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Bug#: 170303
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Status: RESOLVED
Resolution: FIXED
Assigned To: Gentoo Security <security@gentoo.org>
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Reporter: Paweł Hajdan jr (ph) <phajdan.jr@gmail.com>
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Description:   Opened: 2007-03-10 18:43 0000
"This fixes 2 security vulnerabilities in KTorrent. It would be advisable to
upgrade to this release."

See also http://cia.navi.cx/stats/project/kde/ktorrent:

19:03 Thursday  KDE     
Commit by guisson :: r640661 ktorrent/trunk/extragear/network/ktorrent/ (4
files in 2 dirs):
Fix 2 security vulnerabilities, both were discovered by Bryan Burns of Juniper
Networks

------- Comment #1 From Raphael Marichez 2007-03-12 15:22:23 0000 -------
thanks for your report.

Adding maintainer for when he is back.

------- Comment #2 From Marijn Schouten 2007-03-13 13:32:29 0000 -------
*** Bug 170047 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***

------- Comment #3 From Marijn Schouten 2007-03-13 13:33:52 0000 -------

*** This bug has been marked as a duplicate of bug 170727 ***

------- Comment #4 From Ioannis Aslanidis 2007-03-13 13:49:03 0000 -------
I think that this one should be kept open.

------- Comment #5 From Ioannis Aslanidis 2007-03-13 13:50:13 0000 -------
I'll try to do it tonight, but no promises... I still have to configure my
wireless network here in Barcelona, Spain.

------- Comment #6 From Jakub Moc (RETIRED) 2007-03-13 14:20:40 0000 -------
*** Bug 170727 has been marked as a duplicate of this bug. ***

------- Comment #7 From Raphael Marichez 2007-03-14 12:53:57 0000 -------
Unlike some other distros, we don't mark all security bugs as critical :)

http://www.gentoo.org/security/en/vulnerability-policy.xml tells that this kind
of vulnerabilities should be rated "minor". A "critical" bug must be solved
within 3 days only! :)

------- Comment #8 From Ioannis Aslanidis 2007-03-14 20:43:39 0000 -------
Ebuild in CVS. Arches please stabilize asap.

------- Comment #9 From Christian Faulhammer 2007-03-14 22:42:26 0000 -------
x86 stable

------- Comment #10 From Markus Rothe 2007-03-15 17:01:56 0000 -------
ppc64 stable

------- Comment #11 From Gustavo Zacarias (RETIRED) 2007-03-16 16:49:27 0000 -------
sparc stable.

------- Comment #12 From Tobias Scherbaum 2007-03-20 20:23:40 0000 -------
ppc stable

------- Comment #13 From Chris Gianelloni (RETIRED) 2007-03-21 18:38:17 0000 -------
amd64 done

------- Comment #14 From Ioannis Aslanidis 2007-03-21 21:43:14 0000 -------
I think all arches have marked it stable. What's the next step?

------- Comment #15 From Sune Kloppenborg Jeppesen 2007-03-22 17:28:57 0000 -------
This one is ready for GLSA vote.

------- Comment #16 From Sune Kloppenborg Jeppesen 2007-03-25 07:11:50 0000 -------
Upstream didn't even bother to mention it in ChangeLogs.

http://websvn.kde.org/?view=rev&revision=640661
http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/usn-436-1

According to the Ubuntu advisory this could lead to the remote execution of
arbitrary code or did they fix another problem?

------- Comment #17 From Matt Drew 2007-03-25 10:54:22 0000 -------
In the patch I see two things - one is protecting a counter in ChunkCounter.cpp
from going beyond another size value. The other actually has a comment that
indicates the change was to protect against directory traversal.  I vote yes
for GLSA based on Kees' advisory. 

------- Comment #18 From Matt Drew 2007-03-26 12:42:34 0000 -------
The directory traversal fix is incomplete. Cases such as '../' being inserted
into a bnode string in the path sequence will pass the filter they put in place
(which only checks if each string node is == "..").  I've verified this against
2.1.2 in the tree.  Deathwing00 can you contact upstream and see if we can get
a better fix?  

There's a pretty large number of cases that need to be checked - my suggestion
would be a "whitelist" of allowed characters in the strings that specify paths.

------- Comment #19 From Sune Kloppenborg Jeppesen 2007-03-26 13:44:14 0000 -------
Thx Matt. Resetting to upstream status until we have a better fix.

------- Comment #20 From Ioannis Aslanidis 2007-03-30 17:27:04 0000 -------
Upstream: http://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=143637

------- Comment #21 From Ioannis Aslanidis 2007-04-02 18:37:50 0000 -------
Version 2.1.3 in CVS.

------- Comment #22 From Sune Kloppenborg Jeppesen 2007-04-02 19:22:50 0000 -------
Arches please test and mark stable. Target keywords are:

ktorrent-2.1.3.ebuild:KEYWORDS="amd64 ppc ppc64 sparc x86 ~x86-fbsd"

------- Comment #23 From Sune Kloppenborg Jeppesen 2007-04-02 19:27:49 0000 -------
CVE-2007-1384
Directory traversal vulnerability in torrent.cpp in KTorrent before 2.1.2
allows remote attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via ".." sequences in a
torrent filename.

CVE-2007-1385
chunkcounter.cpp in KTorrent before 2.1.2 allows remote attackers to cause a
denial of service (crash) and heap corruption via a negative or large idx
value.

------- Comment #24 From Raúl Porcel 2007-04-02 22:25:21 0000 -------
x86 stable

------- Comment #25 From Sune Kloppenborg Jeppesen 2007-04-03 05:25:57 0000 -------
Name: CVE-2007-1799

Directory traversal vulnerability in torrent.cpp in KTorrent before
2.1.3 only checks for the ".." string, which allows remote attackers
to overwrite arbitrary files via modified ".." sequences in a torrent
filename, as demonstrated by "../" sequences, due to an incomplete fix
for CVE-2007-1384.

------- Comment #26 From Gustavo Zacarias (RETIRED) 2007-04-03 21:35:31 0000 -------
sparc stable.

------- Comment #27 From Tobias Scherbaum 2007-04-04 18:29:49 0000 -------
Once again: ppc stable

------- Comment #28 From Markus Rothe 2007-04-04 19:59:57 0000 -------
ppc64 stable

------- Comment #29 From Marcus D. Hanwell 2007-04-09 19:27:26 0000 -------
Stable on amd64.

------- Comment #30 From Sune Kloppenborg Jeppesen 2007-04-18 05:47:15 0000 -------
This one is ready for GLSA decision. I vote NO.

------- Comment #31 From Pierre-Yves Rofes 2007-04-18 07:15:11 0000 -------
voting NO.

------- Comment #32 From Raphael Marichez 2007-04-23 19:49:55 0000 -------
i vote yes because i think it's easy to trick a user into browsing his own
malicious torrent.

------- Comment #33 From Matt Drew 2007-04-24 19:40:37 0000 -------
I also vote yes - too easy to get a malicious torrent where someone could
download it, and it basically gives an attacker write access to any of the
user's files.

------- Comment #34 From Matt Drew 2007-04-24 19:41:35 0000 -------
changing status and submitting GLSA request.

------- Comment #35 From Raphael Marichez 2007-05-02 03:03:27 0000 -------
GLSA 200705-01, thanks everybody

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