF_INET) {
-	state->addr = mystrdup(inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr));
-	hp = gethostbyaddr((char *) &(sin.sin_addr),
-			   sizeof(sin.sin_addr), AF_INET);
-	if (hp == 0) {
+    else if (errno == 0 && (sa->sa_family == AF_INET
+#ifdef INET6
+			    || sa->sa_family == AF_INET6
+#endif
+		    )) {
+#ifdef INET6
+	char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+	char abuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *rnull = NULL;
+#else
+	char abuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
+	char *hbuf;
+#endif
+	int error = -1;
+
+#ifdef INET6
+	(void)getnameinfo(sa, len, abuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST);
+#else
+	in = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr;
+	inet_ntop(AF_INET, in, abuf, sizeof(hbuf));
+#endif
+	state->addr = mystrdup(abuf);
+#ifdef INET6
+	error = getnameinfo(sa, len, hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD);
+#else
+	hbuf = NULL;
+	hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)in, sizeof(*in), AF_INET);
+	if (hp) {
+	    error = 0;
+		hbuf = mystrdup(hp->h_name);
+	} else
+	    error = 1;
+#endif
+	if (error) {
 	    state->name = mystrdup("unknown");
+#ifdef INET6
+		state->peer_code = (error == EAI_AGAIN ? 4 : 5);
+#else
 	    state->peer_code = (h_errno == TRY_AGAIN ? 4 : 5);
-	} else if (!valid_hostname(hp->h_name, DONT_GRIPE)) {
+#endif
+	} else if (!valid_hostname(hbuf, DONT_GRIPE)) {
 	    state->name = mystrdup("unknown");
 	    state->peer_code = 5;
 	} else {
-	    state->name = mystrdup(hp->h_name);	/* hp->name is clobbered!! */
+	    state->name = mystrdup(hbuf);	/* hp->name is clobbered!! */
 	    state->peer_code = 2;
 
 	    /*
@@ -150,16 +194,31 @@
 	state->peer_code = code; \
     }
 
+#ifdef INET6
+	    memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	    hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+	    hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	    error = getaddrinfo(state->name, NULL, &hints, &rnull);
+	    if (error) {
+		msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: %s",
+			 state->addr, state->name, GAI_STRERROR(error));
+		REJECT_PEER_NAME(state, (error == EAI_AGAIN ? 4 : 5));
+	    }
+	    /* memcmp() isn't needed if we use getaddrinfo */
+	    if (rnull)
+		freeaddrinfo(rnull);
+#else
 	    hp = gethostbyname(state->name);	/* clobbers hp->name!! */
 	    if (hp == 0) {
 		msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: %s",
 			 state->addr, state->name, HSTRERROR(h_errno));
 		REJECT_PEER_NAME(state, (h_errno == TRY_AGAIN ? 4 : 5));
-	    } else if (hp->h_length != sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) {
+	    } else if (hp->h_length != sizeof(*in)) {
 		msg_warn("%s: hostname %s verification failed: bad address size %d",
 			 state->addr, state->name, hp->h_length);
 		REJECT_PEER_NAME(state, 5);
 	    } else {
+		int i;
 		for (i = 0; /* void */ ; i++) {
 		    if (hp->h_addr_list[i] == 0) {
 			msg_warn("%s: address not listed for hostname %s",
@@ -167,12 +226,11 @@
 			REJECT_PEER_NAME(state, 5);
 			break;
 		    }
-		    if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i],
-			       (char *) &sin.sin_addr,
-			       sizeof(sin.sin_addr)) == 0)
+		    if (memcmp(hp->h_addr_list[i], (char *)in, sizeof(*in)) == 0)
 			break;			/* keep peer name */
 		}
 	    }
+#endif
 	}
     }
 
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c	Tue Sep 12 00:45:40 2000
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_sasl_proto.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -128,6 +128,13 @@
 	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: authentication not enabled");
 	return (-1);
     }
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    if (state->tls_auth_only && !state->tls_active) {
+	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
+	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "538 Encryption required for requested authentication mechanism");
+	return (-1);
+    }
+#endif
     if (state->sasl_username) {
 	state->error_mask |= MAIL_ERROR_PROTOCOL;
 	smtpd_chat_reply(state, "503 Error: already authenticated");
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c	Tue Nov  6 18:35:40 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpd/smtpd_state.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -92,6 +92,11 @@
     state->msg_size = 0;
     state->junk_cmds = 0;
     state->warn_if_reject = 0;
+    state->tls_active = 0;
+    state->tls_use_tls = 0;
+    state->tls_enforce_tls = 0;
+    state->tls_info = tls_info_zero;
+    state->tls_auth_only = 0;
 
 #ifdef USE_SASL_AUTH
     if (SMTPD_STAND_ALONE(state))
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpstone/smtp-sink.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpstone/smtp-sink.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/smtpstone/smtp-sink.c	Sat Jun  8 20:21:41 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/smtpstone/smtp-sink.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@
     } else {
 	if (strncmp(argv[optind], "inet:", 5) == 0)
 	    argv[optind] += 5;
-	sock = inet_listen(argv[optind], backlog, BLOCKING);
+	sock = inet_listen(argv[optind], backlog, BLOCKING, 1);
     }
 
