--- pym/output.py	(revision 6794)
+++ pym/output.py	(revision 6795)
@@ -127,6 +127,7 @@ 
 # Portage functions
 codes["INFORM"] = codes["darkgreen"]
 codes["UNMERGE_WARN"] = codes["red"]
+codes["SECURITY_WARN"] = codes["red"]
 codes["MERGE_LIST_PROGRESS"] = codes["yellow"]
 
 def parse_color_map():
--- pym/portage.py	(revision 6794)
+++ pym/portage.py	(revision 6795)
@@ -7023,6 +7023,17 @@ 
 		before and after this method.
 		"""
 
+		# When new_contents is supplied, the security check has already been
+		# done for this slot, so it shouldn't be repeated until the next
+		# replacement or unmerge operation.
+		if new_contents is None:
+			slot = self.vartree.dbapi.aux_get(self.mycpv, ["SLOT"])[0]
+			slot_matches = self.vartree.dbapi.match(
+				"%s:%s" % (dep_getkey(self.mycpv), slot))
+			retval = self._security_check(slot_matches)
+			if retval:
+				return retval
+
 		contents = self.getcontents()
 		# Now, don't assume that the name of the ebuild is the same as the
 		# name of the dir; the package may have been moved.
@@ -7236,12 +7247,9 @@ 
 						writemsg_stdout("--- !md5   %s %s\n" % ("obj", obj))
 						continue
 					try:
-						if statobj.st_mode & (stat.S_ISUID | stat.S_ISGID):
-							# Always blind chmod 0 before unlinking to avoid race conditions.
-							os.chmod(obj, 0000)
-							if statobj.st_nlink > 1:
-								writemsg("setXid: "+str(statobj.st_nlink-1)+ \
-									" hardlinks to '%s'\n" % obj)
+						# Remove permissions to ensure that any hardlinks to
+						# suid/sgid files are rendered harmless.
+						os.chmod(obj, 0)
 						os.unlink(obj)
 					except (OSError,IOError),e:
 						pass
@@ -7305,6 +7313,48 @@ 
 
 		return False
 
+	def _security_check(self, slot_matches):
+		if not slot_matches:
+			return 0
+		file_paths = set()
+		for cpv in slot_matches:
+			file_paths.update(dblink(self.cat, catsplit(cpv)[1],
+				self.vartree.root, self.settings,
+				vartree=self.vartree).getcontents())
+		inode_map = {}
+		for path in file_paths:
+			try:
+				s = os.lstat(path)
+			except OSError, e:
+				if e.errno != errno.ENOENT:
+					raise
+				del e
+				continue
+			if stat.S_ISREG(s.st_mode) and \
+				s.st_nlink > 1 and \
+				s.st_mode & (stat.S_ISUID | stat.S_ISGID):
+				k = (s.st_dev, s.st_ino)
+				inode_map.setdefault(k, []).append((path, s))
+		suspicious_hardlinks = []
+		for path_list in inode_map.itervalues():
+			path, s = path_list[0]
+			if len(path_list) == s.st_nlink:
+				# All hardlinks seem to be owned by this package.
+				continue
+			suspicious_hardlinks.append(path_list)
+		if not suspicious_hardlinks:
+			return 0
+		from output import colorize
+		prefix = colorize("SECURITY_WARN", "*") + " WARNING: "
+		writemsg(prefix + "suid/sgid file(s) " + \
+			"with suspicious hardlink(s):\n", noiselevel=-1)
+		for path_list in suspicious_hardlinks:
+			for path, s in path_list:
+				writemsg(prefix + "  '%s'\n" % path, noiselevel=-1)
+		writemsg(prefix + "See the Gentoo Security Handbook " + \
+			"guide for advice on how to proceed.\n", noiselevel=-1)
+		return 1
+
 	def treewalk(self, srcroot, destroot, inforoot, myebuild, cleanup=0,
 		mydbapi=None, prev_mtimes=None):
 		"""
@@ -7352,6 +7402,10 @@ 
 
 		slot_matches = self.vartree.dbapi.match(
 			"%s:%s" % (self.mysplit[0], self.settings["SLOT"]))
+		retval = self._security_check(slot_matches)
+		if retval:
+			return retval
+
 		if slot_matches:
 			# Used by self.isprotected().
 			max_cpv = None