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Bug#: 74480
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Status: RESOLVED
Resolution: FIXED
Assigned To: Gentoo Security <security@gentoo.org>
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Reporter: Sascha Silbe <sascha-gentoo-bugzilla@silbe.org>
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Filename Description Type Creator Created Size Actions
bug74480-81.rtf 81.rtf from advisory application/rtf Sascha Silbe 2004-12-15 05:26 0000 298 bytes Details
unrtf-final.patch unrtf-final.patch patch Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) 2004-12-30 07:03 0000 906 bytes Details | Diff
unrtf-final.patch unrtf-final.patch patch Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) 2004-12-30 07:08 0000 400 bytes Details | Diff
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Bug 74480 depends on: Show dependency tree
Bug 74480 blocks:

Additional Comments: (this is where you put emerge --info)


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Description:   Opened: 2004-12-15 05:25 0000
Advisory from securesoftware@list.cr.yp.to:

Date: 15 Dec 2004 08:37:03 -0000
From: "D. J. Bernstein" <djb@cr.yp.to>
Subject: [remote] [control] unrtf 0.19.3 process_font_table overflows name buffer
To: securesoftware@list.cr.yp.to, bug-unrtf@gnu.org,
        obraun@informatik.unibw-muenchen.de, tuorfa@yahoo.com
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Mailing-List: contact securesoftware-help@list.cr.yp.to; run by ezmlm
Mail-Followup-To: securesoftware@list.cr.yp.to, bug-unrtf@gnu.org,
        obraun@informatik.unibw-muenchen.de, tuorfa@yahoo.com
Automatic-Legal-Notices: See http://cr.yp.to/mailcopyright.html.

[-- Attachment #1 [details] --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Encoding: 7bit, Size: 1.5K --]

Yosef Klein and Limin Wang, two students in my Fall 2004 UNIX Security
Holes course, have discovered a remotely exploitable security hole in
unrtf. I'm publishing this notice, but all the discovery credits should
be assigned to Klein and Wang.

You are at risk if you take an RTF document from an email message (or a
web page or any other source that could be controlled by an attacker)
and feed it through unrtf. (The unrtf documentation does not tell users
to avoid taking input from the network.) Whoever provides that document
then has complete control over your account: he or she can read and
modify your files, watch the programs you're running, etc.

Proof of concept: On an x86 computer running FreeBSD 4.10, type

   wget http://www.gnu.org/software/unrtf/unrtf-0.19.3.tar.gz
   gunzip < unrtf-0.19.3.tar.gz | tar -xf -
   cd unrtf-0.19.3
   make

to download and compile the unrtf program, version 0.19.3 (current).
Then save the file 81.rtf attached to this message, and type

   ./unrtf 81.rtf

with the unauthorized result that a file named EXPLOITED is created in
the current directory. (I tested this with a 548-byte environment, as
reported by printenv | wc -c; beware that 81.rtf is particularly
sensitive to the environment size.)

Here's the bug: In convert.c, process_font_table() uses an unprotected
strcat() to copy any number of bytes into a 255-byte name array.

---D. J. Bernstein, Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics,
Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago

------- Comment #1 From Sascha Silbe 2004-12-15 05:26:35 0000 -------
Created an attachment (id=46032) [details]
81.rtf from advisory

------- Comment #2 From Matthias Geerdsen 2004-12-15 05:54:49 0000 -------
robbat2/aliz: you have committed ebuilds for this before... pls verify and
advise

------- Comment #3 From Robin Johnson 2004-12-15 06:13:37 0000 -------
Strange the DJB didn't attach a fix as well.

Funnily enough that corrupt file is caught by Windows, but it does affect unrtf on linux.

------- Comment #4 From Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) 2004-12-21 07:03:21 0000 -------
======================================================
Candidate: CAN-2004-1297
URL: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1297
Reference: MISC:http://tigger.uic.edu/~jlongs2/holes/unrtf.txt

Buffer overflow in the process_font_table function in convert.c for
unrtf 0.19.3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a
crafted RTF file.
======================================================

------- Comment #5 From Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) 2004-12-30 07:03:09 0000 -------
Created an attachment (id=47210) [details]
unrtf-final.patch

Patch from http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=287038

------- Comment #6 From Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) 2004-12-30 07:08:48 0000 -------
Created an attachment (id=47211) [details]
unrtf-final.patch

Clean unrtf-final.patch

------- Comment #7 From Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) 2004-12-30 07:09:35 0000 -------
No metadata...
aliz/robbat2: please bump with patch.

------- Comment #8 From Robin Johnson 2005-01-07 03:34:21 0000 -------
-r1 in CVS now, ready for amd64 ppc s390 to stabilze.
It's marked stable for x86 already.

------- Comment #9 From Thierry Carrez (RETIRED) 2005-01-07 04:50:13 0000 -------
ppc, s390: please test 0.19.3-r1 and mark stable

------- Comment #10 From Lars Weiler (RETIRED) 2005-01-08 11:47:43 0000 -------
stable on ppc.

------- Comment #11 From Dan Margolis (RETIRED) 2005-01-10 11:47:19 0000 -------
glsa 200501-15

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