     /*
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/tlsmgr/Makefile.in	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+SHELL	= /bin/sh
+SRCS	= tlsmgr.c
+OBJS	= tlsmgr.o
+HDRS	=
+TESTSRC	=
+WARN	= -W -Wformat -Wimplicit -Wmissing-prototypes \
+	-Wparentheses -Wstrict-prototypes -Wswitch -Wuninitialized \
+	-Wunused
+DEFS	= -I. -I$(INC_DIR) -D$(SYSTYPE)
+CFLAGS	= $(DEBUG) $(OPT) $(DEFS)
+TESTPROG= 
+PROG	= tlsmgr
+INC_DIR	= ../../include
+LIBS	= ../../lib/libmaster.a ../../lib/libglobal.a ../../lib/libutil.a
+
+.c.o:;	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c $*.c
+
+$(PROG):	$(OBJS) $(LIBS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $(OBJS) $(LIBS) $(SYSLIBS)
+
+Makefile: Makefile.in
+	(set -e; echo "# DO NOT EDIT"; $(OPTS) $(SHELL) ../../makedefs; cat $?) >$@
+
+test:	$(TESTPROG)
+
+update: ../../libexec/$(PROG)
+
+../../libexec/$(PROG): $(PROG)
+	cp $(PROG) ../../libexec
+
+printfck: $(OBJS) $(PROG)
+	rm -rf printfck
+	mkdir printfck
+	cp *.h printfck
+	sed '1,/^# do not edit/!d' Makefile >printfck/Makefile
+	set -e; for i in *.c; do printfck -f .printfck $$i >printfck/$$i; done
+	cd printfck; make "INC_DIR=../../../../include" `cd ../..; ls *.o`
+
+lint:
+	lint $(DEFS) $(SRCS) $(LINTFIX)
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *core $(PROG) $(TESTPROG) junk 
+	rm -rf printfck
+
+tidy:	clean
+
+depend: $(MAKES)
+	(sed '1,/^# do not edit/!d' Makefile.in; \
+	set -e; for i in [a-z][a-z0-9]*.c; do \
+	    $(CC) -E $(DEFS) $(INCL) $$i | sed -n -e '/^# *1 *"\([^"]*\)".*/{' \
+	    -e 's//'`echo $$i|sed 's/c$$/o/'`': \1/' -e 'p' -e '}'; \
+	done) | grep -v '[.][o][:][ ][/]' >$$$$ && mv $$$$ Makefile.in
+	@make -f Makefile.in Makefile
+
+# do not edit below this line - it is generated by 'make depend'
+tlsmgr.o: tlsmgr.c
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/sys_defs.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/msg.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/events.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/vstream.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/vbuf.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/dict.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/argv.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/vstring.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/stringops.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mymalloc.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/connect.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/myflock.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mail_conf.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mail_params.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/iostuff.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/master_proto.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/mail_server.h
+tlsmgr.o: ../../include/pfixtls.h
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/tlsmgr/tlsmgr.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,598 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*	tlsmgr 8
+/* SUMMARY
+/*	Postfix TLS session cache and PRNG handling manager
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*	\fBtlsmgr\fR [generic Postfix daemon options]
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/*	The tlsmgr process does housekeeping on the session cache database
+/*	files. It runs through the databases and removes expired entries
+/*	and entries written by older (incompatible) versions.
+/*
+/*	The tlsmgr is responsible for the PRNG handling. The used internal
+/*	OpenSSL PRNG has a pool size of 8192 bits (= 1024 bytes). The pool
+/*	is initially seeded at startup from an external source (EGD or
+/*	/dev/urandom) and additional seed is obtained later during program
+/*	run at a configurable period. The exact time of seed query is
+/*	using random information and is equally distributed in the range of
+/*	[0-\fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR] with a \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
+/*	having a default of 1 hour.
+/*
+/*	Tlsmgr can be run chrooted and with dropped privileges, as it will
+/*	connect to the entropy source at startup.
+/*
+/*	The PRNG is additionally seeded internally by the data found in the
+/*	session cache and timevalues.
+/*
+/*	Tlsmgr reads the old value of the exchange file at startup to keep
+/*	entropy already collected during previous runs.
+/*
+/*	From the PRNG random pool a cryptographically strong 1024 byte random
+/*	sequence is written into the PRNG exchange file. The file is updated
+/*	periodically with the time changing randomly from
+/*	[0-\fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR].
+/* STANDARDS
+/* SECURITY
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	Tlsmgr is not security-sensitive. It only deals with external data
+/*	to be fed into the PRNG, the contents is never trusted. The session
+/*	cache housekeeping will only remove entries if expired and will never
+/*	touch the contents of the cached data.
+/* DIAGNOSTICS
+/*	Problems and transactions are logged to the syslog daemon.
+/* BUGS
+/*	There is no automatic means to limit the number of entries in the
+/*	session caches and/or the size of the session cache files.
+/* CONFIGURATION PARAMETERS
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The following \fBmain.cf\fR parameters are especially relevant to
+/*	this program. See the Postfix \fBmain.cf\fR file for syntax details
+/*	and for default values. Use the \fBpostfix reload\fR command after
+/*	a configuration change.
+/* .SH Session Cache
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* .IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_database\fR
+/*	Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP server session
+/*	cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
+/* .IP \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+/*	Expiry time of SMTP server session cache entries in seconds. Entries
+/*	older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
+/*	performed periodically every \fBsmtpd_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+/*	seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
+/* .IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_database\fR
+/*	Name of the SDBM file (type sdbm:) containing the SMTP client session
+/*	cache. If the file does not exist, it is created.
+/* .IP \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+/*	Expiry time of SMTP client session cache entries in seconds. Entries
+/*	older than this are removed from the session cache. A cleanup-run is
+/*	performed periodically every \fBsmtp_tls_session_cache_timeout\fR
+/*	seconds. Default is 3600 (= 1 hour).
+/* .SH Pseudo Random Number Generator
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/* .IP \fBtls_random_source\fR
+/*	Name of the EGD socket or device or regular file to obtain entropy
+/*	from. The type of entropy source must be specified by preceding the
+/*      name with the appropriate type: egd:/path/to/egd_socket,
+/*      dev:/path/to/devicefile, or /path/to/regular/file.
+/*	tlsmgr opens \fBtls_random_source\fR and tries to read
+/*	\fBtls_random_bytes\fR from it.
+/* .IP \fBtls_random_bytes\fR
+/*	Number of bytes to be read from \fBtls_random_source\fR.
+/*	Default value is 32 bytes. If using EGD, a maximum of 255 bytes is read.
+/* .IP \fBtls_random_exchange_name\fR
+/*	Name of the file written by tlsmgr and read by smtp and smtpd at
+/*	startup. The length is 1024 bytes. Default value is
+/*	/etc/postfix/prng_exch.
+/* .IP \fBtls_random_reseed_period\fR
+/*	Time in seconds until the next reseed from external sources is due.
+/*	This is the maximum value. The actual point in time is calculated
+/*	with a random factor equally distributed between 0 and this maximum
+/*	value. Default is 3600 (= 60 minutes).
+/* .IP \fBtls_random_prng_update_period\fR
+/*	Time in seconds until the PRNG exchange file is updated with new
+/*	pseude random values. This is the maximum value. The actual point
+/*	in time is calculated with a random factor equally distributed
+/*	between 0 and this maximum value. Default is 60 (= 1 minute).
+/* SEE ALSO
+/*	smtp(8) SMTP client
+/*	smtpd(8) SMTP server
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*--*/
+
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>			/* gettimeofday, not POSIX */
+
+/* OpenSSL library. */
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+#include <openssl/rand.h>		/* For the PRNG */
+#endif
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include <msg.h>
+#include <events.h>
+#include <dict.h>
+#include <stringops.h>
+#include <mymalloc.h>
+#include <connect.h>
+#include <myflock.h>
+
+/* Global library. */
+
+#include <mail_conf.h>
+#include <mail_params.h>
+#include <pfixtls.h>
+
+/* Master process interface */
+
+#include <master_proto.h>
+#include <mail_server.h>
+
+/* Application-specific. */
+
+ /*
+  * Tunables.
+  */
+char   *var_tls_rand_source;
+int	var_tls_rand_bytes;
+int	var_tls_reseed_period;
+int	var_tls_prng_upd_period;
+
+static int rand_exch_fd;
+static int rand_source_dev_fd = -1;
+static int rand_source_socket_fd = -1;
+static int srvr_scache_db_active;
+static int clnt_scache_db_active;
+static DICT *srvr_scache_db = NULL;
+static DICT *clnt_scache_db = NULL;
+
+static void tlsmgr_prng_upd_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
+{
+    struct timeval tv;
+    unsigned char buffer[1024];
+    int next_period;
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    /*
+     * It is time to update the PRNG exchange file. Since other processes might
+     * have added entropy, we do this in a read_stir-back_write cycle.
+     */
+    GETTIMEOFDAY(&tv);
+    RAND_seed(&tv, sizeof(struct timeval));
+
+    if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) != 0)
+	msg_fatal("Could not lock random exchange file: %s",
+		  strerror(errno));
+
+    lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+    if (read(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("reading exchange file failed");
+    RAND_seed(buffer, 1024);
+
+    RAND_bytes(buffer, 1024);
+    lseek(rand_exch_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+    if (write(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024) != 1024)
+	msg_fatal("Writing exchange file failed");
+
+    if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) != 0)
+	msg_fatal("Could not unlock random exchange file: %s",
+		  strerror(errno));
+
+    /*
+     * Make prediction difficult for outsiders and calculate the time for the
+     * next execution randomly.
+     */
+    next_period = (var_tls_prng_upd_period * buffer[0]) / 255;
+    event_request_timer(tlsmgr_prng_upd_event, dummy, next_period);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+static void tlsmgr_reseed_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
+{
+    int egd_success;
+    int next_period;
+    int rand_bytes;
+    char buffer[255];
+    struct timeval tv;
+    unsigned char randbyte;
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    /*
+     * It is time to reseed the PRNG.
+     */
+
+    GETTIMEOFDAY(&tv);
+    RAND_seed(&tv, sizeof(struct timeval));
+    if (rand_source_dev_fd != -1) {
+	rand_bytes = read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_rand_bytes);
+	if (rand_bytes > 0)
+	    RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+	else if (rand_bytes < 0) {
+	    msg_fatal("Read from entropy device %s failed",
+		      var_tls_rand_source);
+	}
+    } else if (rand_source_socket_fd != -1) {
+	egd_success = 0;
+	buffer[0] = 1;
+	buffer[1] = var_tls_rand_bytes;
+	if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
+	    msg_info("Could not talk to %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+	else if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
+	    msg_info("Could not read info from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+	else {
+	    rand_bytes = buffer[0];
+	    if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes) != rand_bytes)
+		msg_info("Could not read data from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+	    else {
+		egd_success = 1;
+		RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+	    }
+	}
+	if (!egd_success) {
+	    msg_info("Lost connection to EGD-device, exiting to reconnect.");
+	    exit(0);
+	}
+    } else if (*var_tls_rand_source) {
+	rand_bytes = RAND_load_file(var_tls_rand_source, var_tls_rand_bytes);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Make prediction difficult for outsiders and calculate the time for the
+     * next execution randomly.
+     */
+    RAND_bytes(&randbyte, 1);
+    next_period = (var_tls_reseed_period * randbyte) / 255;
+    event_request_timer(tlsmgr_reseed_event, dummy, next_period);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+static int tlsmgr_do_scache_check(DICT *scache_db, int scache_timeout,
+				  int start)
+{
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    int func;
+    int len;
+    int n;
+    int delete = 0;
+    int result;
+    struct timeval tv;
+    const char *member;
+    const char *value;
+    char *member_copy;
+    unsigned char nibble, *data;
+    pfixtls_scache_info_t scache_info;
+
+    GETTIMEOFDAY(&tv);
+    RAND_seed(&tv, sizeof(struct timeval));
+
+    /*
+     * Run through the given dictionary and check the stored sessions.
+     * If "start" is set to 1, a new run is initiated, otherwise the next
+     * item is accessed. The state is internally kept in the DICT.
+     */
+    if (start)
+	func = DICT_SEQ_FUN_FIRST;
+    else
+	func = DICT_SEQ_FUN_NEXT;
+    result = dict_seq(scache_db, func, &member, &value);
+
+    if (result > 0)
+	return 0;	/* End of list reached */
+    else if (result < 0)
+	msg_fatal("Database fault, should already be caught.");
+    else {
+	member_copy = mystrdup(member);
+	len = strlen(value);
+	RAND_seed(value, len);		/* Use it to increase entropy */
+	if (len < 2 * sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t))
+	    delete = 1;		/* Messed up, delete */
+	else if (len > 2 * sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t))
+	    len = 2 * sizeof(pfixtls_scache_info_t);
+	if (!delete) {
+	    data = (unsigned char *)(&scache_info);
+	    memset(data, 0, len / 2);
+	    for (n = 0; n < len; n++) {
+            if ((value[n] >= '0') && (value[n] <= '9'))
+                nibble = value[n] - '0';
+            else
+                nibble = value[n] - 'A' + 10;
+            if (n % 2)
+                data[n / 2] |= nibble;
+            else
+                data[n / 2] |= (nibble << 4);
+        }
+
+        if ((scache_info.scache_db_version != scache_db_version) ||
+            (scache_info.openssl_version != openssl_version) ||
+            (scache_info.timestamp + scache_timeout < time(NULL)))
+	    delete = 1;
+	}
+	if (delete)
+	    result = dict_del(scache_db, member_copy);
+	myfree(member_copy);
+    }
+
+    if (delete && result)
+	msg_info("Could not delete %s", member);
+    return 1;
+
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+static void tlsmgr_clnt_cache_run_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
+{
+
+    /*
+     * This routine runs when it is time for another tls session cache scan.
+     * Make sure this routine gets called again in the future.
+     */
+    clnt_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(clnt_scache_db, 
+				var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout, 1);
+    event_request_timer(tlsmgr_clnt_cache_run_event, dummy,
+		 var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout);
+}
+
+
+static void tlsmgr_srvr_cache_run_event(int unused_event, char *dummy)
+{
+
+    /*
+     * This routine runs when it is time for another tls session cache scan.
+     * Make sure this routine gets called again in the future.
+     */
+    srvr_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(srvr_scache_db,
+				var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout, 1);
+    event_request_timer(tlsmgr_srvr_cache_run_event, dummy,
+		 var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout);
+}
+
+
+static DICT *tlsmgr_cache_open(const char *dbname)
+{
+    DICT *retval;
+    char *dbpagname;
+    char *dbdirname;
+
+    /*
+     * First, try to find out the real name of the database file, so that
+     * it can be removed.
+     */
+    if (!strncmp(dbname, "sdbm:", 5)) {
+	dbpagname = concatenate(dbname + 5, ".pag", NULL);
+	REMOVE(dbpagname);
+	myfree(dbpagname);
+	dbdirname = concatenate(dbname + 5, ".dir", NULL);
+	REMOVE(dbdirname);
+	myfree(dbdirname);
+    }
+    else {
+	msg_warn("Only type sdbm: supported: %s", dbname);
+	return NULL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Now open the dictionary. Do it with O_EXCL, so that we only open a
+     * fresh file. If we cannot open it with a fresh file, then we won't
+     * touch it.
+     */
+    retval = dict_open(dbname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_EXCL,
+	      DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE | DICT_FLAG_LOCK | DICT_FLAG_SYNC_UPDATE);
+    if (!retval)
+	msg_warn("Could not create dictionary %s", dbname);
+    return retval;
+}
+
+/* tlsmgr_trigger_event - respond to external trigger(s) */
+
+static void tlsmgr_trigger_event(char *buf, int len,
+			               char *unused_service, char **argv)
+{
+    /*
+     * Sanity check. This service takes no command-line arguments.
+     */
+    if (argv[0])
+	msg_fatal("unexpected command-line argument: %s", argv[0]);
+
+}
+
+/* tlsmgr_loop - queue manager main loop */
+
+static int tlsmgr_loop(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+{
+    /*
+     * This routine runs as part of the event handling loop, after the event
+     * manager has delivered a timer or I/O event (including the completion
+     * of a connection to a delivery process), or after it has waited for a
+     * specified amount of time. The result value of qmgr_loop() specifies
+     * how long the event manager should wait for the next event.
+     */
+#define DONT_WAIT	0
+#define WAIT_FOR_EVENT	(-1)
+
+    if (clnt_scache_db_active)
+	clnt_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(clnt_scache_db,
+					var_smtp_tls_scache_timeout, 0);
+    if (srvr_scache_db_active)
+	srvr_scache_db_active = tlsmgr_do_scache_check(srvr_scache_db,
+					var_smtpd_tls_scache_timeout, 0);
+    if (clnt_scache_db_active || srvr_scache_db_active)
+	return (DONT_WAIT);
+    return (WAIT_FOR_EVENT);
+}
+
+/* pre_accept - see if tables have changed */
+
+static void pre_accept(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+{
+    if (dict_changed()) {
+	msg_info("table has changed -- exiting");
+	exit(0);
+    }
+}
+
+/* tlsmgr_pre_init - pre-jail initialization */
+
+static void tlsmgr_pre_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+{
+    int rand_bytes;
+    unsigned char buffer[255];
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    /*
+     * Access the external sources for random seed. We may not be able to
+     * access them again if we are sent to chroot jail, so we must leave
+     * dev: and egd: type sources open.
+     */
+    if (*var_tls_rand_source) {
+        if (!strncmp(var_tls_rand_source, "dev:", 4)) {
+	    /*
+	     * Source is a random device
+	     */
+	    rand_source_dev_fd = open(var_tls_rand_source + 4, 0, 0);
+	    if (rand_source_dev_fd == -1) 
+		msg_fatal("Could not open entropy device %s",
+			  var_tls_rand_source);
+	    if (var_tls_rand_bytes > 255)
+		var_tls_rand_bytes = 255;
+	    rand_bytes = read(rand_source_dev_fd, buffer, var_tls_rand_bytes);
+	    RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+	} else if (!strncmp(var_tls_rand_source, "egd:", 4)) {
+	    /*
+	     * Source is a EGD compatible socket
+	     */
+	    rand_source_socket_fd = unix_connect(var_tls_rand_source +4,
+						 BLOCKING, 10);
+	    if (rand_source_socket_fd == -1)
+		msg_fatal("Could not connect to %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+	    if (var_tls_rand_bytes > 255)
+		var_tls_rand_bytes = 255;
+	    buffer[0] = 1;
+	    buffer[1] = var_tls_rand_bytes;
+	    if (write(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 2) != 2)
+		msg_fatal("Could not talk to %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+	    if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, 1) != 1)
+		msg_fatal("Could not read info from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+	    rand_bytes = buffer[0];
+	    if (read(rand_source_socket_fd, buffer, rand_bytes) != rand_bytes)
+		msg_fatal("Could not read data from %s", var_tls_rand_source);
+	    RAND_seed(buffer, rand_bytes);
+	} else {
+	    rand_bytes = RAND_load_file(var_tls_rand_source,
+					var_tls_rand_bytes);
+	}
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /*
+     * Now open the PRNG exchange file
+     */
+    if (*var_tls_rand_exch_name) {
+	rand_exch_fd = open(var_tls_rand_exch_name, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0600);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Finally, open the session cache files. Remove old files, if still there.
+     * If we could not remove the old files, something is pretty wrong and we
+     * won't touch it!!
+     */
+    if (*var_smtp_tls_scache_db)
+	clnt_scache_db = tlsmgr_cache_open(var_smtp_tls_scache_db);
+    if (*var_smtpd_tls_scache_db)
+	srvr_scache_db = tlsmgr_cache_open(var_smtpd_tls_scache_db);
+}
+
+/* qmgr_post_init - post-jail initialization */
+
+static void tlsmgr_post_init(char *unused_name, char **unused_argv)
+{
+    unsigned char buffer[1024];
+
+    /*
+     * This routine runs after the skeleton code has entered the chroot jail.
+     * Prevent automatic process suicide after a limited number of client
+     * requests or after a limited amount of idle time.
+     */
+    var_use_limit = 0;
+    var_idle_limit = 0;
+
+#ifdef HAS_SSL
+    /*
+     * Complete thie initialization by reading the additional seed from the
+     * PRNG exchange file. Don't care how many bytes were actually read, just
+     * seed buffer into the PRNG, regardless of its contents.
+     */
+    if (rand_exch_fd >= 0) {
+	if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_SHARED) == -1)
+	    msg_fatal("Could not lock random exchange file: %s",
+		      strerror(errno));
+	read(rand_exch_fd, buffer, 1024);
+	if (myflock(rand_exch_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) == -1)
+	    msg_fatal("Could not unlock random exchange file: %s",
+		      strerror(errno));
+	RAND_seed(buffer, 1024);
+	tlsmgr_prng_upd_event(0, (char *) 0);
+	tlsmgr_reseed_event(0, (char *) 0);
+    }
+#endif
+
+    clnt_scache_db_active = 0;
+    srvr_scache_db_active = 0;
+    if (clnt_scache_db)
+	tlsmgr_clnt_cache_run_event(0, (char *) 0);
+    if (srvr_scache_db)
+	tlsmgr_srvr_cache_run_event(0, (char *) 0);
+}
+
+/* main - the main program */
+
+int     main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    static CONFIG_STR_TABLE str_table[] = {
+	VAR_TLS_RAND_SOURCE, DEF_TLS_RAND_SOURCE, &var_tls_rand_source, 0, 0,
+	0,
+    };
+    static CONFIG_TIME_TABLE time_table[] = {
+	VAR_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD, DEF_TLS_RESEED_PERIOD, &var_tls_reseed_period, 0, 0,
