[patch] Updated libressl patch

Crypt-OpenSSL-RSA-0.280.0-openssl-1.1.0.patch (text/plain), 6.85 KB, created by Reuben Farrelly on 2018-03-24 08:21:01 UTC

From fdbda9585f5c99670912e5c0517dbc7a9d92c74b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[e-mail]>
Date: Sat, 1 Oct 2016 19:52:44 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] libcrypt-openssl-rsa-perl: get it compiled with openssl 1.1.0

Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <[e-mail]>

Bug: https://rt.cpan.org/Public/Bug/Display.html?id=117481
Bug-Debian: https://bugs.debian.org/828387

---
 RSA.xs | 173 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 150 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)

diff --git a/RSA.xs b/RSA.xs
index de512e7822d0..b384cb0e23a2 100644
--- a/RSA.xs
+++ b/RSA.xs
@@ -47,9 +47,119 @@ void croakSsl(char* p_file, int p_line)
 
 #define THROW(p_result) if (!(p_result)) { error = 1; goto err; }
 
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L || \
+    (defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070000fL)
+static void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
+                         const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
+{
+    if (n != NULL)
+        *n = r->n;
+    if (e != NULL)
+        *e = r->e;
+    if (d != NULL)
+        *d = r->d;
+}
+
+static int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+    /* If the fields n and e in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL for n and e.  d may be
+     * left NULL (in case only the public key is used).
+     */
+    if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL)
+        || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (n != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->n);
+        r->n = n;
+    }
+    if (e != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->e);
+        r->e = e;
+    }
+    if (d != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->d);
+        r->d = d;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
+{
+    /* If the fields p and q in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL)
+        || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (p != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->p);
+        r->p = p;
+    }
+    if (q != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->q);
+        r->q = q;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
+{
+    if (p != NULL)
+        *p = r->p;
+    if (q != NULL)
+        *q = r->q;
+}
+
+static int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+    /* If the fields dmp1, dmq1 and iqmp in r are NULL, the corresponding input
+     * parameters MUST be non-NULL.
+     */
+    if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL)
+        || (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL)
+        || (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmp1);
+        r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+    }
+    if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->dmq1);
+        r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+    }
+    if (iqmp != NULL) {
+        BN_free(r->iqmp);
+        r->iqmp = iqmp;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+static void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
+                                const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+                                const BIGNUM **iqmp)
+{
+    if (dmp1 != NULL)
+        *dmp1 = r->dmp1;
+    if (dmq1 != NULL)
+        *dmq1 = r->dmq1;
+    if (iqmp != NULL)
+        *iqmp = r->iqmp;
+}
+#endif
+
 char _is_private(rsaData* p_rsa)
 {
-    return(p_rsa->rsa->d != NULL);
+    const BIGNUM *d;
+
+    RSA_get0_key(p_rsa->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
+    return(d != NULL);
 }
 
 SV* make_rsa_obj(SV* p_proto, RSA* p_rsa)
@@ -136,7 +246,7 @@ unsigned char* get_message_digest(SV* text_SV, int hash_method)
     }
 }
 
-SV* bn2sv(BIGNUM* p_bn)
+SV* bn2sv(const BIGNUM* p_bn)
 {
     return p_bn != NULL
         ? sv_2mortal(newSViv((IV) BN_dup(p_bn)))
@@ -297,8 +407,15 @@ generate_key(proto, bitsSV, exponent = 65537)
     unsigned long exponent;
   PREINIT:
     RSA* rsa;
+    BIGNUM *e;
   CODE:
-    CHECK_OPEN_SSL(rsa = RSA_generate_key(SvIV(bitsSV), exponent, NULL, NULL));
+    e = BN_new();
+    CHECK_OPEN_SSL(e);
+    rsa = RSA_new();
+    CHECK_OPEN_SSL(rsa);
+    BN_set_word(e, exponent);
+    CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, SvIV(bitsSV), e, NULL));
+    BN_free(e);
     RETVAL = make_rsa_obj(proto, rsa);
   OUTPUT:
     RETVAL
@@ -325,10 +442,11 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
         croak("At least a modulous and public key must be provided");
     }
     CHECK_OPEN_SSL(rsa = RSA_new());
-    rsa->n = n;
-    rsa->e = e;
+    CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_set0_key(rsa, n, e, NULL));
     if (p || q)
     {
+        BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
+
         error = 0;
         THROW(ctx = BN_CTX_new());
         if (!p)
@@ -341,8 +459,7 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
             q = BN_new();
             THROW(BN_div(q, NULL, n, p, ctx));
         }
-        rsa->p = p;
-        rsa->q = q;
+        CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_set0_factors(rsa, p, q));
         THROW(p_minus_1 = BN_new());
         THROW(BN_sub(p_minus_1, p, BN_value_one()));
         THROW(q_minus_1 = BN_new());
@@ -353,13 +470,17 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
             THROW(BN_mul(d, p_minus_1, q_minus_1, ctx));
             THROW(BN_mod_inverse(d, e, d, ctx));
         }
-        rsa->d = d;
-        THROW(rsa->dmp1 = BN_new());
-        THROW(BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, p_minus_1, ctx));
-        THROW(rsa->dmq1 = BN_new());
-        THROW(BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, q_minus_1, ctx));
-        THROW(rsa->iqmp = BN_new());
-        THROW(BN_mod_inverse(rsa->iqmp, q, p, ctx));
+        CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_set0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, d));
+
+        THROW(dmp1 = BN_new());
+        THROW(dmq1 = BN_new());
+        THROW(iqmp = BN_new());
+
+        THROW(BN_mod(dmp1, d, p_minus_1, ctx));
+        THROW(BN_mod(dmq1, d, q_minus_1, ctx));
+        THROW(BN_mod_inverse(iqmp, q, p, ctx));
+
+        CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_set0_crt_params(rsa, dmp1, dmq1, iqmp));
         THROW(RSA_check_key(rsa) == 1);
      err:
         if (p_minus_1) BN_clear_free(p_minus_1);
@@ -373,7 +494,7 @@ _new_key_from_parameters(proto, n, e, d, p, q)
     }
     else
     {
-        rsa->d = d;
+        CHECK_OPEN_SSL(RSA_set0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, d));
     }
     RETVAL = make_rsa_obj(proto, rsa);
 }
@@ -386,15 +507,21 @@ _get_key_parameters(p_rsa)
 PPCODE:
 {
     RSA* rsa;
+    const BIGNUM *n, *e, *d, *p, *q;
+    const BIGNUM *dmp1, *dmq1, *iqmp;
+
     rsa = p_rsa->rsa;
-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->n));
-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->e));
-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->d));
-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->p));
-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->q));
-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->dmp1));
-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->dmq1));
-    XPUSHs(bn2sv(rsa->iqmp));
+    RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, &d);
+    RSA_get0_factors(rsa, &p, &q);
+    RSA_get0_crt_params(rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(n));
+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(e));
+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(d));
+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(p));
+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(q));
+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(dmp1));
+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(dmq1));
+    XPUSHs(bn2sv(iqmp));
 }
 
 SV*
-- 
2.1.4