Bug 77888 - app-text/xpdf: the saga continues
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Bug#:
77888
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Product: Gentoo Security
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Version: unspecified
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Platform: All
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OS/Version: All
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Status: RESOLVED
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Severity: major
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Priority: P2
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Resolution: FIXED
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Assigned To: security@gentoo.org
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Reported By: jaervosz@gentoo.org
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Component: Vulnerabilities
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URL:
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Summary: app-text/xpdf: the saga continues
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Keywords:
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Status Whiteboard: A2 [glsa] koon
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Opened: 2005-01-13 13:11 0000
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Multiple Unix/Linux Vendor Xpdf makeFileKey2 Stack Overflow
iDEFENSE Security Advisory 01.18.05
http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?type=vulnerabilities
January 18, 2005
I. BACKGROUND
Xpdf is an open-source viewer for PDF files. More information is
available at the following site:
http://www.foolabs.com/xpdf/
II. DESCRIPTION
Remote exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability in the xpdf PDF
viewer included in multiple Unix and Linux distributions could allow for
arbitrary code execution as the user viewing a PDF file.
The vulnerability specifically exists due to insufficient bounds
checking while processing a PDF file that provides malicious values in
the /Encrypt /Length tag. The offending code can be found in the
Decrypt::makeFileKey2 function in the source file xpdf/Decrypt.cc.
GBool Decrypt::makeFileKey2(int encVersion, int encRevision, int keyLength,
GString *ownerKey, GString *userKey,
int permissions, GString *fileID,
GString *userPassword, Guchar *fileKey) {
Guchar *buf;
Guchar test[32];
Guchar fState[256];
Guchar tmpKey[16];
Guchar fx, fy;
int len, i, j;
GBool ok;
...
memcpy(test, userKey->getCString(), 32);
for (i = 19; i >= 0; --i) {
for (j = 0; j < keyLength; ++j) {
[overflow] tmpKey[j] = fileKey[j] ^ i;
}
...
}
...
}
In this piece of code, the keyLength value is ultimately supplied by the
PDF file. This allows an attacker to specify an arbitrarily large value
and overwrite portions of stack memory. As a consequence, arbitrary code
execution is possible.
III. ANALYSIS
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability leads to arbitrary code
execution as the user who opened the malicious file. An attacker would
have to convince a target to open the provided file in order to exploit
this vulnerability, thus lessening the impact.
Exploitation can be performed reliably, especially with knowledge of the
target system.
IV. DETECTION
iDEFENSE has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in version
3.00 of xpdf. It is suspected previous versions are vulnerable.
The following Linux vendors may be affected by this vulnerability:
Novell Inc. (SUSE)
Red Hat Inc.
The Fedora Project
Debian Project
Gentoo Foundation Inc.
The FreeBSD Project
OpenBSD
V. WORKAROUND
Only open PDF files from trusted individuals.
VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
A patch to address this issue is available at:
ftp://ftp.foolabs.com/pub/xpdf/xpdf-3.00pl3.patch
Updated binaries (ver. 3.00pl3) to address this issue are available at:
http://www.foolabs.com/xpdf/download.html
VII. CVE INFORMATION
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
names CAN-2005-0064 to these issues. This is a candidate for inclusion
in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for
security problems.
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
01/06/2004 Initial vendor notification
01/12/2004 Initial vendor response
01/18/2004 Coordinated public disclosure
IX. CREDIT
The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.
Get paid for vulnerability research
http://www.idefense.com/poi/teams/vcp.jsp
X. LEGAL NOTICES
Copyright
Multiple Unix/Linux Vendor Xpdf makeFileKey2 Stack Overflow
iDEFENSE Security Advisory 01.18.05
http://www.idefense.com/application/poi/display?type=vulnerabilities
January 18, 2005
I. BACKGROUND
Xpdf is an open-source viewer for PDF files. More information is
available at the following site:
http://www.foolabs.com/xpdf/
II. DESCRIPTION
Remote exploitation of a buffer overflow vulnerability in the xpdf PDF
viewer included in multiple Unix and Linux distributions could allow for
arbitrary code execution as the user viewing a PDF file.
The vulnerability specifically exists due to insufficient bounds
checking while processing a PDF file that provides malicious values in
the /Encrypt /Length tag. The offending code can be found in the
Decrypt::makeFileKey2 function in the source file xpdf/Decrypt.cc.