+	VAR_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD, DEF_TLS_PRNG_UPD_PERIOD, &var_tls_prng_upd_period, 0, 0,
+	0,
+    };
+    static CONFIG_INT_TABLE int_table[] = {
+	VAR_TLS_RAND_BYTES, DEF_TLS_RAND_BYTES, &var_tls_rand_bytes, 0, 0,
+	0,
+    };
+
+    /*
+     * Use the trigger service skeleton, because no-one else should be
+     * monitoring our service port while this process runs, and because we do
+     * not talk back to the client.
+     */
+    trigger_server_main(argc, argv, tlsmgr_trigger_event,
+			MAIL_SERVER_TIME_TABLE, time_table,
+			MAIL_SERVER_INT_TABLE, int_table,
+			MAIL_SERVER_STR_TABLE, str_table,
+			MAIL_SERVER_PRE_INIT, tlsmgr_pre_init,
+			MAIL_SERVER_POST_INIT, tlsmgr_post_init,
+			MAIL_SERVER_LOOP, tlsmgr_loop,
+			MAIL_SERVER_PRE_ACCEPT, pre_accept,
+			0);
+}
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/Makefile.in postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/Makefile.in
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/Makefile.in	Tue Jun 11 03:12:45 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/Makefile.in	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 	dict_tcp.c dict_unix.c dir_forest.c doze.c duplex_pipe.c \
 	environ.c events.c exec_command.c fifo_listen.c fifo_trigger.c \
 	file_limit.c find_inet.c fsspace.c fullname.c get_domainname.c \
-	get_hostname.c hex_quote.c htable.c inet_addr_host.c \
+	get_hostname.c get_port.c hex_quote.c htable.c inet_addr_host.c \
 	inet_addr_list.c inet_addr_local.c inet_connect.c inet_listen.c \
 	inet_trigger.c inet_util.c intv.c line_wrap.c lowercase.c \
 	lstat_as.c mac_expand.c mac_parse.c make_dirs.c match_list.c \
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
 	unix_connect.c unix_listen.c unix_trigger.c unsafe.c username.c \
 	valid_hostname.c vbuf.c vbuf_print.c vstream.c vstream_popen.c \
 	vstring.c vstring_vstream.c watchdog.c writable.c write_buf.c \
-	write_wait.c strcasecmp.c nvtable.c
+	write_wait.c strcasecmp.c nvtable.c dict_sdbm.c sdbm.c
 OBJS	= alldig.o argv.o argv_split.o attr_print0.o attr_print64.o \
 	attr_scan0.o attr_scan64.o base64_code.o basename.o binhash.o \
 	chroot_uid.o clean_env.o close_on_exec.o concatenate.o ctable.o \
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
 	dict_tcp.o dict_unix.o dir_forest.o doze.o duplex_pipe.o \
 	environ.o events.o exec_command.o fifo_listen.o fifo_trigger.o \
 	file_limit.o find_inet.o fsspace.o fullname.o get_domainname.o \
-	get_hostname.o hex_quote.o htable.o inet_addr_host.o \
+	get_hostname.o get_port.o hex_quote.o htable.o inet_addr_host.o \
 	inet_addr_list.o inet_addr_local.o inet_connect.o inet_listen.o \
 	inet_trigger.o inet_util.o intv.o line_wrap.o lowercase.o \
 	lstat_as.o mac_expand.o mac_parse.o make_dirs.o match_list.o \
@@ -54,13 +54,13 @@
 	unix_connect.o unix_listen.o unix_trigger.o unsafe.o username.o \
 	valid_hostname.o vbuf.o vbuf_print.o vstream.o vstream_popen.o \
 	vstring.o vstring_vstream.o watchdog.o writable.o write_buf.o \
-	write_wait.o nvtable.o $(STRCASE)
+	write_wait.o nvtable.o $(STRCASE) dict_sdbm.o sdbm.o
 HDRS	= argv.h attr.h base64_code.h binhash.h chroot_uid.h clean_env.h \
 	connect.h ctable.h dict.h dict_db.h dict_dbm.h dict_env.h \
 	dict_ht.h dict_ldap.h dict_mysql.h dict_ni.h dict_nis.h \
 	dict_nisplus.h dict_pcre.h dict_regexp.h dict_static.h dict_tcp.h \
 	dict_unix.h dir_forest.h events.h exec_command.h find_inet.h \
-	fsspace.h fullname.h get_domainname.h get_hostname.h hex_quote.h \
+	fsspace.h fullname.h get_domainname.h get_hostname.h get_port.h hex_quote.h \
 	htable.h inet_addr_host.h inet_addr_list.h inet_addr_local.h \
 	inet_util.h intv.h iostuff.h line_wrap.h listen.h lstat_as.h \
 	mac_expand.h mac_parse.h make_dirs.h match_list.h match_ops.h \
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@
 	split_at.h stat_as.h stringops.h sys_defs.h timed_connect.h \
 	timed_wait.h trigger.h username.h valid_hostname.h vbuf.h \
 	vbuf_print.h vstream.h vstring.h vstring_vstream.h watchdog.h \
-	nvtable.h
+	nvtable.h dict_sdbm.h sdbm.h
 TESTSRC	= fifo_open.c fifo_rdwr_bug.c fifo_rdonly_bug.c select_bug.c \
 	stream_test.c dup2_pass_on_exec.c
 WARN	= -W -Wformat -Wimplicit -Wmissing-prototypes \
@@ -591,6 +591,7 @@
 dict_open.o: dict_unix.h
 dict_open.o: dict_tcp.h
 dict_open.o: dict_dbm.h
+dict_open.o: dict_sdbm.h
 dict_open.o: dict_db.h
 dict_open.o: dict_nis.h
 dict_open.o: dict_nisplus.h
@@ -725,6 +726,7 @@
 get_domainname.o: mymalloc.h
 get_domainname.o: get_hostname.h
 get_domainname.o: get_domainname.h
+get_port.o: sys_defs.h
 get_hostname.o: get_hostname.c
 get_hostname.o: sys_defs.h
 get_hostname.o: mymalloc.h
@@ -841,6 +843,7 @@
 match_list.o: stringops.h
 match_list.o: argv.h
 match_list.o: dict.h
+match_list.o: inet_util.h
 match_list.o: match_ops.h
 match_list.o: match_list.h
 match_ops.o: match_ops.c
@@ -1225,3 +1228,9 @@
 write_wait.o: sys_defs.h
 write_wait.o: msg.h
 write_wait.o: iostuff.h
+sdbm.o: sdbm.c
+sdbm.o: sdbm.h
+dict_sdbm.o: sdbm.h
+dict_sdbm.o: dict_sdbm.c
+dict_sdbm.o: dict_sdbm.h
+dict_sdbm.o: sys_defs.h
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_open.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_open.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_open.c	Fri Dec 21 23:18:07 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_open.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@
 #include <dict_env.h>
 #include <dict_unix.h>
 #include <dict_tcp.h>
+#include <dict_sdbm.h>
 #include <dict_dbm.h>
 #include <dict_db.h>
 #include <dict_nis.h>
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@
 #if 0
     DICT_TYPE_TCP, dict_tcp_open,
 #endif
+    "sdbm", dict_sdbm_open,
 #ifdef HAS_DBM
     DICT_TYPE_DBM, dict_dbm_open,
 #endif
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_sdbm.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_sdbm.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_sdbm.c	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_sdbm.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*	dict_sdbm 3
+/* SUMMARY
+/*	dictionary manager interface to SDBM files
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*	#include <dict_sdbm.h>
+/*
+/*	DICT	*dict_sdbm_open(path, open_flags, dict_flags)
+/*	const char *name;
+/*	const char *path;
+/*	int	open_flags;
+/*	int	dict_flags;
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/*	dict_sdbm_open() opens the named SDBM database and makes it available
+/*	via the generic interface described in dict_open(3).
+/* DIAGNOSTICS
+/*	Fatal errors: cannot open file, file write error, out of memory.
+/* SEE ALSO
+/*	dict(3) generic dictionary manager
+/*	sdbm(3) data base subroutines
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*	Wietse Venema
+/*	IBM T.J. Watson Research
+/*	P.O. Box 704
+/*	Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
+/*--*/
+
+#include "sys_defs.h"
+
+/* System library. */
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "mymalloc.h"
+#include "htable.h"
+#include "iostuff.h"
+#include "vstring.h"
+#include "myflock.h"
+#include "stringops.h"
+#include "dict.h"
+#include "dict_sdbm.h"
+#include "sdbm.h"
+
+/* Application-specific. */
+
+typedef struct {
+    DICT    dict;			/* generic members */
+    SDBM   *dbm;			/* open database */
+    char   *path;			/* pathname */
+} DICT_SDBM;
+
+/* dict_sdbm_lookup - find database entry */
+
+static const char *dict_sdbm_lookup(DICT *dict, const char *name)
+{
+    DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
+    datum   dbm_key;
+    datum   dbm_value;
+    static VSTRING *buf;
+    const char *result = 0;
+
+    dict_errno = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Acquire an exclusive lock.
+     */
+    if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+	&& myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_SHARED) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+    /*
+     * See if this DBM file was written with one null byte appended to key
+     * and value.
+     */
+    if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL) {
+	dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
+	dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name) + 1;
+	dbm_value = sdbm_fetch(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key);
+	if (dbm_value.dptr != 0) {
+	    dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL;
+	    result = dbm_value.dptr;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * See if this DBM file was written with no null byte appended to key and
+     * value.
+     */
+    if (result == 0 && (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL)) {
+	dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
+	dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name);
+	dbm_value = sdbm_fetch(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key);
+	if (dbm_value.dptr != 0) {
+	    if (buf == 0)
+		buf = vstring_alloc(10);
+	    vstring_strncpy(buf, dbm_value.dptr, dbm_value.dsize);
+	    dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL;
+	    result = vstring_str(buf);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Release the exclusive lock.
+     */
+    if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+	&& myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+    return (result);
+}
+
+/* dict_sdbm_update - add or update database entry */
+
+static void dict_sdbm_update(DICT *dict, const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+    DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
+    datum   dbm_key;
+    datum   dbm_value;
+    int     status;
+
+    dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
+    dbm_value.dptr = (void *) value;
+    dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name);
+    dbm_value.dsize = strlen(value);
+
+    /*
+     * If undecided about appending a null byte to key and value, choose a
+     * default depending on the platform.
+     */
+    if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL)
+	&& (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL)) {
+#ifdef DBM_NO_TRAILING_NULL
+	dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL;
+#else
+	dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL;
+#endif
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Optionally append a null byte to key and value.
+     */
+    if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL) {
+	dbm_key.dsize++;
+	dbm_value.dsize++;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Acquire an exclusive lock.
+     */
+    if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+	&& myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+    /*
+     * Do the update.
+     */
+    if ((status = sdbm_store(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key, dbm_value,
+     (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_DUP_REPLACE) ? DBM_REPLACE : DBM_INSERT)) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("error writing SDBM database %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+    if (status) {
+	if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_DUP_IGNORE)
+	     /* void */ ;
+	else if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_DUP_WARN)
+	    msg_warn("%s: duplicate entry: \"%s\"", dict_sdbm->path, name);
+	else
+	    msg_fatal("%s: duplicate entry: \"%s\"", dict_sdbm->path, name);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Release the exclusive lock.
+     */
+    if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+	&& myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+}
+
+
+/* dict_sdbm_delete - delete one entry from the dictionary */
+
+static int dict_sdbm_delete(DICT *dict, const char *name)
+{
+    DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
+    datum   dbm_key;
+    int     status = 1;
+    int     flags = 0;
+
+    /*
+     * Acquire an exclusive lock.
+     */
+    if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+	&& myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+    /*
+     * See if this DBM file was written with one null byte appended to key
+     * and value.
+     */
+    if (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL) {
+	dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
+	dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name) + 1;
+	sdbm_clearerr(dict_sdbm->dbm);
+	if ((status = sdbm_delete(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key)) < 0) {
+	    if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm) != 0)	/* fatal error */
+		msg_fatal("error deleting from %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+	    status = 1;				/* not found */
+	} else {
+	    dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL;	/* found */
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * See if this DBM file was written with no null byte appended to key and
+     * value.
+     */
+    if (status > 0 && (dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL)) {
+	dbm_key.dptr = (void *) name;
+	dbm_key.dsize = strlen(name);
+	sdbm_clearerr(dict_sdbm->dbm);
+	if ((status = sdbm_delete(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key)) < 0) {
+	    if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm) != 0)	/* fatal error */
+		msg_fatal("error deleting from %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+	    status = 1;				/* not found */
+	} else {
+	    dict->flags &= ~DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL;	/* found */
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Release the exclusive lock.
+     */
+    if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+	&& myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+    return (status);
+}
+
+/* traverse the dictionary */
+
+static int dict_sdbm_sequence(DICT *dict, const int function,
+			             const char **key, const char **value)
+{
+    char   *myname = "dict_sdbm_sequence";
+    DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
+    datum   dbm_key;
+    datum   dbm_value;
+    int     status = 0;
+    static VSTRING *key_buf;
+    static VSTRING *value_buf;
+
+    /*
+     * Acquire an exclusive lock.
+     */
+    if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+	&& myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_EXCLUSIVE) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("%s: lock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+    /*
+     * Determine and execute the seek function. It returns the key.
+     */
+    switch (function) {
+    case DICT_SEQ_FUN_FIRST:
+	dbm_key = sdbm_firstkey(dict_sdbm->dbm);
+	break;
+    case DICT_SEQ_FUN_NEXT:
+	dbm_key = sdbm_nextkey(dict_sdbm->dbm);
+	break;
+    default:
+	msg_panic("%s: invalid function: %d", myname, function);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Release the exclusive lock.
+     */
+    if ((dict->flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK)
+	&& myflock(dict->lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("%s: unlock dictionary: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+
+    if (dbm_key.dptr != 0 && dbm_key.dsize > 0) {
+
+	/*
+	 * See if this DB file was written with one null byte appended to key
+	 * an d value or not. If necessary, copy the key.
+	 */
+	if (((char *) dbm_key.dptr)[dbm_key.dsize - 1] == 0) {
+	    *key = dbm_key.dptr;
+	} else {
+	    if (key_buf == 0)
+		key_buf = vstring_alloc(10);
+	    vstring_strncpy(key_buf, dbm_key.dptr, dbm_key.dsize);
+	    *key = vstring_str(key_buf);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Fetch the corresponding value.
+	 */
+	dbm_value = sdbm_fetch(dict_sdbm->dbm, dbm_key);
+
+	if (dbm_value.dptr != 0 && dbm_value.dsize > 0) {
+
+	    /*
+	     * See if this DB file was written with one null byte appended to
+	     * key and value or not. If necessary, copy the key.
+	     */
+	    if (((char *) dbm_value.dptr)[dbm_value.dsize - 1] == 0) {
+		*value = dbm_value.dptr;
+	    } else {
+		if (value_buf == 0)
+		    value_buf = vstring_alloc(10);
+		vstring_strncpy(value_buf, dbm_value.dptr, dbm_value.dsize);
+		*value = vstring_str(value_buf);
+	    }
+	} else {
+
+	    /*
+	     * Determine if we have hit the last record or an error
+	     * condition.
+	     */
+	    if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm))
+		msg_fatal("error seeking %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+	    return (1);				/* no error: eof/not found
+						 * (should not happen!) */
+	}
+    } else {
+
+	/*
+	 * Determine if we have hit the last record or an error condition.
+	 */
+	if (sdbm_error(dict_sdbm->dbm))
+	    msg_fatal("error seeking %s: %m", dict_sdbm->path);
+	return (1);				/* no error: eof/not found */
+    }
+    return (0);
+}
+
+/* dict_sdbm_close - disassociate from data base */
+
+static void dict_sdbm_close(DICT *dict)
+{
+    DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) dict;
+
+    sdbm_close(dict_sdbm->dbm);
+    myfree(dict_sdbm->path);
+    myfree((char *) dict_sdbm);
+}
+
+/* dict_sdbm_open - open SDBM data base */
+
+DICT   *dict_sdbm_open(const char *path, int open_flags, int dict_flags)
+{
+    DICT_SDBM *dict_sdbm;
+    struct stat st;
+    SDBM   *dbm;
+    char   *dbm_path;
+    int     lock_fd;
+
+    if (dict_flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK) {
+	dbm_path = concatenate(path, ".pag", (char *) 0);
+	if ((lock_fd = open(dbm_path, open_flags, 0644)) < 0)
+	    msg_fatal("open database %s: %m", dbm_path);
+	if (myflock(lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_SHARED) < 0)
+	    msg_fatal("shared-lock database %s for open: %m", dbm_path);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * XXX SunOS 5.x has no const in dbm_open() prototype.
+     */
+    if ((dbm = sdbm_open((char *) path, open_flags, 0644)) == 0)
+	msg_fatal("open database %s.{dir,pag}: %m", path);
+
+    if (dict_flags & DICT_FLAG_LOCK) {
+	if (myflock(lock_fd, INTERNAL_LOCK, MYFLOCK_OP_NONE) < 0)
+	    msg_fatal("unlock database %s for open: %m", dbm_path);
+	if (close(lock_fd) < 0)
+	    msg_fatal("close database %s: %m", dbm_path);
+	myfree(dbm_path);
+    }
+    dict_sdbm = (DICT_SDBM *) mymalloc(sizeof(*dict_sdbm));
+    dict_sdbm->dict.lookup = dict_sdbm_lookup;
+    dict_sdbm->dict.update = dict_sdbm_update;
+    dict_sdbm->dict.delete = dict_sdbm_delete;
+    dict_sdbm->dict.sequence = dict_sdbm_sequence;
+    dict_sdbm->dict.close = dict_sdbm_close;
+    dict_sdbm->dict.lock_fd = sdbm_dirfno(dbm);
+    dict_sdbm->dict.stat_fd = sdbm_pagfno(dbm);
+    if (fstat(dict_sdbm->dict.stat_fd, &st) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("dict_sdbm_open: fstat: %m");
+    dict_sdbm->dict.mtime = st.st_mtime;
+    close_on_exec(sdbm_pagfno(dbm), CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
+    close_on_exec(sdbm_dirfno(dbm), CLOSE_ON_EXEC);
+    dict_sdbm->dict.flags = dict_flags | DICT_FLAG_FIXED;
+    if ((dict_flags & (DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL | DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL)) == 0)
+	dict_sdbm->dict.flags |= (DICT_FLAG_TRY0NULL | DICT_FLAG_TRY1NULL);
+    dict_sdbm->dbm = dbm;
+    dict_sdbm->path = mystrdup(path);
+
+    return (&dict_sdbm->dict);
+}
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_sdbm.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_sdbm.h
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/dict_sdbm.h	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/dict_sdbm.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:48 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+#ifndef _DICT_SDBM_H_INCLUDED_
+#define _DICT_SDBM_H_INCLUDED_
+
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*	dict_dbm 3h
+/* SUMMARY
+/*	dictionary manager interface to DBM files
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*	#include <dict_dbm.h>
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* .nf
+
+ /*
+  * Utility library.
+  */
+#include <dict.h>
+
+ /*
+  * External interface.
+  */
+extern DICT *dict_sdbm_open(const char *, int, int);
+
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	The Secure Mailer license must be distributed with this software.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*	Wietse Venema
+/*	IBM T.J. Watson Research
+/*	P.O. Box 704
+/*	Yorktown Heights, NY 10598, USA
+/*--*/
+
+#endif
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/get_port.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/get_port.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/get_port.c	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/get_port.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*	get_port 3
+/* SUMMARY
+/*	trivial host and port extracter
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*	#include <get_port.h>
+/*
+/*	char	*get_port(data)
+/*	char	*data;
+/*
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* 	get_port() extract host name or ip address from
+/* 	strings such as [3ffe:902:12::10]:25, [::1]
+/* 	or 192.168.0.1:25, and null-terminates the
+/* 	\fIdata\fR at the first occurrence of port separator.
+/* DIAGNOSTICS
+/* 	If port not found return null pointer.
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	BSD Style (or BSD like) license.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*	Arkadiusz Mi¶kiewicz <[e-mail]>
+/*	Wroclaw, POLAND
+/*--*/
+
+/* System libraries */
+
+#include <sys_defs.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* Utility library. */
+
+#include "get_port.h"
+
+/* get_port - extract port number from string */
+
+char *get_port(char *data)
+{
+	const char *escl=strchr(data,'[');
+	const char *sepl=strchr(data,':');
+	char *escr=strrchr(data,']');
+	char *sepr=strrchr(data,':');
+
+	/* extract from "[address]:port" or "[address]"*/
+	if (escl && escr)
+	{
+		memmove(data, data + 1, strlen(data) - strlen(escr));
+		data[strlen(data) - strlen(escr) - 1] = 0;
+		*escr++ = 0;
+		if (*escr == ':')
+			escr++;
+		return (*escr ? escr : NULL);
+	}
+	/* extract from "address:port" or "address" */
+	if ((sepl == sepr) && sepr && sepl)
+	{
+		*sepr++ = 0;
+		return sepr;
+	}
+
+	/* return empty string */
+	return NULL;
+}
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/get_port.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/get_port.h
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/get_port.h	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/get_port.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#ifndef _GET_PORT_H_INCLUDED_
+#define _GET_PORT_H_INCLUDED_
+
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*	get_port 3h
+/* SUMMARY
+/*	trivial host and port extracter
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*	#include <get_port.h>
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* .nf
+
+ /* External interface. */
+
+extern char *get_port(char *);
+
+
+/* LICENSE
+/* .ad
+/* .fi
+/*	BSD Style (or BSD like) license.
+/* AUTHOR(S)
+/*	Arkadiusz Mi¶kiewicz <[e-mail]>
+/*	Wroclaw, POLAND
+/*--*/
+
+#endif
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_host.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_host.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_host.c	Fri Dec 11 19:55:35 1998
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_host.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -38,7 +38,10 @@
 #include <sys_defs.h>
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
 
