Bug 175022 - net-mail/fetchmail APOP design error (CVE-2007-1558)
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Bug#:
175022
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Product: Gentoo Security
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Version: unspecified
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Platform: All
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OS/Version: Linux
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Status: RESOLVED
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Severity: normal
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Priority: P2
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Resolution: FIXED
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Assigned To: security@gentoo.org
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Reported By: jaervosz@gentoo.org
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Component: Vulnerabilities
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URL:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-1558
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Summary: net-mail/fetchmail APOP design error (CVE-2007-1558)
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Keywords:
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Status Whiteboard: B? [noglsa] jaervosz
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Opened: 2007-04-18 05:24 0000
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The APOP protocol allows remote attackers to guess the first 3 characters of a
password via man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks that use crafted message IDs and
MD5 collisions.
From fetchmail-6.3.8's changelog:
fetchmail 6.3.8 (released 2007-04-06):
# SECURITY STRENGTHENING:
* Make the APOP challenge parser more distrustful and have it reject challenges
that do not conform to RFC-822 msg-id format, in the hope to make mounting
man-in-the-middle attacks (MITM) against APOP a bit more difficult.
(CVE-2007-1558, reported by Gaëtan Leurent, published 2007-04-02 on Bugtraq)
APOP is claimed insecure by Gaëtan Leurent for MITM scenarios for typical
setups: based on MD5 collisions, it is purportedly possible to recover the
first three characters of the shared secret (password), which would then make
recovery of the shared secret a matter of hours or minutes; this would then
enable the attacker to impersonate the client vis-à-vis the server.
For further details, check
* Gaëtan Leurent, "Message Freedom in MD4 and MD5 Collisions: Application
to APOP", Fast Software Encryption 2007, Luxembourg. (Proceedings to appear
in
Springer's Lecture Notes on Computer Science.)
* The mailing list discussion thread at
<http://lists.berlios.de/pipermail/fetchmail-devel/2007-March/000887.html>
Um, I forgot to mention that 6.3.8 has been in the tree for quite some time
now...
Thx Ticho.
Arches please test and mark stable. Target keywords are:
fetchmail-6.3.8.ebuild:KEYWORDS="alpha amd64 arm hppa ia64 mips ppc ppc64 s390
sh sparc x86 ~x86-fbsd"
ppc stable, ready for GLSA voting
voting NO. 3 chars != full password, if someone uses a 3 chars password he has
more serious problems to worry about :)
Voting NO and closing. Feel free to reopen if you disagree.