GBool Decrypt::makeFileKey2(int encVersion, int encRevision, int keyLength,
GString *ownerKey, GString *userKey,
int permissions, GString *fileID,
GString *userPassword, Guchar *fileKey) {
Guchar *buf;
Guchar test[32];
Guchar fState[256];
Guchar tmpKey[16];
Guchar fx, fy;
int len, i, j;
GBool ok;
...
memcpy(test, userKey->getCString(), 32);
for (i = 19; i >= 0; --i) {
for (j = 0; j < keyLength; ++j) {
[overflow] tmpKey[j] = fileKey[j] ^ i;
}
...
}
...
}
In this piece of code, the keyLength value is ultimately supplied by the
PDF file. This allows an attacker to specify an arbitrarily large value
and overwrite portions of stack memory. As a consequence, arbitrary code
execution is possible.
III. ANALYSIS
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability leads to arbitrary code
execution as the user who opened the malicious file. An attacker would
have to convince a target to open the provided file in order to exploit
this vulnerability, thus lessening the impact.
Exploitation can be performed reliably, especially with knowledge of the
target system.
IV. DETECTION
iDEFENSE has confirmed the existence of this vulnerability in version
3.00 of xpdf. It is suspected previous versions are vulnerable.
The following Linux vendors may be affected by this vulnerability:
Novell Inc. (SUSE)
Red Hat Inc.
The Fedora Project
Debian Project
Gentoo Foundation Inc.
The FreeBSD Project
OpenBSD
V. WORKAROUND
Only open PDF files from trusted individuals.
VI. VENDOR RESPONSE
A patch to address this issue is available at:
ftp://ftp.foolabs.com/pub/xpdf/xpdf-3.00pl3.patch
Updated binaries (ver. 3.00pl3) to address this issue are available at:
http://www.foolabs.com/xpdf/download.html
VII. CVE INFORMATION
The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned the
names CAN-2005-0064 to these issues. This is a candidate for inclusion
in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes names for
security problems.
VIII. DISCLOSURE TIMELINE
01/06/2004 Initial vendor notification
01/12/2004 Initial vendor response
01/18/2004 Coordinated public disclosure
IX. CREDIT
The discoverer of this vulnerability wishes to remain anonymous.
Get paid for vulnerability research
http://www.idefense.com/poi/teams/vcp.jsp
X. LEGAL NOTICES
Copyright © 2004 iDEFENSE, Inc.
Permission is granted for the redistribution of this alert
electronically. It may not be edited in any way without the express
written consent of iDEFENSE. If you wish to reprint the whole or any
part of this alert in any other medium other than electronically, please
email customerservice@idefense.com for permission.
Disclaimer: The information in the advisory is believed to be accurate
at the time of publishing based on currently available information. Use
of the information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition.
There are no warranties with regard to this information. Neither the
author nor the publisher accepts any liability for any direct, indirect,
or consequential loss or damage arising from use of, or reliance on,
this information.
declassifying signoff=jaervosz/koon
Waiting for more definitive patch
Heinrich Wendel (lanius) is the man for this one. adding him to the CC:
Heinrich: An official patch will be available on the 18th (see url above), but
if we can prepare and arch-test another one in the meantime, all the better.
We can't commit this to portage until it's public, so please attach the ebuild
to the bug so that we let arches test from here.
Successfully tested on amd64.
Installs on sparc and seems to work fine for me.
This is going public sometime today, ppc testing is still needed.
OK apparently this patch is not sufficient. We'll just wait for the upstream
official patch... sorry for wasting your time, folks.
commited with "alpha amd64 ~hppa ~ia64 ~ppc ppc64 sparc x86"
ok, removed the commit again
Heinrich: keep the engine running, you will have a lot to commit tonight !
Do kdegraphics/koffice get their own bugs or did you forget us!? ;)
Heinrich: Please bump in Portage using the official patch
Arches please test & mark 3.00-r8 stable
Target KEYWORDS="alpha amd64 hppa ia64 ppc ppc64 sparc x86"
Stable for sparc. Installs and tests as good.
corsair: ppc64 stable marking doesn't show in KEYWORDS
sorry, now it is definetly marked stable on ppc64
GLSA 200501-28
hppa, ia64 please mark stable to benefit from GLSA