 #ifndef INADDR_NONE
 #define INADDR_NONE 0xffffffff
@@ -48,15 +51,47 @@
 
 #include <inet_addr_list.h>
 #include <inet_addr_host.h>
+#ifdef TEST
+#include <msg.h>
+#endif
 
 /* inet_addr_host - look up address list for host */
 
 int     inet_addr_host(INET_ADDR_LIST *addr_list, const char *hostname)
 {
+#ifdef INET6
+    int s;
+    struct addrinfo hints, *res0, *res;
+#ifdef TEST	
+	char buforhosta[1024];
+#endif	
+    int error;
+#else
     struct hostent *hp;
     struct in_addr addr;
+#endif
     int     initial_count = addr_list->used;
 
+#ifdef INET6
+    memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+    hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+    hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+    error = getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &res0);
+    if (error == 0) {
+	for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
+	    if(res->ai_family != AF_INET && res->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+		continue;
+	    /* filter out address families that are not supported */
+	    s = socket(res->ai_family, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
+	    if (s < 0)
+		continue;
+	    close(s);
+
+	    inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, res->ai_addr);
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(res0);
+    }
+#else
     if ((addr.s_addr = inet_addr(hostname)) != INADDR_NONE) {
 	inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, &addr);
     } else {
@@ -65,9 +100,12 @@
 		inet_addr_list_append(addr_list,
 				    (struct in_addr *) * hp->h_addr_list++);
     }
+#endif
+
     return (addr_list->used - initial_count);
 }
 
+
 #ifdef TEST
 
 #include <msg.h>
@@ -78,6 +116,8 @@
 {
     INET_ADDR_LIST addr_list;
     int     i;
+    struct sockaddr *sa;
+    char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
 
     msg_vstream_init(argv[0], VSTREAM_ERR);
 
@@ -89,8 +129,12 @@
 	if (inet_addr_host(&addr_list, *argv) == 0)
 	    msg_fatal("not found: %s", *argv);
 
-	for (i = 0; i < addr_list.used; i++)
-	    vstream_printf("%s\n", inet_ntoa(addr_list.addrs[i]));
+	for (i = 0; i < addr_list.used; i++) {
+	    sa = (struct sockaddr *)&addr_list.addrs[i];
+	    getnameinfo(sa, SA_LEN(sa), hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0,
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST);
+	    vstream_printf("%s\n", hbuf);
+	}
 	vstream_fflush(VSTREAM_OUT);
     }
     inet_addr_list_free(&addr_list);
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_list.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_list.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_list.c	Tue Jul 31 20:13:41 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_list.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -51,6 +51,13 @@
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 
+#include <netdb.h>
+
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+
 /* Utility library. */
 
 #include <msg.h>
@@ -63,12 +70,39 @@
 {
     list->used = 0;
     list->size = 2;
+#ifdef INET6
+    list->addrs = (struct sockaddr_storage *)
+#else
     list->addrs = (struct in_addr *)
+#endif
 	mymalloc(sizeof(*list->addrs) * list->size);
 }
 
 /* inet_addr_list_append - append address to internet address list */
 
+#ifdef INET6
+void    inet_addr_list_append(INET_ADDR_LIST *list, 
+                              struct sockaddr * addr)
+{
+    char   *myname = "inet_addr_list_append";
+    char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+    if (msg_verbose > 1) {
+	if (getnameinfo(addr, SA_LEN(addr), hbuf, sizeof(hbuf), NULL, 0,
+	    NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
+	    strncpy(hbuf, "??????", sizeof(hbuf));
+	}
+	msg_info("%s: %s", myname, hbuf);
+    }
+
+    if (list->used >= list->size)
+	list->size *= 2;
+    list->addrs = (struct sockaddr_storage *)
+	myrealloc((char *) list->addrs,
+		  sizeof(*list->addrs) * list->size);
+    memcpy(&list->addrs[list->used++], addr, SA_LEN(addr));
+}
+#else
 void    inet_addr_list_append(INET_ADDR_LIST *list, struct in_addr * addr)
 {
     char   *myname = "inet_addr_list_append";
@@ -83,15 +117,22 @@
 		  sizeof(*list->addrs) * list->size);
     list->addrs[list->used++] = *addr;
 }
+#endif
 
 /* inet_addr_list_comp - compare addresses */
 
 static int inet_addr_list_comp(const void *a, const void *b)
 {
+#ifdef INET6
+    if(((struct sockaddr*)a)->sa_family != ((struct sockaddr*)b)->sa_family)
+	return ( ((struct sockaddr*)a)->sa_family - ((struct sockaddr*)b)->sa_family );
+    return memcmp(a,b,SA_LEN((struct sockaddr*)a));
+#else
     const struct in_addr *a_addr = (const struct in_addr *) a;
     const struct in_addr *b_addr = (const struct in_addr *) b;
 
     return (a_addr->s_addr - b_addr->s_addr);
+#endif
 }
 
 /* inet_addr_list_uniq - weed out duplicates */
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_list.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_list.h
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_list.h	Tue Jul 31 19:56:47 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_list.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -16,19 +16,42 @@
   */
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 
+#ifndef SA_LEN
+# ifndef HAS_SA_LEN
+#  define SA_LEN(x)	(((x)->sa_family == AF_INET6) ? sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) : sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+#  define SS_LEN(x)	(((x).ss_family == AF_INET6) ? sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) : sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+# else
+#  define SA_LEN(x)       ((x)->sa_len)
+#  define SS_LEN(x)       ((x).ss_len)
+# endif
+#else
+# ifndef SS_LEN
+#  define SS_LEN(x)	(((x).ss_family == AF_INET6) ? sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) : sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+# endif
+#endif
+	
  /*
   * External interface.
   */
 typedef struct INET_ADDR_LIST {
     int     used;			/* nr of elements in use */
     int     size;			/* actual list size */
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct sockaddr_storage *addrs;   /* payload */
+#else
     struct in_addr *addrs;		/* payload */
+#endif
 } INET_ADDR_LIST;
 
 extern void inet_addr_list_init(INET_ADDR_LIST *);
 extern void inet_addr_list_free(INET_ADDR_LIST *);
 extern void inet_addr_list_uniq(INET_ADDR_LIST *);
+#ifdef INET6
+struct sockaddr;
+extern void inet_addr_list_append(INET_ADDR_LIST *, struct sockaddr *);
+#else
 extern void inet_addr_list_append(INET_ADDR_LIST *, struct in_addr *);
+#endif
 
 /* LICENSE
 /* .ad
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_local.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_local.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_addr_local.c	Sun Feb 25 19:20:19 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_addr_local.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -47,6 +47,13 @@
 #endif
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <string.h>
+#if defined(INET6) && (defined (LINUX) || defined (LINUX2))
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GETIFADDRS
+#include <ifaddrs.h>
+#endif
 
 /* Utility library. */
 
@@ -78,18 +85,104 @@
 
 int     inet_addr_local(INET_ADDR_LIST *addr_list, INET_ADDR_LIST *mask_list)
 {
+#ifdef HAVE_GETIFADDRS
+    char *myname = "inet_addr_local";
+    struct ifaddrs *ifap, *ifa;
+    int initial_count = addr_list->used;
+    struct sockaddr *sa, *sam;
+#ifdef INET6
+#ifdef __KAME__
+    struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
+#endif
+#else
+    void *addr,*addrm;
+#endif
+
+    if (getifaddrs(&ifap) < 0)
+	msg_fatal("%s: getifaddrs: %m", myname);
+
+    for (ifa = ifap; ifa; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) {
+		if (! (ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_RUNNING) || ifa->ifa_addr==NULL) 
+			continue;
+	sa = ifa->ifa_addr;
+	sam = ifa->ifa_netmask;
+	switch (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+#ifndef INET6
+	    addr = (void *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr)->sin_addr;
+	    addrm = (void *)&((struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_netmask)->sin_addr;
+#endif
+	    break;
+#ifdef INET6
+	case AF_INET6:
+#ifdef __KAME__
+	    memcpy(&addr6, ifa->ifa_addr, ifa->ifa_addr->sa_len);
+	    /* decode scoped address notation */
+	    if ((IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&addr6.sin6_addr) ||
+	         IN6_IS_ADDR_SITELOCAL(&addr6.sin6_addr)) &&
+		addr6.sin6_scope_id == 0) {
+		addr6.sin6_scope_id = ntohs(addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[3] |
+		    (unsigned int)addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[2] << 8);
+		addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[2] = addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[3] = 0;
+		sa = (struct sockaddr *)&addr6;
+	    }
+#endif
+	    break;
+#endif
+	default:
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+#ifdef INET6
+	inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, sa);
+	if (mask_list != NULL)
+	    inet_addr_list_append(mask_list, sam);
+#else
+	inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, (struct in_addr *)addr);
+	if (mask_list != NULL)
+	    inet_addr_list_append(mask_list, (struct in_addr *)addrm);
+#endif
+    }
+
+    freeifaddrs(ifap);
+    return (addr_list->used - initial_count);
+#else
     char   *myname = "inet_addr_local";
     struct ifconf ifc;
     struct ifreq *ifr;
     struct ifreq *the_end;
     int     sock;
-    VSTRING *buf = vstring_alloc(1024);
+    VSTRING *buf;
     int     initial_count = addr_list->used;
     struct in_addr addr;
     struct ifreq *ifr_mask;
+    int af = AF_INET;
+#ifdef INET6
+#if defined (LINUX) || defined (LINUX2)
+#define _PATH_PROCNET_IFINET6   "/proc/net/if_inet6"
+    FILE *f;
+    char addr6p[8][5], addr6res[40], devname[20];
+    int plen, scope, dad_status, if_idx, gaierror;
+    struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0;
+#endif
+    struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
 
-    if ((sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0)
+other_socket_type:
+#endif
+    buf = vstring_alloc(1024);
+
+    if ((sock = socket(af, SOCK_DGRAM, 0)) < 0) {
+#ifdef INET6
+	if (af == AF_INET6)
+	{
+	    if (msg_verbose)
+		    msg_warn("%s: socket: %m", myname);
+	    goto end;
+	}
+	else
+#endif
 	msg_fatal("%s: socket: %m", myname);
+    }
 
     /*
      * Get the network interface list. XXX The socket API appears to have no
@@ -126,10 +219,15 @@
      */
     the_end = (struct ifreq *) (ifc.ifc_buf + ifc.ifc_len);
     for (ifr = ifc.ifc_req; ifr < the_end;) {
-	if (ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == AF_INET) {	/* IP interface */
+	if ((ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == AF_INET) &&
+			(ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == af)) { /* IP interface */
 	    addr = ((struct sockaddr_in *) & ifr->ifr_addr)->sin_addr;
 	    if (addr.s_addr != INADDR_ANY) {	/* has IP address */
+#ifdef INET6
+		inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, &ifr->ifr_addr);
+#else
 		inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, &addr);
+#endif
 		if (mask_list) {
 		    ifr_mask = (struct ifreq *) mymalloc(IFREQ_SIZE(ifr));
 		    memcpy((char *) ifr_mask, (char *) ifr, IFREQ_SIZE(ifr));
@@ -141,11 +239,61 @@
 		}
 	    }
 	}
+#ifdef INET6
+	else if ((ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == AF_INET6) &&
+			(ifr->ifr_addr.sa_family == af)) {  /* IPv6 interface */
+	    addr6 = *((struct sockaddr_in6 *) & ifr->ifr_addr);
+#ifdef __KAME__
+	    /* decode scoped address notation */
+	    if ((IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(&addr6.sin6_addr) ||
+	         IN6_IS_ADDR_SITELOCAL(&addr6.sin6_addr)) &&
+		addr6.sin6_scope_id == 0) {
+		addr6.sin6_scope_id = ntohs(addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[3] |
+		    (unsigned int)addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[2] << 8);
+		addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[2] = addr6.sin6_addr.s6_addr[3] = 0;
+	    }
+#endif
+	    if (!(IN6_IS_ADDR_UNSPECIFIED(&addr6.sin6_addr)))
+	        inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, (struct sockaddr *)&addr6);
+	}
+#endif
 	ifr = NEXT_INTERFACE(ifr);
     }
     vstring_free(buf);
     (void) close(sock);
+#ifdef INET6
+end:
+    if (af != AF_INET6) {
+	    af = AF_INET6;
+	    goto other_socket_type;
+    }
+#if defined (LINUX) || defined (LINUX2)
+    if ((f = fopen(_PATH_PROCNET_IFINET6, "r")) != NULL) {
+         while (fscanf(f, "%4s%4s%4s%4s%4s%4s%4s%4s %02x %02x %02x %02x %20s\n",
+	       addr6p[0], addr6p[1], addr6p[2], addr6p[3], addr6p[4],
+	       addr6p[5], addr6p[6], addr6p[7],
+	       &if_idx, &plen, &scope, &dad_status, devname) != EOF) {
+		 sprintf(addr6res, "%s:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s",
+				 addr6p[0], addr6p[1], addr6p[2], addr6p[3],
+				 addr6p[4], addr6p[5], addr6p[6], addr6p[7]);
+		 addr6res[sizeof(addr6res) - 1] = 0;
+		 memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+		 hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+		 hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+		 hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+		 gaierror = getaddrinfo(addr6res, NULL, &hints, &res0);
+		 if (!gaierror) {
+			 for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
+			       inet_addr_list_append(addr_list, res->ai_addr);
+			 }
+			 freeaddrinfo(res0);
+		 }
+	 }
+    }
+#endif /* linux */
+#endif
     return (addr_list->used - initial_count);
+#endif
 }
 
 #ifdef TEST
@@ -158,6 +306,8 @@
     INET_ADDR_LIST addr_list;
     INET_ADDR_LIST mask_list;
     int     i;
+    char abuf[NI_MAXHOST], mbuf[NI_MAXHOST];
+    struct sockaddr *sa;
 
     msg_vstream_init(argv[0], VSTREAM_ERR);
 
@@ -172,8 +322,17 @@
 	msg_warn("found only one active network interface");
 
     for (i = 0; i < addr_list.used; i++) {
-	vstream_printf("%s/", inet_ntoa(addr_list.addrs[i]));
-	vstream_printf("%s\n", inet_ntoa(mask_list.addrs[i]));
+	sa = (struct sockaddr *)&addr_list.addrs[i];
+	if (getnameinfo(sa, SA_LEN(sa), abuf, sizeof(abuf), NULL, 0,
+		NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
+	    strncpy(abuf, "???", sizeof(abuf));
+	}
+	sa = (struct sockaddr *)&mask_list.addrs[i];
+	if (getnameinfo(sa, SA_LEN(sa), mbuf, sizeof(mbuf), NULL, 0,
+		NI_NUMERICHOST)) {
+	    strncpy(mbuf, "???", sizeof(mbuf));
+	}
+	vstream_printf("%s/%s\n", abuf, mbuf);
     }
     vstream_fflush(VSTREAM_OUT);
     inet_addr_list_free(&addr_list);
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_connect.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_connect.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_connect.c	Mon Nov 20 19:06:31 2000
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_connect.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <errno.h>
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <netdb.h>
+#endif
 
 /* Utility library. */
 
@@ -73,7 +76,12 @@
     char   *buf;
     char   *host;
     char   *port;
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct addrinfo hints, *res, *res0;
+    int    error;
+#else
     struct sockaddr_in sin;
+#endif
     int     sock;
 
     /*
@@ -81,14 +89,58 @@
      * the local host.
      */
     buf = inet_parse(addr, &host, &port);
+#ifdef INET6
+    if (*host == 0)
+	host = NULL;
+    memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+    hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+    hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+    hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;	/* find_inet_addr is numeric only */
+    if (getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res0))
+	msg_fatal("host not found: %s", host);
+#else
     if (*host == 0)
 	host = "localhost";
     memset((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
     sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
     sin.sin_addr.s_addr = find_inet_addr(host);
     sin.sin_port = find_inet_port(port, "tcp");
+#endif
     myfree(buf);
 
+#ifdef INET6
+    sock = -1;
+    for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
+	if ((res->ai_family != AF_INET) && (res->ai_family != AF_INET6))
+	    continue;
+
+	sock = socket(res->ai_family, res->ai_socktype, res->ai_protocol);
+	if (sock < 0)
+	    continue;
+	if (timeout > 0) {
+	    non_blocking(sock, NON_BLOCKING);
+	    if (timed_connect(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, timeout) < 0) {
+		close(sock);
+		sock = -1;
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    if (block_mode != NON_BLOCKING)
+		non_blocking(sock, block_mode);
+	    break;
+	} else {
+	    non_blocking(sock, block_mode);
+	    if (connect(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0
+		&& errno != EINPROGRESS) {
+		close(sock);
+		sock = -1;
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+    freeaddrinfo(res0);
+    return sock;
+#else
     /*
      * Create a client socket.
      */
@@ -121,4 +173,5 @@
 	}
 	return (sock);
     }
+#endif
 }
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_listen.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_listen.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/inet_listen.c	Mon Nov 20 19:06:32 2000
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/inet_listen.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 /* SYNOPSIS
 /*	#include <listen.h>
 /*
-/*	int	inet_listen(addr, backlog, block_mode)
+/*	int	inet_listen(addr, backlog, block_mode, addinuse_fatal)
 /*	const char *addr;
 /*	int	backlog;
 /*	int	block_mode;
@@ -51,11 +51,17 @@
 #include <sys_defs.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <netinet/in.h>
+#ifdef INET6
+#if (! __GLIBC__ >= 2 && __GLIBC_MINOR__ >=1 )
+#include <netinet6/in6.h>
+#endif
+#endif
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <netdb.h>
 #ifndef MAXHOSTNAMELEN
 #include <sys/param.h>
 #endif
+#include <errno.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 
@@ -77,35 +83,116 @@
 
 /* inet_listen - create inet-domain listener */
 
-int     inet_listen(const char *addr, int backlog, int block_mode)
+int     inet_listen(const char *addr, int backlog, int block_mode, int addrinuse_fatal)
 {
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct addrinfo *res, *res0, hints;
+    int error;
+#else
+    struct ai {
+	int ai_family;
+	int ai_socktype;
+	int ai_protocol;
+	struct sockaddr *ai_addr;
+	SOCKADDR_SIZE ai_addrlen;
+	struct ai *ai_next;
+    } *res, *res0, resbody;
     struct sockaddr_in sin;
+#endif
     int     sock;
     int     t = 1;
+    int     addrinuse = 0;
     char   *buf;
     char   *host;
     char   *port;
+#ifdef INET6
+    char hbuf[NI_MAXHOST], pbuf[NI_MAXSERV];
+#else
+    char hbuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
+    char pbuf[sizeof("255.255.255.255") + 1];
+#endif
+    char *cause = "unknown";
 
     /*
      * Translate address information to internal form.
      */
     buf = inet_parse(addr, &host, &port);
-    memset((char *) &sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
+#ifdef INET6
+    memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+    hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+    hints.ai_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+    hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+    error = getaddrinfo(*host ? host : NULL, *port ? port : "0", &hints, &res0);
+    if (error) {
+	msg_fatal("getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
+    }
+    myfree(buf);
+#else
+    memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
     sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
+#ifdef HAS_SA_LEN
+    sin.sin_len = sizeof(sin);
+#endif
     sin.sin_port = find_inet_port(port, "tcp");
     sin.sin_addr.s_addr = (*host ? find_inet_addr(host) : INADDR_ANY);
-    myfree(buf);
 
-    /*
-     * Create a listener socket.
-     */
-    if ((sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
-	msg_fatal("socket: %m");
-    if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *) &t, sizeof(t)) < 0)
-	msg_fatal("setsockopt: %m");
-    if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) & sin, sizeof(sin)) < 0)
-	msg_fatal("bind %s port %d: %m", sin.sin_addr.s_addr == INADDR_ANY ?
-	       "INADDR_ANY" : inet_ntoa(sin.sin_addr), ntohs(sin.sin_port));
+    memset(&resbody, 0, sizeof(resbody)); 
+    resbody.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+    resbody.ai_family = AF_INET;
+    resbody.ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)&sin;
+    resbody.ai_addrlen = sizeof(sin);
+
+    res0 = &resbody;
+#endif
+
+    sock = -1;
+    for (res = res0; res; res = res->ai_next) {
+	if ((res->ai_family != AF_INET) && (res->ai_family != AF_INET6))
+	    continue;
+
+	/*
+	 * Create a listener socket.
+	 */
+	if ((sock = socket(res->ai_family, res->ai_socktype, 0)) < 0) {
+	    cause = "socket";
+	    continue;
+	}
+#ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY
+	if (res->ai_family == AF_INET6 &&
+	    setsockopt(sock, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, (char *) &t, sizeof(t)) < 0) {
+		/* if kernel/libc don't support this simple ignore it
+	    cause = "setsockopt(IPV6_V6ONLY)";
+	    close(sock);
+	    sock = -1;
+	    continue;
+		*/
+		;
+	}
+#endif
+	if (setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (char *) &t, sizeof(t)) < 0) {
+	    cause = "setsockopt(SO_REUSEADDR)";
+	    close(sock);
+	    sock = -1;
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+	if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+	    cause = "bind";
+	    if (errno == EADDRINUSE)
+		addrinuse = 1;
+	    close(sock);
+	    sock = -1;
+	    continue;
+	}
+	break;
+    }
+    if (sock < 0 && (addrinuse_fatal || !addrinuse))
+	msg_fatal("%s: %m", cause);
+#ifdef INET6
+    freeaddrinfo(res0);
+#endif
+    if (sock < 0)
+	return -1;
     non_blocking(sock, block_mode);
     if (listen(sock, backlog) < 0)
 	msg_fatal("listen: %m");
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/listen.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/listen.h
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/listen.h	Mon Mar 22 02:57:11 1999
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/listen.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
   * Listener external interface.
   */
 extern int unix_listen(const char *, int, int);
-extern int inet_listen(const char *, int, int);
+extern int inet_listen(const char *, int, int, int);
 extern int fifo_listen(const char *, int, int);
 extern int stream_listen(const char *, int, int);
 
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/match_list.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/match_list.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/match_list.c	Tue Nov 20 21:07:15 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/match_list.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
 		    list = match_list_parse(list, vstring_str(buf));
 	    if (vstream_fclose(fp))
 		msg_fatal("%s: read file %s: %m", myname, pattern);
-	} else if (strchr(pattern, ':') != 0) {	/* type:table */
+	} else if ((strchr(pattern, ']') == 0) && (strchr(pattern, ':') != 0)) {	/* type:table */
 	    for (cp = pattern; *cp == '!'; cp++)
 		 /* void */ ;
 	    if (dict_handle(pattern) == 0)
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/match_ops.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/match_ops.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/match_ops.c	Tue Nov 20 21:16:10 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/match_ops.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -81,6 +81,307 @@
 #include <match_ops.h>
 #include <stringops.h>
 
+#ifdef INET6
+/*
+ *		$Id: match_ops.c,v 1.2 2000/05/22 12:01:17 misiek Exp $
+ *
+ *		This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ *		modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ *		as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ *		2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * Authors:	Alexey Kuznetsov, <[e-mail]>
+ * 
+ * Modifications:
+ *		Artur Frysiak <[e-mail]>
+ *		Arkadiusz Mi¶kiewicz <[e-mail]>
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+#ifndef	AF_DECnet
+#define	AF_DECnet	12
+#endif
+
+#ifndef	PF_PACKET
+#define	PF_PACKET	17
+#endif
+
+typedef struct
+{
+	unsigned char family;
+	unsigned char bytelen;
+	signed short  bitlen;
+	unsigned int data[4];
+} inet_prefix;
+
+/* prototypes */
+int masked_match(char *, char *, char *);
+int get_integer(int *, char *, int);
+int get_addr_1(inet_prefix *, char *, int);
+int get_prefix_1(inet_prefix *, char *, int);
+int get_addr(inet_prefix *, char *, int);
+int get_prefix(inet_prefix *, char *, int);
+unsigned int get_addr32(char *);
+int matches(char *, char *);
+int inet_addr_match(inet_prefix *, inet_prefix *, int);
+int mask_match(char *, char *, char *);
+	
+int get_integer(int *val, char *arg, int base)
+{
+	long res;
+	char *ptr;
+
+	if (!arg || !*arg)
+		return -1;
+	res = strtol(arg, &ptr, base);
+	if (!ptr || ptr == arg || *ptr || res > INT_MAX || res < INT_MIN)
+		return -1;
+	*val = res;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int get_addr_1(inet_prefix *addr, char *name, int family)
+{
+	char *cp;
+	unsigned char *ap = (unsigned char*)addr->data;
+	int i;
+
+	memset(addr, 0, sizeof(*addr));
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "default") == 0 || strcmp(name, "any") == 0) {
+		if (family == AF_DECnet)
+			return -1;
+		addr->family = family;
+		addr->bytelen = (family == AF_INET6 ? 16 : 4);
+		addr->bitlen = -1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (strchr(name, ':')) {
+		addr->family = AF_INET6;
+		if (family != AF_UNSPEC && family != AF_INET6)
+			return -1;
+		if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, name, addr->data) <= 0)
+			return -1;
+		addr->bytelen = 16;
+		addr->bitlen = -1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	addr->family = AF_INET;
+	if (family != AF_UNSPEC && family != AF_INET)
+		return -1;
+	addr->bytelen = 4;
+	addr->bitlen = -1;
+	for (cp = name, i = 0; *cp; cp++) {
+		if (*cp <= '9' && *cp >= '0') {
+			ap[i] = 10*ap[i] + (*cp-'0');
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (*cp == '.' && ++i <= 3)
+			continue;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int get_prefix_1(inet_prefix *dst, char *arg, int family)
+{
+	int err;
+	unsigned plen;
+	char *slash;
+
+	memset(dst, 0, sizeof(*dst));
+
+	if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
+		if (family == AF_DECnet)
+			return -1;
+		dst->family = family;
+		dst->bytelen = 0;
+		dst->bitlen = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	slash = strchr(arg, '/');
+	if (slash)
+		*slash = 0;
+	err = get_addr_1(dst, arg, family);
+	if (err == 0) {
+		switch(dst->family) {
+			case AF_INET6:
+				dst->bitlen = 128;
+				break;
+			case AF_DECnet:
+				dst->bitlen = 16;
+				break;
+			default:
+			case AF_INET:
+				dst->bitlen = 32;
+		}
+		if (slash) {
+			if (get_integer(&plen, slash+1, 0) || plen > dst->bitlen) {
+				err = -1;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			dst->bitlen = plen;
+		}
+	}
+done:
+	if (slash)
+		*slash = '/';
+	return err;
+}
+
+int get_addr(inet_prefix *dst, char *arg, int family)
+{
+#ifdef AF_PACKET
+	if (family == AF_PACKET)
+		return -1;
+#endif
+	if (get_addr_1(dst, arg, family))
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int get_prefix(inet_prefix *dst, char *arg, int family)
+{
+#ifdef AF_PACKET
+	if (family == AF_PACKET)
+		return -1;
+#endif
+	if (get_prefix_1(dst, arg, family))
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+unsigned int get_addr32(char *name)
+{
+	inet_prefix addr;
+	if (get_addr_1(&addr, name, AF_INET))
+		return -1;
+	return addr.data[0];
+}
+
+int matches(char *cmd, char *pattern)
+{
+	int len = strlen(cmd);
+	if (len > strlen(pattern))
+		return -1;
+	return memcmp(pattern, cmd, len);
+}
+
+int inet_addr_match(inet_prefix *a, inet_prefix *b, int bits)
+{
+	unsigned int *a1 = a->data;
+	unsigned int *a2 = b->data;
+	int words = bits >> 0x05;
+
+	bits &= 0x1f;
+
+	if (words)
+		if (memcmp(a1, a2, words << 2))
+			return -1;
+
+	if (bits) {
+		unsigned int w1, w2;
+		unsigned int mask;
+
+		w1 = a1[words];
+		w2 = a2[words];
+
+		mask = htonl((0xffffffff) << (0x20 - bits));
+
+		if ((w1 ^ w2) & mask)
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* zero if matches */
+int mask_match(char *network, char *cprefix, char *address)
+{
+ 	inet_prefix *inetwork;
+	inet_prefix *iaddress;
+	int ret, prefix;
+
+	if (!(network && address && cprefix))
+		return -1;
+	prefix = strtol(cprefix, (char **)NULL, 10);
+	if ((prefix < 0) || (prefix > 128))
+		return -1;
+	if ((strlen(network) == 0) || (strlen(address) == 0))
+		return -1;
+
+	inetwork = malloc(sizeof(inet_prefix));
+	iaddress = malloc(sizeof(inet_prefix));
+
+	if ((get_addr(iaddress, address, AF_UNSPEC) >= 0)
+			&& (get_addr(inetwork, network, AF_UNSPEC) >= 0))
+		ret = inet_addr_match(inetwork, iaddress, prefix);
+	else
+		ret = -1;
+	free(inetwork);
+	free(iaddress);
+
+	/* 1 if matches */
+	/* return (!ret); */
+	/* 0 if matches */
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * masked_match() - universal for IPv4 and IPv6  - 1 if matches
+ */
+int masked_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string)
+char	*net_tok;
+char	*mask_tok;
+char	*string;
+{
+#ifdef INET6
+	struct in6_addr in6[2];
+	char v4addr[2][INET_ADDRSTRLEN];
+	char newmask[6];
+	int plen;
+#endif
+
+	/* Check for NULL */
+	if (!(net_tok && mask_tok && string))
+		return 0; /* doesn't match!!! */
+
+	/* If IPv6 mapped convert to native-IPv4 */
+#ifdef INET6
+	if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, net_tok, &in6[0]) == 1 &&
+	    inet_pton(AF_INET6, string, &in6[1]) == 1 &&
+	    IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&in6[0]) && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&in6[1])) {
+		plen = atoi(mask_tok);
+		if (32 < plen && plen < 129) {
+			sprintf(newmask, "%d", plen - 96);
+			mask_tok = newmask;
+		}
+
+		(void)inet_ntop(AF_INET, &in6[0].s6_addr[12], v4addr[0],
+		    sizeof(v4addr[0]));
+		net_tok = v4addr[0];
+		(void)inet_ntop(AF_INET, &in6[1].s6_addr[12], v4addr[1],
+		    sizeof(v4addr[1]));
+		string = v4addr[1];
+	}
+#endif
+	return (!mask_match(net_tok, mask_tok, string));
+}
+#endif
+
 /* match_string - match a string literal */
 
 int     match_string(int unused_flags, const char *string, const char *pattern)
@@ -177,6 +478,7 @@
     return (0);
 }
 
+#ifndef INET6
 /* match_parse_mask - parse net/mask pattern */
 
 static int match_parse_mask(const char *pattern, unsigned long *net_bits,
@@ -198,27 +500,55 @@
     return (mask != 0);
 }
 
+#endif
+
 /* match_hostaddr - match host by address */
 
 int     match_hostaddr(int unused_flags, const char *addr, const char *pattern)
 {
     char   *myname = "match_hostaddr";
+#ifdef INET6
+    char *network, *mask, *escl, *escr, *patternx;
+    struct in6_addr in6;
+    char v4addr[INET_ADDRSTRLEN];
+#else
     int     mask_shift;
     unsigned long mask_bits;
     unsigned long net_bits;
     unsigned long addr_bits;
+#endif
 
     if (msg_verbose)
 	msg_info("%s: %s ~? %s", myname, addr, pattern);
 
+#ifdef INET6
+    if (addr[strspn(addr, "01234567890./:abcdef")] != 0)
+#else
     if (addr[strspn(addr, "01234567890./:")] != 0)
+#endif
 	return (0);
 
+#ifdef INET6
+    patternx = mystrdup(pattern);
+    escl = strchr(patternx,'[');
+    escr = strrchr(patternx,']');
+    if (escl && escr) {
+      *escr = 0;
+      sprintf(patternx, "%s%s", escl + 1, escr + 1);
+      pattern = patternx;
+    }
+#endif
+
     /*
      * Try dictionary lookup. This can be case insensitive. XXX Probably
      * should also try again after stripping least significant octets.
      */
-    if (strchr(pattern, ':') != 0) {
+#ifdef INET6
+    if (!(escl && escr) && strchr(pattern, ':') != 0)
+#else
+    if (strchr(pattern, ':') != 0)
+#endif
+    {
 	if (dict_lookup(pattern, addr) != 0)
 	    return (1);
 	if (dict_errno != 0)
@@ -229,6 +559,12 @@
     /*
      * Try an exact match with the host address.
      */
+#ifdef INET6
+    if (inet_pton(AF_INET6, addr, &in6) == 1 && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&in6)) {
+	(void)inet_ntop(AF_INET, &in6.s6_addr[12], v4addr, sizeof(v4addr));
+	addr = v4addr;
+    }
+#endif
     if (strcasecmp(addr, pattern) == 0) {
 	return (1);
     }
@@ -237,6 +573,20 @@
      * In a net/mask pattern, the mask is specified as the number of bits of
      * the network part.
      */
+#ifdef INET6
+    network = mystrdup(patternx);
+    mask = split_at(network, '/');
+
+    if (masked_match(network, mask, (char *)addr)) {
+	myfree(network);
+	myfree(patternx);
+	return (1);
+    } else {
+	myfree(network);
+	myfree(patternx);
+    }
+#else
+	    
     if (match_parse_mask(pattern, &net_bits, &mask_shift)) {
 	addr_bits = inet_addr(addr);
 	if (addr_bits == INADDR_NONE)
@@ -244,5 +594,6 @@
 	mask_bits = htonl((0xffffffff) << (BITS_PER_ADDR - mask_shift));
 	return ((addr_bits & mask_bits) == (net_bits & mask_bits));
     }
+#endif
     return (0);
 }
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sdbm.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sdbm.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sdbm.c	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sdbm.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,971 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*      sdbm 3h
+/* SUMMARY
+/*      SDBM Simple DBM: ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*      include "sdbm.h"
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/*	This file includes the public domain SDBM (ndbm work-alike hashed
+/*	database library), based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing
+/*	algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
+/*	author: [e-mail]
+/*	status: public domain
+/*	The file has been patched following the advice of Uwe Ohse
+/*	<[e-mail]>:
+/*	--------------------------------------------------------------
+/*	this patch fixes a problem with sdbms .dir file, which arrises when
+/*	a second .dir block is needed for the first time. read() returns 0
+/*	in that case, and the library forgot to initialize that new block.
+/*
+/*	A related problem is that the calculation of db->maxbno is wrong.
+/*	It just appends 4096*BYTESIZ bits, which is not enough except for
+/*	small databases (.dir basically doubles everytime it's too small).
+/*	--------------------------------------------------------------
+/*	According to Uwe Ohse, the patch has also been submitted to the
+/*	author of SDBM. (The 4096*BYTESIZ bits comment may apply with a
+/*	different size for Postfix/TLS, as the patch was sent against the
+/*	original SDBM distributiona and for Postfix/TLS I have changed the
+/*	default sizes.
+/* .nf
+/*--*/
+
+/*
+ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+ * based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
+ * author: [e-mail]
+ * status: public domain.
+ *
+ * core routines
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef WIN32
+#include <io.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#else
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef __STDC__
+#include <stddef.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <sdbm.h>
+
+/*
+ * useful macros
+ */
+#define bad(x)          ((x).dptr == NULL || (x).dsize <= 0)
+#define exhash(item)    sdbm_hash((item).dptr, (item).dsize)
+#define ioerr(db)       ((db)->flags |= DBM_IOERR)
+
+#define OFF_PAG(off)    (long) (off) * PBLKSIZ
+#define OFF_DIR(off)    (long) (off) * DBLKSIZ
+
+static long masks[] =
+{
+    000000000000, 000000000001, 000000000003, 000000000007,
+    000000000017, 000000000037, 000000000077, 000000000177,
+    000000000377, 000000000777, 000000001777, 000000003777,
+    000000007777, 000000017777, 000000037777, 000000077777,
+    000000177777, 000000377777, 000000777777, 000001777777,
+    000003777777, 000007777777, 000017777777, 000037777777,
+    000077777777, 000177777777, 000377777777, 000777777777,
+    001777777777, 003777777777, 007777777777, 017777777777
+};
+
+datum   nullitem =
+{NULL, 0};
+
+typedef struct
+{
+    int     dirf;			/* directory file descriptor */
+    int     pagf;			/* page file descriptor */
+    int     flags;			/* status/error flags, see below */
+    long    maxbno;			/* size of dirfile in bits */
+    long    curbit;			/* current bit number */
+    long    hmask;			/* current hash mask */
+    long    blkptr;			/* current block for nextkey */
+    int     keyptr;			/* current key for nextkey */
+    long    blkno;			/* current page to read/write */
+    long    pagbno;			/* current page in pagbuf */
+    char   *pagbuf;			/* page file block buffer */
+    long    dirbno;			/* current block in dirbuf */
+    char   *dirbuf;			/* directory file block buffer */
+}       DBM;
+
+
+/* ************************* */
+
+/*
+ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+ * based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
+ * author: [e-mail]
+ * status: public domain. keep it that way.
+ *
+ * hashing routine
+ */
+
+/*
+ * polynomial conversion ignoring overflows
+ * [this seems to work remarkably well, in fact better
+ * then the ndbm hash function. Replace at your own risk]
+ * use: 65599   nice.
+ *      65587   even better.
+ */
+static long sdbm_hash (char *str, int len)
+{
+    unsigned long n = 0;
+
+#ifdef DUFF
+#define HASHC   n = *str++ + 65599 * n
+    if (len > 0)
+      {
+	  int     loop = (len + 8 - 1) >> 3;
+
+	  switch (len & (8 - 1))
+	    {
+	    case 0:
+		do
+		  {
+		      HASHC;
+	    case 7:
+		      HASHC;
+	    case 6:
+		      HASHC;
+	    case 5:
+		      HASHC;
+	    case 4:
+		      HASHC;
+	    case 3:
+		      HASHC;
+	    case 2:
+		      HASHC;
+	    case 1:
+		      HASHC;
+		  }
+		while (--loop);
+	    }
+
+      }
+#else
+    while (len--)
+	n = *str++ + 65599 * n;
+#endif
+    return n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check page sanity:
+ * number of entries should be something
+ * reasonable, and all offsets in the index should be in order.
+ * this could be made more rigorous.
+ */
+static int chkpage (char *pag)
+{
+    int     n;
+    int     off;
+    short  *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+    if ((n = ino[0]) < 0 || n > PBLKSIZ / sizeof (short))
+	        return 0;
+
+    if (n > 0)
+      {
+	  off = PBLKSIZ;
+	  for (ino++; n > 0; ino += 2)
+	    {
+		if (ino[0] > off || ino[1] > off ||
+		    ino[1] > ino[0])
+		    return 0;
+		off = ino[1];
+		n -= 2;
+	    }
+      }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * search for the key in the page.
+ * return offset index in the range 0 < i < n.
+ * return 0 if not found.
+ */
+static int seepair (char *pag, int n, char *key, int siz)
+{
+    int     i;
+    int     off = PBLKSIZ;
+    short  *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+    for (i = 1; i < n; i += 2)
+      {
+	  if (siz == off - ino[i] &&
+	      memcmp (key, pag + ino[i], siz) == 0)
+	      return i;
+	  off = ino[i + 1];
+      }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SEEDUPS
+static int duppair (char *pag, datum key)
+{
+    short  *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+    return ino[0] > 0 && seepair (pag, ino[0], key.dptr, key.dsize) > 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ************************* */
+
+/*
+ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+ * based on Per-Aake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
+ * author: [e-mail]
+ * status: public domain.
+ *
+ * page-level routines
+ */
+
+/*
+ * page format:
+ *      +------------------------------+
+ * ino  | n | keyoff | datoff | keyoff |
+ *      +------------+--------+--------+
+ *      | datoff | - - - ---->         |
+ *      +--------+---------------------+
+ *      |        F R E E A R E A       |
+ *      +--------------+---------------+
+ *      |  <---- - - - | data          |
+ *      +--------+-----+----+----------+
+ *      |  key   | data     | key      |
+ *      +--------+----------+----------+
+ *
+ * calculating the offsets for free area:  if the number
+ * of entries (ino[0]) is zero, the offset to the END of
+ * the free area is the block size. Otherwise, it is the
+ * nth (ino[ino[0]]) entry's offset.
+ */
+
+static int fitpair (char *pag, int need)
+{
+    int     n;
+    int     off;
+    int     avail;
+    short  *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+    off = ((n = ino[0]) > 0) ? ino[n] : PBLKSIZ;
+    avail = off - (n + 1) * sizeof (short);
+    need += 2 * sizeof (short);
+
+    return need <= avail;
+}
+
+static void putpair (char *pag, datum key, datum val)
+{
+    int     n;
+    int     off;
+    short  *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+    off = ((n = ino[0]) > 0) ? ino[n] : PBLKSIZ;
+/*
+ * enter the key first
+ */
+    off -= key.dsize;
+    (void) memcpy (pag + off, key.dptr, key.dsize);
+    ino[n + 1] = off;
+/*
+ * now the data
+ */
+    off -= val.dsize;
+    (void) memcpy (pag + off, val.dptr, val.dsize);
+    ino[n + 2] = off;
+/*
+ * adjust item count
+ */
+    ino[0] += 2;
+}
+
+static datum getpair (char *pag, datum key)
+{
+    int     i;
+    int     n;
+    datum   val;
+    short  *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+    if ((n = ino[0]) == 0)
+	return nullitem;
+
+    if ((i = seepair (pag, n, key.dptr, key.dsize)) == 0)
+	return nullitem;
+
+    val.dptr = pag + ino[i + 1];
+    val.dsize = ino[i] - ino[i + 1];
+    return val;
+}
+
+static datum getnkey (char *pag, int num)
+{
+    datum   key;
+    int     off;
+    short  *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+    num = num * 2 - 1;
+    if (ino[0] == 0 || num > ino[0])
+	return nullitem;
+
+    off = (num > 1) ? ino[num - 1] : PBLKSIZ;
+
+    key.dptr = pag + ino[num];
+    key.dsize = off - ino[num];
+
+    return key;
+}
+
+static int delpair (char *pag, datum key)
+{
+    int     n;
+    int     i;
+    short  *ino = (short *) pag;
+
+    if ((n = ino[0]) == 0)
+	return 0;
+
+    if ((i = seepair (pag, n, key.dptr, key.dsize)) == 0)
+	return 0;
+/*
+ * found the key. if it is the last entry
+ * [i.e. i == n - 1] we just adjust the entry count.
+ * hard case: move all data down onto the deleted pair,
+ * shift offsets onto deleted offsets, and adjust them.
+ * [note: 0 < i < n]
+ */
+    if (i < n - 1)
+      {
+	  int     m;
+	  char   *dst = pag + (i == 1 ? PBLKSIZ : ino[i - 1]);
+	  char   *src = pag + ino[i + 1];
+	  int     zoo = dst - src;
+
+/*
+ * shift data/keys down
+ */
+	  m = ino[i + 1] - ino[n];
+#ifdef DUFF
+#define MOVB    *--dst = *--src
+	  if (m > 0)
+	    {
+		int     loop = (m + 8 - 1) >> 3;
+
+		switch (m & (8 - 1))
+		  {
+		  case 0:
+		      do
+			{
+			    MOVB;
+		  case 7:
+			    MOVB;
+		  case 6:
+			    MOVB;
+		  case 5:
+			    MOVB;
+		  case 4:
+			    MOVB;
+		  case 3:
+			    MOVB;
+		  case 2:
+			    MOVB;
+		  case 1:
+			    MOVB;
+			}
+		      while (--loop);
+		  }
+	    }
+#else
+	  dst -= m;
+	  src -= m;
+	  memmove (dst, src, m);
+#endif
+/*
+ * adjust offset index up
+ */
+	  while (i < n - 1)
+	    {
+		ino[i] = ino[i + 2] + zoo;
+		i++;
+	    }
+      }
+    ino[0] -= 2;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void splpage (char *pag, char *new, long sbit)
+{
+    datum   key;
+    datum   val;
+
+    int     n;
+    int     off = PBLKSIZ;
+    char    cur[PBLKSIZ];
+    short  *ino = (short *) cur;
+
+    (void) memcpy (cur, pag, PBLKSIZ);
+    (void) memset (pag, 0, PBLKSIZ);
+    (void) memset (new, 0, PBLKSIZ);
+
+    n = ino[0];
+    for (ino++; n > 0; ino += 2)
+      {
+	  key.dptr = cur + ino[0];
+	  key.dsize = off - ino[0];
+	  val.dptr = cur + ino[1];
+	  val.dsize = ino[0] - ino[1];
+/*
+ * select the page pointer (by looking at sbit) and insert
+ */
+	  (void) putpair ((exhash (key) & sbit) ? new : pag, key, val);
+
+	  off = ino[1];
+	  n -= 2;
+      }
+}
+
+static int getdbit (DBM * db, long dbit)
+{
+    long    c;
+    long    dirb;
+
+    c = dbit / BYTESIZ;
+    dirb = c / DBLKSIZ;
+
+    if (dirb != db->dirbno)
+      {
+	  int got;
+	  if (lseek (db->dirf, OFF_DIR (dirb), SEEK_SET) < 0
+	      || (got = read(db->dirf, db->dirbuf, DBLKSIZ)) < 0)
+	      return 0;
+	  if (got==0)
+              memset(db->dirbuf,0,DBLKSIZ);
+	  db->dirbno = dirb;
+      }
+
+    return db->dirbuf[c % DBLKSIZ] & (1 << dbit % BYTESIZ);
+}
+
+static int setdbit (DBM * db, long dbit)
+{
+    long    c;
+    long    dirb;
+
+    c = dbit / BYTESIZ;
+    dirb = c / DBLKSIZ;
+
+    if (dirb != db->dirbno)
+      {
+	  int got;
+	  if (lseek (db->dirf, OFF_DIR (dirb), SEEK_SET) < 0
+	      || (got = read(db->dirf, db->dirbuf, DBLKSIZ)) < 0)
+	      return 0;
+	  if (got==0)
+              memset(db->dirbuf,0,DBLKSIZ);
+	  db->dirbno = dirb;
+      }
+
+    db->dirbuf[c % DBLKSIZ] |= (1 << dbit % BYTESIZ);
+
+#if 0
+    if (dbit >= db->maxbno)
+	db->maxbno += DBLKSIZ * BYTESIZ;
+#else
+    if (OFF_DIR((dirb+1))*BYTESIZ > db->maxbno)
+        db->maxbno=OFF_DIR((dirb+1))*BYTESIZ;
+#endif
+
+    if (lseek (db->dirf, OFF_DIR (dirb), SEEK_SET) < 0
+	|| write (db->dirf, db->dirbuf, DBLKSIZ) < 0)
+	return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * getnext - get the next key in the page, and if done with
+ * the page, try the next page in sequence
+ */
+static datum getnext (DBM * db)
+{
+    datum   key;
+
+    for (;;)
+      {
+	  db->keyptr++;
+	  key = getnkey (db->pagbuf, db->keyptr);
+	  if (key.dptr != NULL)
+	      return key;
+/*
+ * we either run out, or there is nothing on this page..
+ * try the next one... If we lost our position on the
+ * file, we will have to seek.
+ */
+	  db->keyptr = 0;
+	  if (db->pagbno != db->blkptr++)
+	      if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->blkptr), SEEK_SET) < 0)
+		  break;
+	  db->pagbno = db->blkptr;
+	  if (read (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) <= 0)
+	      break;
+	  if (!chkpage (db->pagbuf))
+	      break;
+      }
+
+    return ioerr (db), nullitem;
+}
+
+/*
+ * all important binary trie traversal
+ */
+static int getpage (DBM * db, long hash)
+{
+    int     hbit;
+    long    dbit;
+    long    pagb;
+
+    dbit = 0;
+    hbit = 0;
+    while (dbit < db->maxbno && getdbit (db, dbit))
+	dbit = 2 * dbit + ((hash & (1 << hbit++)) ? 2 : 1);
+
+    db->curbit = dbit;
+    db->hmask = masks[hbit];
+
+    pagb = hash & db->hmask;
+/*
+ * see if the block we need is already in memory.
+ * note: this lookaside cache has about 10% hit rate.
+ */
+    if (pagb != db->pagbno)
+      {
+/*
+ * note: here, we assume a "hole" is read as 0s.
+ * if not, must zero pagbuf first.
+ */
+	  if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (pagb), SEEK_SET) < 0
+	      || read (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+	      return 0;
+	  if (!chkpage (db->pagbuf))
+	      return 0;
+	  db->pagbno = pagb;
+      }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * makroom - make room by splitting the overfull page
+ * this routine will attempt to make room for SPLTMAX times before
+ * giving up.
+ */
+static int makroom (DBM * db, long hash, int need)
+{
+    long    newp;
+    char    twin[PBLKSIZ];
+    char   *pag = db->pagbuf;
+    char   *new = twin;
+    int     smax = SPLTMAX;
+
+    do
+      {
+/*
+ * split the current page
+ */
+	  (void) splpage (pag, new, db->hmask + 1);
+/*
+ * address of the new page
+ */
+	  newp = (hash & db->hmask) | (db->hmask + 1);
+
+/*
+ * write delay, read avoidence/cache shuffle:
+ * select the page for incoming pair: if key is to go to the new page,
+ * write out the previous one, and copy the new one over, thus making
+ * it the current page. If not, simply write the new page, and we are
+ * still looking at the page of interest. current page is not updated
+ * here, as sdbm_store will do so, after it inserts the incoming pair.
+ */
+	  if (hash & (db->hmask + 1))
+	    {
+		if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
+		    || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+		    return 0;
+		db->pagbno = newp;
+		(void) memcpy (pag, new, PBLKSIZ);
+	    }
+	  else if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (newp), SEEK_SET) < 0
+		   || write (db->pagf, new, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+	      return 0;
+
+	  if (!setdbit (db, db->curbit))
+	      return 0;
+/*
+ * see if we have enough room now
+ */
+	  if (fitpair (pag, need))
+	      return 1;
+/*
+ * try again... update curbit and hmask as getpage would have
+ * done. because of our update of the current page, we do not
+ * need to read in anything. BUT we have to write the current
+ * [deferred] page out, as the window of failure is too great.
+ */
+	  db->curbit = 2 * db->curbit +
+	      ((hash & (db->hmask + 1)) ? 2 : 1);
+	  db->hmask |= db->hmask + 1;
+
+	  if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
+	      || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+	      return 0;
+
+      }
+    while (--smax);
+/*
+ * if we are here, this is real bad news. After SPLTMAX splits,
+ * we still cannot fit the key. say goodnight.
+ */
+#ifdef BADMESS
+    (void) write (2, "sdbm: cannot insert after SPLTMAX attempts.\n", 44);
+#endif
+    return 0;
+
+}
+
+static SDBM *sdbm_prep (char *dirname, char *pagname, int flags, int mode)
+{
+    SDBM   *db;
+    struct stat dstat;
+
+    if ((db = (SDBM *) mymalloc (sizeof (SDBM))) == NULL)
+	return errno = ENOMEM, (SDBM *) NULL;
+
+    db->flags = 0;
+    db->blkptr = 0;
+    db->keyptr = 0;
+/*
+ * adjust user flags so that WRONLY becomes RDWR,
+ * as required by this package. Also set our internal
+ * flag for RDONLY if needed.
+ */
+    if (flags & O_WRONLY)
+	flags = (flags & ~O_WRONLY) | O_RDWR;
+    else if ((flags & 03) == O_RDONLY)
+	db->flags = DBM_RDONLY;
+#if defined(OS2) || defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
+    flags |= O_BINARY;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Make sure to ignore the O_EXCL option, as the file might exist due
+ * to the locking.
+ */
+    flags &= ~O_EXCL;
+
+/*
+ * open the files in sequence, and stat the dirfile.
+ * If we fail anywhere, undo everything, return NULL.
+ */
+
+    if ((db->pagf = open (pagname, flags, mode)) > -1)
+      {
+	  if ((db->dirf = open (dirname, flags, mode)) > -1)
+	    {
+/*
+ * need the dirfile size to establish max bit number.
+ */
+		if (fstat (db->dirf, &dstat) == 0)
+		  {
+		      /*
+                       * success
+                       */
+		      return db;
+		  }
+		msg_info ("closing dirf");
+		(void) close (db->dirf);
+	    }
+	  msg_info ("closing pagf");
+	  (void) close (db->pagf);
+      }
+    myfree ((char *) db);
+    return (SDBM *) NULL;
+}
+
+static DBM *sdbm_internal_open (SDBM * sdbm)
+{
+    DBM    *db;
+    struct stat dstat;
+
+    if ((db = (DBM *) mymalloc (sizeof (DBM))) == NULL)
+	return errno = ENOMEM, (DBM *) NULL;
+
+    db->flags = sdbm->flags;
+    db->hmask = 0;
+    db->blkptr = sdbm->blkptr;
+    db->keyptr = sdbm->keyptr;
+    db->pagf = sdbm->pagf;
+    db->dirf = sdbm->dirf;
+    db->pagbuf = sdbm->pagbuf;
+    db->dirbuf = sdbm->dirbuf;
+
+/*
+ * need the dirfile size to establish max bit number.
+ */
+    if (fstat (db->dirf, &dstat) == 0)
+      {
+/*
+ * zero size: either a fresh database, or one with a single,
+ * unsplit data page: dirpage is all zeros.
+ */
+	  db->dirbno = (!dstat.st_size) ? 0 : -1;
+	  db->pagbno = -1;
+	  db->maxbno = dstat.st_size * BYTESIZ;
+
+	  (void) memset (db->pagbuf, 0, PBLKSIZ);
+	  (void) memset (db->dirbuf, 0, DBLKSIZ);
+	  return db;
+      }
+    myfree ((char *) db);
+    return (DBM *) NULL;
+}
+
+static void sdbm_internal_close (DBM * db)
+{
+    if (db == NULL)
+	errno = EINVAL;
+    else
+      {
+	  myfree ((char *) db);
+      }
+}
+
+datum   sdbm_fetch (SDBM * sdb, datum key)
+{
+    datum   retval;
+    DBM    *db;
+
+    if (sdb == NULL || bad (key))
+	return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+    if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
+	return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+    if (getpage (db, exhash (key)))
+      {
+	  retval = getpair (db->pagbuf, key);
+	  sdbm_internal_close (db);
+	  return retval;
+      }
+
+    sdbm_internal_close (db);
+
+    return ioerr (sdb), nullitem;
+}
+
+int     sdbm_delete (SDBM * sdb, datum key)
+{
+    int     retval;
+    DBM    *db;
+
+    if (sdb == NULL || bad (key))
+	return errno = EINVAL, -1;
+    if (sdbm_rdonly (sdb))
+	return errno = EPERM, -1;
+
+    if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
+	return errno = EINVAL, -1;
+
+    if (getpage (db, exhash (key)))
+      {
+	  if (!delpair (db->pagbuf, key))
+	      retval = -1;
+/*
+ * update the page file
+ */
+	  else if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
+		   || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+	      retval = ioerr (sdb), -1;
+	  else
+	      retval = 0;
+      }
+    else
+	retval = ioerr (sdb), -1;
+
+    sdbm_internal_close (db);
+
+    return retval;
+}
+
+int     sdbm_store (SDBM * sdb, datum key, datum val, int flags)
+{
+    int     need;
+    int     retval;
+    long    hash;
+    DBM    *db;
+
+    if (sdb == NULL || bad (key))
+	return errno = EINVAL, -1;
+    if (sdbm_rdonly (sdb))
+	return errno = EPERM, -1;
+
+    need = key.dsize + val.dsize;
+/*
+ * is the pair too big (or too small) for this database ??
+ */
+    if (need < 0 || need > PAIRMAX)
+	return errno = EINVAL, -1;
+
+    if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
+	return errno = EINVAL, -1;
+
+    if (getpage (db, (hash = exhash (key))))
+      {
+/*
+ * if we need to replace, delete the key/data pair
+ * first. If it is not there, ignore.
+ */
+	  if (flags == DBM_REPLACE)
+	      (void) delpair (db->pagbuf, key);
+#ifdef SEEDUPS
+	  else if (duppair (db->pagbuf, key))
+	    {
+		sdbm_internal_close (db);
+		return 1;
+	    }
+#endif
+/*
+ * if we do not have enough room, we have to split.
+ */
+	  if (!fitpair (db->pagbuf, need))
+	      if (!makroom (db, hash, need))
+		{
+		    sdbm_internal_close (db);
+		    return ioerr (db), -1;
+		}
+/*
+ * we have enough room or split is successful. insert the key,
+ * and update the page file.
+ */
+	  (void) putpair (db->pagbuf, key, val);
+
+	  if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (db->pagbno), SEEK_SET) < 0
+	      || write (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+	    {
+		sdbm_internal_close (db);
+		return ioerr (db), -1;
+	    }
+	  /*
+           * success
+           */
+	  sdbm_internal_close (db);
+	  return 0;
+      }
+
+    sdbm_internal_close (db);
+    return ioerr (sdb), -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * the following two routines will break if
+ * deletions aren't taken into account. (ndbm bug)
+ */
+datum   sdbm_firstkey (SDBM * sdb)
+{
+    datum   retval;
+    DBM    *db;
+
+    if (sdb == NULL)
+	return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+    if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
+	return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+/*
+ * start at page 0
+ */
+    if (lseek (db->pagf, OFF_PAG (0), SEEK_SET) < 0
+	|| read (db->pagf, db->pagbuf, PBLKSIZ) < 0)
+      {
+	  sdbm_internal_close (db);
+	  return ioerr (sdb), nullitem;
+      }
+    db->pagbno = 0;
+    db->blkptr = 0;
+    db->keyptr = 0;
+
+    retval = getnext (db);
+    sdb->blkptr = db->blkptr;
+    sdb->keyptr = db->keyptr;
+    sdbm_internal_close (db);
+    return retval;
+}
+
+datum   sdbm_nextkey (SDBM * sdb)
+{
+    datum   retval;
+    DBM    *db;
+
+    if (sdb == NULL)
+	return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+    if (!(db = sdbm_internal_open (sdb)))
+	return errno = EINVAL, nullitem;
+
+    retval = getnext (db);
+    sdb->blkptr = db->blkptr;
+    sdb->keyptr = db->keyptr;
+    sdbm_internal_close (db);
+    return retval;
+}
+
+void    sdbm_close (SDBM * db)
+{
+    if (db == NULL)
+	errno = EINVAL;
+    else
+      {
+	  (void) close (db->dirf);
+	  (void) close (db->pagf);
+	  myfree ((char *) db);
+      }
+}
+
+SDBM   *sdbm_open (char *file, int flags, int mode)
+{
+    SDBM   *db;
+    char   *dirname;
+    char   *pagname;
+    int     n;
+
+    if (file == NULL || !*file)
+	return errno = EINVAL, (SDBM *) NULL;
+/*
+ * need space for two seperate filenames
+ */
+    n = strlen (file) * 2 + strlen (DIRFEXT) + strlen (PAGFEXT) + 2;
+
+    if ((dirname = (char *) mymalloc ((unsigned) n)) == NULL)
+	return errno = ENOMEM, (SDBM *) NULL;
+/*
+ * build the file names
+ */
+    dirname = strcat (strcpy (dirname, file), DIRFEXT);
+    pagname = strcpy (dirname + strlen (dirname) + 1, file);
+    pagname = strcat (pagname, PAGFEXT);
+
+    db = sdbm_prep (dirname, pagname, flags, mode);
+    myfree ((char *) dirname);
+    return db;
+}
+
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sdbm.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sdbm.h
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sdbm.h	Thu Jan  1 01:00:00 1970
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sdbm.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -0,0 +1,97 @@
+/*++
+/* NAME
+/*      sdbm 3h
+/* SUMMARY
+/*      SDBM Simple DBM: ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+/* SYNOPSIS
+/*      include "sdbm.h"
+/* DESCRIPTION
+/* .nf
+/*--*/
+
+#ifndef UTIL_SDBM_H
+#define UTIL_SDBM_H
+
+/*
+ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+ * based on Per-Ake Larson's Dynamic Hashing algorithms. BIT 18 (1978).
+ * author: [e-mail]
+ * status: public domain.
+ */
+
+#define DUFF    /* go ahead and use the loop-unrolled version */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#define DBLKSIZ 16384                   /* SSL cert chains require more */
+#define PBLKSIZ 8192                    /* SSL cert chains require more */
+#define PAIRMAX 8008                    /* arbitrary on PBLKSIZ-N */
+#define SPLTMAX 10                      /* maximum allowed splits */
+                                        /* for a single insertion */
+#define DIRFEXT ".dir"
+#define PAGFEXT ".pag"
+
+typedef struct {
+        int dirf;                      /* directory file descriptor */
+        int pagf;                      /* page file descriptor */
+        int flags;                     /* status/error flags, see below */
+        long blkptr;                   /* current block for nextkey */
+        int keyptr;                    /* current key for nextkey */
+        char pagbuf[PBLKSIZ];          /* page file block buffer */
+        char dirbuf[DBLKSIZ];          /* directory file block buffer */
+} SDBM;
+
+#define DBM_RDONLY      0x1            /* data base open read-only */
+#define DBM_IOERR       0x2            /* data base I/O error */
+
+/*
+ * utility macros
+ */
+#define sdbm_rdonly(db)         ((db)->flags & DBM_RDONLY)
+#define sdbm_error(db)          ((db)->flags & DBM_IOERR)
+
+#define sdbm_clearerr(db)       ((db)->flags &= ~DBM_IOERR)  /* ouch */
+
+#define sdbm_dirfno(db) ((db)->dirf)
+#define sdbm_pagfno(db) ((db)->pagf)
+
+typedef struct {
+        char *dptr;
+        int dsize;
+} datum;
+
+extern datum nullitem;
+
+/*
+ * flags to sdbm_store
+ */
+#define DBM_INSERT      0
+#define DBM_REPLACE     1
+
+/*
+ * ndbm interface
+ */
+extern SDBM *sdbm_open(char *, int, int);
+extern void sdbm_close(SDBM *);
+extern datum sdbm_fetch(SDBM *, datum);
+extern int sdbm_delete(SDBM *, datum);
+extern int sdbm_store(SDBM *, datum, datum, int);
+extern datum sdbm_firstkey(SDBM *);
+extern datum sdbm_nextkey(SDBM *);
+
+/*
+ * sdbm - ndbm work-alike hashed database library
+ * tuning and portability constructs [not nearly enough]
+ * author: [e-mail]
+ */
+
+#define BYTESIZ         8
+
+/*
+ * important tuning parms (hah)
+ */
+
+#define SEEDUPS                 /* always detect duplicates */
+#define BADMESS                 /* generate a message for worst case:
+                                   cannot make room after SPLTMAX splits */
+#endif /* UTIL_SDBM_H */
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sys_defs.h postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sys_defs.h
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/sys_defs.h	Mon Apr 15 23:56:08 2002
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/sys_defs.h	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@
 #define DEF_MAILBOX_LOCK "flock, dotlock"
 #endif
 
+#if ((defined(__NetBSD_Version__) && __NetBSD_Version__ >= 105000000) || defined(USAGI_LIBINET6))
+#define HAVE_GETIFADDRS
+#endif
+
  /*
   * UNIX on MAC.
   */
diff -Pur postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/valid_hostname.c postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/valid_hostname.c
--- postfix-1.1.11-20020613-orig/src/util/valid_hostname.c	Sun Jan 28 15:10:18 2001
+++ postfix-1.1.11-20020613/src/util/valid_hostname.c	Wed Jun 26 15:26:49 2002
@@ -47,6 +47,13 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
 
+#ifdef INET6
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#endif
+
 /* Utility library. */
 
 #include "msg.h"
@@ -103,7 +110,23 @@
 		    msg_warn("%s: misplaced hyphen: %.100s", myname, name);
 		return (0);
 	    }
-	} else {
+	}
+#ifdef INET6
+	else if (ch == ':') {
+	    struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+
+	    memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	    hints.ai_family = AF_INET6;
+	    hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;	/*dummy*/
+	    hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	    if (getaddrinfo(name, "0", &hints, &res) == 0) {
+		freeaddrinfo(res);
+		return 1;
+	    } else
+		return 0;
+	}
+#endif
+	else {
 	    if (gripe)
 		msg_warn("%s: invalid character %d(decimal): %.100s",
 			 myname, ch, name);
@@ -135,6 +158,9 @@
     int     byte_count = 0;
     int     byte_val = 0;
     int     ch;
+#ifdef INET6
+    struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+#endif
 
 #define BYTES_NEEDED	4
 
@@ -146,6 +172,17 @@
 	    msg_warn("%s: empty address", myname);
 	return (0);
     }
+
+#ifdef INET6
+    memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+    hints.ai_family = AF_INET6;
+    hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;	/*dummy*/
+    hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+    if (getaddrinfo(addr, "0", &hints, &res) == 0) {
+	freeaddrinfo(res);
+	return 1;
+    }
+#endif
 
     /*
      * Scary code to avoid sscanf() overflow nasties.